Strategic and expressive voting

Taylor, Brad R. (2015) Strategic and expressive voting. Constitutional Political Economy, 26 (2). pp. 159-170. ISSN 1043-4062


Critics of the expressive account of voting have argued that it is inconsistent with strategic voting. Since there is strong evidence that people vote strategically, this has been taken to show that many voters are at least partially instrumentally motivated. This paper argues that strategic voting in the relevant sense is consistent with entirely expressive political motivation. Building on an earlier suggestion by Geoffrey Brennan, I model voters as expressively valuing ideological position as well as the strategic pursuit of expressively-defined preferences. This model predicts strategic voting without instrumental preferences entering the voter’s calculus at all. I also suggest that expressive preferences for strategic behaviour can be usefully analysed in terms of dispositional choice.

Statistics for USQ ePrint 28337
Statistics for this ePrint Item
Item Type: Article (Commonwealth Reporting Category C)
Refereed: Yes
Item Status: Live Archive
Additional Information: Permanent restricted access to published version in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher.
Faculty/School / Institute/Centre: Current - Faculty of Business, Education, Law and Arts - School of Commerce
Date Deposited: 22 Apr 2016 03:07
Last Modified: 28 Jul 2016 04:40
Uncontrolled Keywords: expressive voting; strategic voting; political dispositions; revisionist public choice theory
Fields of Research : 14 Economics > 1402 Applied Economics > 140213 Public Economics-Public Choice
Identification Number or DOI: 10.1007/s10602-014-9180-0

Actions (login required)

View Item Archive Repository Staff Only