War secrets: How an Australian Prime Minister Developed Investigative Journalism Techniques, 1941-1945©

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Abstract:
During escalating Pacific crises, the former journalist and Australian Prime Minister John Curtin confided war secrets to a select circle of reporters to elicit media support for his leadership in World War II. Although his briefings appeared astonishingly indiscreet, there are research gaps on how Curtin selectively developed journalistic techniques, including off-the-record talks and news leaks, to influence the media portrayal of Australia’s role in the Pacific war. This paper uses secret wartime diaries, confidential cables and unscreened newsreels to reveal Curtin’s ability to win press support for his controversial decision to bring home the nation’s troops from Burma battles in 1942. He expanded the political correspondents’ roles as instruments of public diplomacy to sway Allied public opinion towards supporting Australian defence. While he benefited from censorship, he legitimised the use of candid press relations that opened more opportunities for the growth of investigative reporting of Australia’s involvement in war.

Introduction:
As the Australian Prime Minister, John Curtin had been a journalist who used his background in the news to develop astonishingly candid talks with reporters during World War II. Curtin used his unprecedented off-the-record talks to win media support for his controversial decisions to bring back Australian troops from faraway battles for home defence. Previously, the Australian prime minister had cultivated relatively formal and distant media relations. For example, the Melbourne Herald correspondent Joseph Alexander lamented that the past prime ministers’ conferences had been “like angel’s visits, few and far between.”.1 Although Curtin’s briefings appeared astonishingly indiscreet, there are research gaps on how he selectively developed journalistic techniques, including off-the-record talks and news leaks, to influence the media portrayal of Australia’s role in the Pacific war.2
His sharing of war secrets allowed a small circle of senior political journalists to gain deeper insights into the Allies’ disagreements over whether Australia needed stronger defence against enemy attacks. The seemingly candid, egalitarian talks encouraged the journalists to view themselves as a crucial part of his governance. He shared top-secret war cables with this select group of reporters during his twice-daily briefings. In his blue, upholstered prime minister’s office, he appeared to lean back casually on his swivel chair as if he were thinking out loud with the journalists.³ Curtin had been a labour-oriented newspaper editor, and he indicated to the reporters that he trusted them to give their opinions and advice at the conferences. Alexander recalled, “At one stroke, Curtin created a two-way pipeline of information which he regarded as of vital importance in the conduct of the war.”⁴ Whereas Curtin benefited from censorship, he distanced himself from appearing to suppress journalists’ stories by delegating this task to the government bureaucrats.⁵ This paper provides a rare analysis of Curtin’s press, broadcast and film techniques that influenced journalists’ enthusiastic withholding of secrets and legitimised his Pacific war strategies in the news. A study of his techniques indicates the democratic possibilities of using expanded communication spaces for greater critical enquiries into war and governance.

**Literature review:**

There has been a lack of published research on Curtin’s ability to persuade more journalists to back the escalated American troop deployment in Queensland’s capital city, Brisbane, which became US General Douglas MacArthur’s headquarters in the South-West Pacific. Scholars and biographers have commented that Curtin benefited from his media background to establish mainly positive relations with journalists during the war. The son of a struggling police constable in the gold mining town of Creswick, Victoria, Curtin had been a trade union newspaper editor. Later, he became the Australia Journalists’ Association district president in Western Australia.⁶ During his Australian Labor Party (ALP) prime ministership from October 7, 1941 to July 5, 1945, he generally held twice-daily media briefings that included off-the-record talks.⁷ He became Australia’s first prime minister to appoint a full-time press secretary, who aided his communications to journalists.⁸ This paper contributes to the scholarly research on government-media relations by revealing how Curtin used persuasive, performative media tactics to encourage journalists to reproduce his war views to public audiences.
Likewise, there is a gap in the research on how Curtin used radio and filmed broadcasts to appear to have developed relations of direct democracy and trust with news audiences. The medium of political newsreel reports was relatively new in wartime Australia, despite the limited filming decades earlier with a cinema advertisement of Prime Minister Stanley Bruce in the mid-1920s.\(^9\) Whereas authors have focused on television’s “lowering effect”, making a political leader appear to be in an equal relationship with the media audiences,\(^10\) few scholars have examined Curtin’s techniques to appear in an “everyman” framework for the public.\(^11\) Radio was still developing in Australia and previous prime ministers generally did not adapt long, complicated speeches to the broadcast medium for public audiences.\(^12\) Scholarly works have discussed how the national leader’s radio and film messages generated sympathetic public responses, but these have not shown how news teams cooperated with Curtin to mask governmental conflicts behind the scenes.\(^13\) This study helps to fill gaps in the research of Curtin’s use of film symbolism, media events and rhetoric to articulate persuasive power and secure journalists’ endorsement of his war strategies.

**Multimethod approaches**

To gain insights into Curtin’s use of the media during the South-West Pacific conflict, this study is informed by Manuel Castells’ analysis of power and the views of journalism of Richard V. Ericson, Patricia M. Baranek and Janet B.L. Chan.\(^14\) Following Ericson et al’s ideas, this analysis considers that the wartime correspondents mainly operated as government “information brokers” and “knowledge linkers” with the public because they were engaged in “reproducing the knowledge of their sources.”\(^15\) Applying this concept, the paper shows that journalists often cooperated with Curtin to visualise and define threats to Australia, principally in the form of Axis aggression, as a social deviation from moral and ethical principles of fairness, justice and decency. According to Castells, communication and information are fundamental sources of power.\(^16\) In Castells’ view, media politics has led to the “personalization of politics” around leaders, who create symbolic messages of trust about themselves that will obtain citizens’ support. The political messages “must be couched in the specific language of the media” if these are to be communicated successfully to citizens. This study analyses Curtin’s multimedia messages to ascertain how he appeared to be the “symbolic embodiment of trust”, making his governance seem more transparent and
responsive when communicating his resolve to defend Australia and the South-West Pacific.\textsuperscript{17}

Furthermore, this article uses a dramaturgy approach to explore the more stylized aspects of Curtin’s political tactics to create symbolic messages of trust. By communicating about policies in clear, appealing terms through the popular entertainment settings of the era, a leader can secure the spectators’ collective participation in an event and satisfy the public desire for the liberating function of free speaking.\textsuperscript{18} This study of Curtin’s use of newsreels reveals his rehearsed rhetoric, practiced gestures and camera techniques to seemingly reduce the traditional divide between the national leader and public audiences.\textsuperscript{19} From a sample of screened and unissued newsreels, an analysis is made of the camera angles, shots and signs, or meaning, based on Arthur Asa Berger’s semiotic film conventions.\textsuperscript{20} This analysis reveals how he collaborated with news teams to portray the semblance of a close, active relationship between him and public audiences that disguised Allied disagreements revealed in private correspondence.\textsuperscript{21}

Moreover, this paper includes an analysis of relevant rhetoric to find out how Curtin made his Pacific war messages to seem appealing, relatable and open to public audiences. A leader’s use of a formal speaking style indicates a distancing from the working classes and desire to keep them at arm’s length.\textsuperscript{22} Thus an examination is made of the selection of words and reading ease of Curtin’s radio talks to determine his efforts to engage more citizens. To evaluate whether he delivered messages in “the specific language of the media”, this article examines his broadcast scripts’ readability.\textsuperscript{23} An analysis has been made of four of his major war broadcasts.\textsuperscript{24} This study’s readability measurement includes the Flesch-Kincaid score; the recommendation is for a score of eight, close to the reading level of “middle-brow” newspapers and suitable for an eighth-grade reading level.\textsuperscript{25} Public opinion polling had begun in 1941 in Australia and was still developing in the US because this did not include sophisticated methods to measure media audiences. To discover the impact of Curtin’s media messages, this study ascertains whether journalists reproduced his statements favourably in the news.\textsuperscript{26} This analysis is based on the Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism formula that a news article is deemed “positive” if two-thirds of the statements appear to support a leader.\textsuperscript{27} By applying these methods and conceptual approaches, this article will identify how journalists cooperated with Curtin to generate positive news.
coverage about his Pacific war views, as well as media messages that would appear accessible and persuasive to democratic audiences.

**Findings and discussion**

Curtin’s off-the-record talks and information leaks became a vital diplomatic tool in the Allies’ controversy over Burma in 1942. Through top-secret cables, he was defying both the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt by turning back Australian troops from Burma for home defence. During confidential news briefings, journalists agreed with him that Australia needed stronger military defence and they volunteered to self-censor his dispute with Churchill and Roosevelt, who asserted that the nation was not in danger of an enemy invasion. Newsreels revealed gaps and omissions in the early reporting of Curtin’s dispute with the Allies in February 1942. Reporters carefully masked the tensions among the Allied leaders, when the Axis enemies still held the advantage. For example, a British Movietone newsreel reporter neglected to mention Curtin’s disagreements with Churchill when broadcasting the Australian prime minister’s speech. The newsreel reporter also did not mention Curtin’s health concerns when he gave his talk at Sydney’s Martin Place. Instead, the film narrator, Leslie Mitchell, portrayed this to be a spontaneous news report as he seemingly confided to mass audiences: “As we know, he is not in the habit of beating about the bush and his impromptu remarks on this occasion were typically frank.” In fact, Curtin was attempting to hide his stomach problem by confidently hooking his thumb into his waistcoat pocket when he stood on a podium to project the image of a strong leader. Unscreened footage revealed his meticulous rehearsing to deliver forceful language and gestures. Even so, he was taken to a Sydney hospital some 45 minutes after his filmed speech. Journalists played down the news of his health problems as they emphasised his views on the need for an Australian military build-up.

Likewise, the journalists did not mention that on the same day as Curtin’s filmed speech, the Australian troops had faced a disastrous defeat in Java. The Australian divisions had lacked weapons in their ships and the unarmed men quickly surrendered to Japanese forces in Java. Curtin received very few hospital visitors as he remained in the patients’ ward during the bombing of Darwin two days later. He released a brief media statement from his hospital bed.
about the bombing on 19 February 1942. Reporters cooperated to emphasise his language of enemy threats to the nation. The newspaper references to enemy attacks significantly outweighed the defence terms in the press. The event was portrayed as “Australia’s greatest hour” that could be repeated at “many ports in our Northern regions”. Whereas Curtin had mentioned “enemy” only once in his media release, the term appeared 18 times in the related Canberra Times stories. As the journalists contributed to visualising an enemy deviance from Australian democratic ideals, they repeated Curtin’s appeal to “the gallantry that is traditional in the people of our stock” to galvanise public support for fighting in the South-West Pacific battles. About three months later, the press repeated his radio warning that “[t]he invasion is a menace capable hourly of becoming an actuality”. Of the selected radio scripts, this study found that Curtin aimed his Pacific war messages to Australian audiences with a tenth-grade reading level. Whereas his broadcast words were generally at a higher level than the ideal score, his messages were still suited to a lower secondary school standard. The news media gave authority and preference to his version of war events, neglecting the alternate Allied leaders’ views that the Australian mainland was not in immediate danger of an invasion.

A week after the Darwin bombing, the Burma dispute became an opportunity for the news editors and journalists to delve beyond staged scenes and media releases. Joseph Alexander recalled that Curtin showed a great pile of Churchill’s secret cables to the journalists at a private news conference. Curtin also confided that he had defied Churchill’s orders to send some Australian troops to the Burma battles. These troops were from the Sixth and Seventh Divisions that had been fighting in the Middle East. Since the divisions lacked weapons in their ships, the Australian government did not want to repeat the disaster of Java. At his news conference, Curtin selectively represented the other Allied leaders’ private messages to gain the journalists’ support for turning back the troops. His press secretary, Don Rodgers, told the press gallery that Churchill had sent a “black mailing” message that threatened to withhold Allied support for Australia. Curtin also said that Roosevelt’s secret cable was “encouraging”. In fact, the US President had sent a more nuanced message to Curtin by stating, “I cannot wholly agree as to [the] immediate need of first returning [the] division in Australia”. Even so, Roosevelt had concluded in his cable, “[u]nder any circumstances you can depend upon our fullest support.” Later Alexander remarked that:
… although [the journalists] were staggered at the idea of Curtin opposing the will of a man like Churchill at a time like this, we all felt, I think, proud of him, because he was determined to put Australia first.  

As Curtin selectively shared the war cables to create the appearance of seemingly two-way conversations with journalists, he generated news messages of him as a trustworthy leader who was capable of helping to bring about an Australian war victory.

The private conversations also encouraged the journalists to view themselves as Curtin’s confidants. After the cable dispute, he told several journalists of his sleepless nights as he worried over the troops’ safety during the journey home to Australia. For instance, Curtin talked with the Sydney Sun newspaper’s Alan Reid about his nightmares when they were playing cards on a train. Reid recalled that he tried to comfort Curtin, but “periodically you’d see him wipe the sweat from his forehead.” Curtin also met the Sun News-Pictorial correspondent Harold Cox during a late summer evening’s walk in Canberra. Curtin exclaimed, “Harold! What would you do if you knew the troops’ equipment was on another convoy two days behind them?” The next night, Curtin met Harold Cox by coincidence again. The reporter remarked that Curtin looked a lot better now. Curtin replied, “Yes, I feel a lot better, too. They’re coming home”.

The seemingly unguarded exchanges elicited journalists’ sympathy for Curtin and they self-censored the news of the Sixth and Seventh Divisions’ risky voyage back to Australia.

After the divisions’ safe return in early March 1942, Curtin agreed to journalists’ calls to ease the censorship rules to tell a positive story of Australian heroism in war. The press secretary, Don Rodgers, helped to generate credible messages of Curtin’s insistence on bringing back the troops for Australian defence. The favourable news coverage benefited Curtin because the servicemen arrived in his federal electorate of Fremantle, Western Australia a year before the national elections. Rodgers recalled that publicising the story “was a very smart move and I should think it had a big effect on the vote in the 1943 elections”. An Australian Cinesound Review newsreel promoted the troops as a “famous fighting unit” in the Middle East that had experienced “hardships, grim fighting [and] high adventure”. The film also conveyed some muted criticism of the Western Australian government for the
lackluster welcome ceremony during the troops’ arrival. Accompanied by emotional images of the soldiers reuniting with their families, the narrator explained to the cinema audiences:

There’s a great big welcome on the mat for these boys and the army of cobbers that came with them. And if official welcome arrangements were not all that they might have been, it wasn’t the public’s fault. There’s nothing more that John Public and his wife want more than a chance to show appreciation of these diggers, the real thing in fighting men.\(^{54}\)

Outside of Australia, the media event remained contentious because Curtin had resisted the other Allies’ demands to send the troops to Burma, which was defeated on 26 May 1942.\(^{55}\) International film distributors appeared to have filed, but not released, the Australian Cinesound Review special.\(^{56}\) Masking the controversy, Australian news teams did not blame Curtin for the lack of an official reception to greet the returning servicemen.\(^{57}\) As he associated his prime ministership with the emotional stories of the troops’ courageous battles, he appeared a successful war leader.

Unexpectedly, the relaxation of the censorship rules allowed for more news debates on Australia’s wartime role. Curtin appeared to encourage and participate in the media discussions in the lead-up to the 1943 federal election. Australian journalists began reporting on the American press criticisms about the Burma battles. The US General Joseph W. Stilwell had partly blamed Australia for the Burma defeat and his media statements were widely circulated in the news.\(^{58}\) Stilwell had told the *New York Times*:

I claim we got a hell of a beating. We got run out of Burma. I think we ought to find out what caused it, go back and retake it.\(^{59}\)

Moreover, the Australian news owner, Sir Keith Murdoch, argued that the Australian troops might have prevented such a humiliating blow to the Allies’ military pride in Burma.\(^{60}\) News editors also published readers’ letters and editorials that sided with Curtin. During the election campaign, Curtin rebuked “arm chair critics” but still cultivated the appearance of frank and open talks in his news conferences.\(^{61}\) For example, the Australian United Press journalist, F.T. Smith, recalled Curtin’s “amazing outburst” over one of Murdoch’s editorials that portrayed the government as giving only half-hearted support to the Allied forces. Curtin asserted, “The basis of it was all wrong … it is no good for public morale”. Also he confided
to the reporters that he did not trust Murdoch.62 The Herald’s Joseph Alexander recalled his embarrassment about some of Murdoch’s editorials:

“These long, boldly featured articles in ‘The Herald’ made a painful impression on me, because the country was at war and in grave danger, and certainly there was no one else who could conceivably be considered as taking Curtin’s place.”63

Curtin used persuasive rhetoric to influence a media campaign that associated his re-election with the need to protect Australia. Most newspaper editors helped him to win a landslide victory in the 1943 election.64

As the Allies gained the military advantage, Curtin agreed to some journalists’ calls for more information about Australia’s role in the South-West Pacific battles. He began using his news briefings to counteract the global media tendency to overlook Australia’s military contributions to the Pacific fighting in 1944.65 As Curtin attempted to smooth over the tensions with Churchill, he wrote that they should work together to limit the opportunities for some American military generals to claim they won the Pacific war “relatively unaided”.66

When Curtin was absent from the parliament due to his illness, the Federal Opposition and newspaper owners objected to the “inadequacy” of General MacArthur’s US-oriented communiqués in early January 1945.67 MacArthur’s well-resourced publicity headquarters in Brisbane released the daily media statements to emphasise the US troops’ success.68 The general had already complained privately to Curtin that many news editors were neglecting to publicise his communiqués.69 For example, Brisbane’s Courier-Mail editor Theodor Bray recalled “a degree of exaggeration” in the communiqués that the newsroom received each morning.70 Once Curtin had resumed his media briefings on 22 January 1945, he announced a new communication method for the Australian army’s public relations unit to give “supplementary information” about the nation’s troops, in consultation with MacArthur. The press campaign succeeded in helping to establish more background briefings on Australia’s involvement in the war.71

An hour after Bray had received one of MacArthur’s communiqués, an Australian government official visited the editor’s Brisbane office to give a secret briefing. MacArthur still required Bray to publish his media statement verbatim, but the editor would use the
Australian off-the-record talk to decide whether the communiqué deserved a prominent space in the next day's newspaper. Bray explained, “if there was a very high degree of exaggeration, it was treated more quietly.” Journalists cooperated with Curtin by developing eye-witness reporting from battle scenes to magnify the Australian combatants’ roles. Whereas the media colluded with Curtin’s political rhetoric to emphasise the significance of the nation’s war contributions, some historians provided a more nuanced assessment of the “tenuous relevance” of Australia’s involvement in the final South-West Pacific battles. Curtin retained the news correspondents’ support and they overlooked his growing health problems until he died from a heart condition on 5 July 1945, several months before the Pacific war’s end.

**Conclusion**

Recruiting news correspondents as allies in influencing public opinion, Curtin initiated relatively new journalistic techniques to legitimise the prime minister’s use of off-the-record talks and information leaks about war secrets. He used these techniques to win Australian journalists’ support for his leadership and his selective views of the war. Curtin developed media symbolism, rhetoric and relatable stories of enemy attacks, national peril and Australian war heroism. News teams developed the semblance of eye-witness reporting, combining emotive imagery and purportedly objective language to portray his interpretations as authentic versions of the war events. Masking Allied tensions, the correspondents helped to visualise deviance in the form of Axis enemies threatening Australian democracy, particularly during the height of the South-West Pacific conflicts. Unexpectedly, Curtin’s sharing of information led the journalists to push for more press freedom at times when a national crisis seemed to have been averted.

Due to Curtin’s journalism background, he appeared to overturn the censorship restrictions once he had orchestrated the subsequent news coverage of the contentious information to his political advantage. As he controlled the delivery of war news, he was able to manage his talks with journalists to show that he shared their values, concerns and aspirations. Since he indicated his agreement with the journalists about a US bias in the war reporting, he created more background government briefings that encouraged them to replicate his views of
Australia’s role in the battles. This analysis of Curtin’s tactics indicates the value of developing close government-media relations to inform war news reports. His seemingly open talks provided the journalists with more glimpses and limited views of national decision-making and secret foreign policies. As the immediate war crises receded, news editors and correspondents developed a slightly more assertive reporting style as they demanded comprehensive information on Australia’s involvement in the South-West Pacific fighting. Curtin unintentionally created more opportunities for journalists to explore multiple, conflicting interpretations of that war zone, although they mainly represented his statements as authoritative in the news. Moreover, this study of Curtin’s interactions with the reporters indicated a need for more independent, investigative journalism that would delve beyond the views of a popular, democratic leader.

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2 Alexander interview; Clem Lloyd and Richard Hall (eds), Backroom Briefings: John Curtin’s war, National Library of Australia [hereafter NLA], Canberra, 1997; Donald Kilgour Rodgers, interviewed by Mel Pratt, JCPML 00497, 29 April 1971, transcript np.
4 Alexander interview.
5 Australian Department of Defence, “Censorship of Outward Press Copy,” National Archives of Australia [hereafter NAA], SP109/3, 315/16, 1942, p. 29; R.J.F Boyer to Williams, NAA, SP109/3, 315/16, 10 July 1941, p. 100; Harold Cox, interviewed by Mel Pratt, JCPML 01060/1, 6 April 1973, transcript np.

12 National Film and Sound Archive, “Australian Prime Ministers”, Acton, 2008; O. Honeyman, “Mr. Menzies’s broadcast”, The Sydney Morning Herald, letter, 22 May 1940, p. 6; Barbara Thomson, “Mr. Menzies’s broadcast”, Sydney Morning Herald, letter, 20 May 1940, p. 3; “Why Mr. Menzies was not broadcast”, The Argus, 12 July 1939, p. 3.


22 Bourdieu, “The Aristocracy of Culture”.


24 Curtin, “Broadcast by the Prime Minister from London”, Digest of Decisions and Announcements and Important Speeches by the Prime Minister (Right Hon. John Curtin) [hereafter DDA], no. 81, 8 May 1944, pp. 53-56; Curtin, “General Election ALP Policy Statement”, JCPML 00421/2, 26 July 1943, transcript np; Curtin, “National Broadcast by Prime Minister”, DDA, no. 10, 8 December 1941, pp. 19-22; Curtin, “Radio broadcast to the United States”, DDA, no. 22, 14 March 1942, pp. 9-13.


26 The *Age, Canberra Times, Sydney Morning Herald, West Australian*, 9-10 December 1941, 16 March 1942, 27 July 1943, 10 May 1944.


29 Alexander interview; Alexander, “Papers”, 28 December 1941, 20, 24 February 1942; Cox interview; Lloyd and Hall, *Backroom Briefings*.

30 “Mr. Curtin opens war loan”, *Newsreels of Curtin, 1942-1945*, produced by British Movietone News, newsreel, JCPML 00734/1, 17 February 1942.

31 *Parliament in Session; Personalities Living at the Federal Capital.*


33 Australian Department of Defence Co-ordination, “Lieut General Lavarack – Correspondence with Prime Minister Concerning Advice to Government in February 1942 on Division of A.I.F. to Burma,” NAA, A5954, 266/7, 1943.


36 “Australia Can Take It”, *Canberra Times*, 20 February 1942, p. 4; “Into the Front Line”, *West Australian*, 20 February 1942, p. 4.


40 Curtin, “Broadcast by the Prime Minister from London;” Curtin, “General Election ALP Policy Statement;” “National Broadcast by Prime Minister;” Curtin, “Radio broadcast to the United States”.

41 Case to Curtin, 21 February 1942.

42 Alexander interview; Alexander, “Papers,” 24 February 1942; Casey to Curtin, 22 February 1942.

43 Australian Department of Defence Co-ordination, “Lieut General Lavarack – Correspondence with Prime Minister”.

44 Alexander, “Papers,” 24 February 1942; Casey to Curtin, 22 February 1942.

45 Alexander interview.

46 Alexander interview.


48 Rodgers interview.

49 Alan D. Reid, interviewed by Mel Pratt, JCPML 00501, 4 October 1972, 28 February 1973, transcript np.
50 Cox interview.
51 Cox interview; Daily News, Sydney Morning Herald, West Australian, 17-18 February 1942.
52 Geoff Burgoyne to Curtin, 27 March 1942, JCPML, N/C. 009; Curtin to Burgoyne, 20 April 1942, JCPML, N/C. 010.
53 Rodgers interview.
58 Stilwell to Curtin, 27 March 1942; Diggers Return from Overseas, Cinesound Review.
63 Alexander interview.
64 Curtin, “General Election ALP Policy Statement”; Also, Age, Canberra Times, Sydney Morning Herald, West Australian, 27 July 1943.
65 Cox, “Typescript reports”, 3 July 1944, 16-17 February 1945; “Our Role In Pacific Overlooked”, Argus, 5 August 1944, p. 3; Smith, cited in Lloyd and Hall, Backroom briefings, pp. 99-100.
66 Alexander interview.
67 Curtin to Churchill, 12 August 1944, Documents on Australian Foreign Policy, vol. 7.
70 Theodor Charles Bray, interviewed by Mel Pratt, JCPML 00512, 5 March 1971, transcript np.
71 “A.I.F. Activities Endorsed: Mr. Curtin Says Hazards Reduced”, Canberra Times, 23 January 1945, p. 2; Forde, “Allied Offensive–War Communiques”.
72 Bray interview.