Does negotiating with terrorists make them more risk seeking?

Phillips, Peter J. and Pohl, Gabriela (2013) Does negotiating with terrorists make them more risk seeking? Journal of Politics and Law, 6 (4). pp. 108-120. ISSN 1913-9047

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We treat government concessions as additions to an expected payoffs schedule rather than as being synonymous with it. Government concessions that add to terrorists' expected payoffs past some point on a positively sloped risk-reward trade-off schedule will not make all terrorists more risk seeking. Such concessions do not represent certain 'windfall gains' to terrorists of the kind that interact with relative and absolute risk aversion. Although the expected payoffs to higher risk actions may be augmented by the government's concessions, terrorists must still bear risk in order to attain them. Terrorist groups that were unwilling to bear that risk before will not be enticed to bear it after expected payoffs are enhanced. Conversely, negative concessions or penalties will make terrorists more averse to risk because penalties alter the risk-reward trade-off in ways that make lower-risk actions more desirable to risk-averse terrorists. Our paper also explores the risk-reward characteristics of new and innovative terrorist actions relative to the structure of an existing expected payoffs schedule.

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Item Type: Article (Commonwealth Reporting Category C)
Refereed: Yes
Item Status: Live Archive
Additional Information: © Canadian Center of Science and Education. This publication is copyright. It may be reproduced in whole or in part for the purposes of study, research, or review, but is subject to the inclusion of an acknowledgment of the source.
Faculty/School / Institute/Centre: Current - Faculty of Business, Education, Law and Arts - School of Commerce
Date Deposited: 09 Dec 2013 00:27
Last Modified: 04 Feb 2015 05:54
Uncontrolled Keywords: terrorism; government policy; concessions; penalties; risk; innovation; Red Army faction; 2nd of June Movement
Fields of Research : 14 Economics > 1402 Applied Economics > 140213 Public Economics-Public Choice
17 Psychology and Cognitive Sciences > 1701 Psychology > 170107 Industrial and Organisational Psychology
16 Studies in Human Society > 1606 Political Science > 160609 Political Theory and Political Philosophy
Socio-Economic Objective: A Defence > 81 Defence > 8101 Defence > 810107 National Security
A Defence > 81 Defence > 8101 Defence > 810105 Intelligence
Identification Number or DOI: 10.5539/jpl.v6n4p108

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