To illustrate several points made in the “Introduction” as to how the dimensions of traditional and non-traditional security and the factors related to uncertainty, security and sustainability seem to ‘dovetail’ in today’s more globalised world, this essay draws on the authors’ recent research about ‘Australia and “People Beyond the State”: Researching Expatriate Identities, Citizen Security and States’ Jurisdictions—Case Studies of the People’s Republic of China and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region’. In focusing on expatriates (‘expats’), it poses a number of questions about the notions of ‘glocality’ and considers the challenges faced by expats from Australia in the PRC and the HKSAR and, ultimately, by expats in Australia from those jurisdictions (as well Aussie repatriates who have resided in those places). Among these very real challenges, now increasingly recognised by their home/host governments and societies, are such expats’ continuing search for identity, appropriate conditions of citizenship, and senses of broadly based security.

Contoured by CAG, the 21st century has been portrayed an ‘Asia-Pacific Century’ during which a ‘the Rise of China’ will continue to feature prominently. Indeed, as David Scott (2007: 129-130) points out in a detailed survey of recent scholarly works, this century is increasingly being labelled as ‘China’s Century’. In addition to significant trade and other economic interests, as ‘jurisdictions’ the PRC state (and the entity of the HKSAR) will continue to be of special interest to Australia for a variety of reasons, including an increasingly prominent range of broadly based security issues pertaining to the movement of its peoples, such as expats, ‘venturing’ to/from such places. Our research emphasises the growing strategic and human importance of expats of nation-states (such as Australia and the PRC)—a matter that, until the seminal happenings of the past two decades (including the various ‘crises’ of communism and capitalism, terrorism, pandemics, and climate change) has not really been given detailed attention by scholars or governments.

In terms of both its national interest and wider considerations of the mix of national and human (and citizen) security, Australia (for one) will be compelled to develop positive policies and relationships with its expat populations, whether in the PRC, the HKSAR or elsewhere, as well as with such host jurisdictions and societies. The numerous challenges related to the phenomenon of a ‘less bounded and more spatially extended citizenry’ have a relevancy for both managers and societies facing the complex issues associated with achieving a ‘fair, inclusive, viable and sustainable’ citizenship—as in the case of a ‘multicultural Australia’. The formulation of policies and the encouragement of positive social attitudes both must be properly sensitive to the range of extant and potential volatilities and life challenges that await Aussie expats (hereafter AEs), both at home and abroad (see Advancing the National Interest: Australia’s Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper 2003, hereafter DFAT White Paper 2003).

This is congruent with Graham Hugo’s contention that there is a need for a revised concept of what should be considered the ‘national (Australian) population’, AEs included, and that Australian authorities ‘should develop a national diaspora/expatriate policy, recognising that in a globalising world a state’s citizens and its human resources will not all be within its national borders’ (2003a 14). Moreover, he suggests that such
national policy should aim at developing mechanisms for the greater inclusion of the national diaspora into the country’s culture and aim to encourage AE communities to identify with Australia, to be more involved in Australian affairs, to increase their participation in the national economy, and to facilitate and encourage their return migration.

The authors particularly agree with Hugo’s view that such a policy should include ‘the protection of the ‘security and the rights’ of Australians while they are living outside national boundaries.’ Beyond that, questions need to be posed about the extent to which such AEs themselves might be aware of and/or prepared to address the same range of concerns. As “Submission 637” to the important Senate Report (2005), ‘They Still Call Australia Home: Inquiry into Australian Expatriates’, stated:

[There] is a need for on-going research into the needs of the Australian expatriate population since it is a ‘dynamic’ group with often frequent movements between cities and countries. [Some of the many questions that need to be answered] include: Who are our expats? Where are they? What do they do? What level of education do they have? What languages do they speak? Do they have kids? Do they have health insurance? [emphasis added, in italics]

**What is the Meaning of “Expat”?** A simple, popular definition of an expat is ‘a person living overseas.’ Historically, expatriation often implied a diasporic-like exile involving a renunciation or denial of one’s citizenship. Currently, Canberra simply regards its AEs, a label that not all accept (McMillen 2006b), as ‘any Australian citizen or other person with an historic physical link to Australia who is residing overseas’—and the term ‘exile’ is absent (Senate Report 2005: 5). In an interview with a Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) official in Canberra in August 2006, the one author was told that ‘broadly, an expat is anyone who anytime ventures beyond their country(ies) of citizenship either voluntarily or not, and who may retain “ties” to their home country(ies) through various means, however regularly’ (McMillen 2006a). This definition is accepted for our purposes here.

The experience of Aussies venturing abroad has been significantly conditioned in recent years by DFAT “Travellers' Warnings” concerning a variety of potential risks in some destination places (McMillen 2006a). Having said that, recent evidence demonstrates that significant numbers of both Australia-born and overseas-born Australians, as well as longer-term residents, are increasingly expatriating themselves for reasons including better employment, more financially rewarding work, more comfortable lifestyles and familiar cultural settings, study opportunities, extended travel adventures, and family/heritage considerations (see, e.g., Hugo Report 2003: 44). And, they are doing so for lengthy periods of time (namely, twelve months or more). It is recognised that this longer-term expatriation trend is only one dimension of the much larger phenomenon of glocal population mobility involving migrant labourers, students, pilgrims, tourists, refugees, business travellers, and so on that characterises the present era.

First, the Senate Report 2005 (18) noted that, according to DFAT, the AE community ‘includes a highly transient population of young students, volunteers, and working holiday makers as well as senior, successful long term residents and dual nationals, some of whom have a high profile in government, business, the arts, sports, the media, and academia across the globe.’ AEs are largely professional and skilled people working in the global economy. As the Lowy Report [Fullilove and
Flutter] (2004: x) added, ‘the Australian diaspora represents a market, a constituency, a sales force and an ambassadorial corps’. Second, the composition of the AE population is ‘multicultural’, with a sizeable number of both Australia-born and non Australia-born persons—many tracing their heritage to places other than Australia. In the PRC they probably constitute over 60% of AEs (and that proportion is increasing rapidly), while in the HKSAR they compromise nearly 90% of AEs. Third, the duration of time a person has spent overseas is not regarded as relevant, although the words “permanently or long-term” are officially stated (Senate Report 2005). Fourth, as implied above, in most cases AEs venture overseas voluntarily, even if there may be factors that compel them to do so.

In 2002, the officially reported total of Australians traveling, working and living overseas was more than 1 million. However, those classified as “AEs”—citizens or long-term residents venturing overseas for more lengthy stays—totaled 720,000, or about 4% of the country’s population (DFAT White Paper 2003). Some 40,000 persons were then leaving the country each year to live, work or study abroad. However, figures cited in December 2001 stated that the total number of AEs living in other countries on a long-term or permanent basis was 858,886, or 4.3%, of the national population—with an additional 264,995 shorter term ‘visiting Australian citizens overseas’—although both figures probably included some double counting (Hugo 2003b: 75). And, subsequent sources put the number of AEs above 1 million, or nearly 5% of the national population—and this now has become the most widely cited figure, even if it needs to be updated. Whatever the precise numbers are, it is significant that the number of AEs is more than double the United Nations estimate of 2% (or 180 million) of the world’s population that live outside their country of origin). As discussed below, this is a sizeable number, and it continues to increase.

Map 1 (see below) produced by the AE “Southern Cross Group” shows that the global distribution of such Australian venturers in 2002. Some 48.4% were located in European Union states, and nearly half of them (more than 200,000) were residing in the United Kingdom. The second largest number was in Greece (135,000), the third in the United States (106,410), and the fourth in New Zealand (68,000). Estimates of AE numbers in the PRC and the HKSAR will be treated below. While not a focus of this research, it is interesting that some 45,000 AEs were then residing in the more proximate region of Southeast Asia. In any case, to put the estimated global population of AEs in a comparative perspective, in 2002 the total number (and percentage of the national population) of the ‘national diaspora’ of other countries was: the Philippines, 7.6 million (9.4%); the United States, 7 million (2.5%); and New Zealand, 850,000 (21.9%).

Some general population movement trends also show a general increase in Aussie ‘long-term venturer’ numbers, even if such events as the Asian economic crisis of the late 1990s, the various terrorist attacks since 2001/2002, the SARS and H1N1 scares of 2003 and 2009, subsequent periodic fuel price rises, and the more recent global economic crisis and other fears might have temporarily slowed such movements. For example, over the past decade the demand for Australian passports has generally remained high, averaging around 1 million per annum, and even in 2001/02 Australians departing the country for all reasons had reached 3.5 million (DFAT White Paper 2003). On the night of the 2001 Australian Census, 330,200 Aussie residents (1.7% of the national population) were reported to be ‘temporarily overseas’ (again, these figures need to be updated and assessed based on the 2006 Australian Census).
The fact nonetheless remains that the group of Australians who have been ‘missed altogether’ in Census enumerations are those who have moved overseas on a permanent or longer-term basis. The vast majority of this group, moreover, has largely retained Australian citizenship—especially since dual citizenship was introduced in 2001. It is noted, though, that it is difficult for DFAT, or others, to provide accurate estimates of Aussies who claim to be dual nationals of their country of residence as they are rarely identified (or may only sometimes identify themselves) as being ‘Australian’ (Senate Report 2005: 19). This aside, Hugo has noted that ‘in Australia we are probably better off than any other country in the world in looking at our diaspora, partly because we are one of the very few countries having an outgoing passenger card’ (cited in the Senate Report 2005: 22).

On a ‘population flow’ basis, in 2002/03 more than two-third’s of Australians departing the country went to five locations: the United Kingdom (21%), New Zealand (17%), the United States (16%), and the HKSAR and Singapore (6% each). Significantly, in recent years the number of Australians emigrating to Asia, where socio-cultural differences are less for some but more pronounced for others, increased by more than 50% (Hugo 2003b: 11). Interestingly, in 2002/03 the Australian government reported that it had provided various types of consular assistance to nearly 90,000 Australians overseas, including 24,000 who had experienced ‘significant difficulties’. For example, it had evacuated 758 and 1066 Australians and their families from Indonesia and Solomon Islands during crises there in 1998 and 2000. Similar assistance for Aussies overseas has been provided since the 9/11/2001 terrorist attacks, especially after the October 2002 Bali bombings and subsequent incidents in London and Madrid (and in Mumbai, November 2008, and in Jakarta, July 2009) that increasingly have targeted ‘Westerners’/’Others’. The same occurred during recent turmoil in Lebanon. Moreover, almost 75,000 notarial acts were reportedly performed by Australian overseas posts and by DFAT’s domestic state and territorial offices in 2001/02—an 11% increase over the previous year. And, it recently was reported that DFAT ‘handles more than 16,000 cases involving the welfare of Australians [overseas] who have suffered illness, theft, robbery or assault each year’ (The Sunday Mail, 9 December 2007: 81). Finally, in mid-2009 over 20 AEs were being held in PRC custody for a range of
‘crimes’—including the July 2009 detention of Stern Hu and three other PRC nationals by the Ministry of State Security. Hu, the head of Rio Tinto’s iron ore operations in Shanghai and a PRC-born Australian passport holder, was accused of ‘stealing state secrets’ in negotiating Australian business deals with China. As will be discussed later, this episode raises a number of sensitive legal/jurisdictional (and even cultural) questions concerning AEs who live and work abroad.

In December 2001, DFAT estimated that the HKSAR had the fifth largest community of Australian citizens overseas, numbering 46,000 (mostly of Chinese heritage). The DFAT White Paper (2003) suggested that number to be 52,500, although the figure cited by AustCham-Hong Kong in early 2007 was ‘around 50,000’, and in the authors’ initial interviews with Australian Consulate-General staff in the HKSAR in late 2006 the total was put at ‘around 55,000’ (McMillen 2006b). Taking this latter estimate as a basis for comparative purposes, the AE population in the HKSAR is equal to, if not more than, that of the United States!

Officially, the total number of AEs in the PRC (excluding Hong Kong/Macau) in 2001/02 (nearly a decade ago) was said to be 9,180, having more than doubled over the previous five years. As a ‘rough guess’, that total now has likely doubled again, with more than 10,000 located in urban areas of the ‘dynamic’ southeastern coastal region of the Pearl River Delta (and in adjacent provinces or special economic/administrative zones near Hong Kong/Macau) alone. Significant, and increasing, numbers reside in Shanghai and Beijing, and in other PRC metropolitan areas. In late 2006, Australian Consulate-General officials in Guangzhou (and that diplomatic mission is now one of Australia’s largest in the Asian region) told the authors that the AE population there was: ‘largely of Chinese heritage’; ‘fairly diffuse’ in terms of location; and in its ‘first stage of organisation’. They opined that most AEs there ‘really only want to make money by doing business’ (with ‘a few being engaged in what could be considered shady or illegal transnational criminal activities) and that many AEs of Chinese heritage feel that having an Australian citizenship (passport) provided them with a ‘safety net’/*insurance policy’ in terms of PRC policies and laws (McMillen 2006b).

Having cited some estimated AE population figures, which are in need of further updating), it is fair to say that any investigation aimed at establishing more precise information about the size, composition and distribution of AE communities in such localities is quite difficult because there are no accurate or comprehensive listings available. In late 2006, the authors were informed Australian Consulate-General staff in Guangzhou and the HK SAR that only some 15% of Aussies overseas had formally registered with those diplomatic missions (McMillen 2006b). Thus, any ‘guesstimates’ of AE numbers likely are based on a variety of sources and indicators, including information about intended destinations provided by Australian citizens (and, perhaps, permanent or long-term residents) on their departure cards as they left Australia, any accessible PRC/HKSAR immigration data, and figures aggregated from various local overseas Australian organisations (such as AustCham-Hong Kong and AE groupings).

To reiterate a previous point, Hugo (2003b) has said ‘we know little of their [AEs] characteristics because they are, unlike the population resident in Australia, not at present included in the Australian population census.’ Nevertheless, he reported that a 2002 survey had revealed 79.3% of AEs “Still Call Australia
Home”, while 16.7% did not do so, and 4% were undecided. The Senate Report 2005 subsequently went on to state that:

[Int]he same way that most expatriate Australians still embrace Australia as their home, we should embrace our expatriate community as part of the Australian nation, and recognise that our expatriates are an important part of Australian society.

**AEs and Australian Multicultural Contexts—'The Chinese'.** The data cited in the brief discussion below is drawn from various extant sources, including the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), DFAT, the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (DIMA), which since January 2007 has taken on the formal name of the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC), and Australian state governments. Such data contributes to a basic contextual and locational quantitative profile of AEs as a generic population in the targeted localities, and particularly of ‘people of Chinese ancestry having citizenship or significant ties to Australia’ who are the focus of a later phase of the research that will concentrate particularly on the Australian states of New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland (see the earlier writings of McMillen 1998, McMillen & Su 1998 and Su & McMillen 1998).

Accordingly, the following selected 2005/06 data (with emphasis added, in italics) ‘profiles’ Australian domestic multiculturalism, particularly as relevant to the groups under study here (many of whom are of Chinese heritage):

- Queensland gained 29,238 people through net overseas migration (NOM), and another 25,774 people through net interstate migration. The number of settler arrivals was 24,862 (42.5% from New Zealand and 32.6% in the Skills Stream). Queensland received 4,511 Family Stream settler arrivals, with those from the PRC accounting for 6.8% of the total. Queensland received 8,101 Family Stream settler arrivals, with those from the PRC accounting for 3.6% of the total. The state was said to be the second most preferred destination of overseas visitors to Australia after New South Wales.

- In New South Wales the total number of settler arrivals was 44,661, with those from the PRC numbering 5,296 (or 16.4% of the total). Skill Stream arrivals accounted for 41.7% of the total, while Family Stream arrivals (15,220) accounted for 34.1%. Skill Stream arrivals from the PRC comprised 13.9% of the total.

- Victoria gained 38,551 people through NOM, with settler arrivals numbering 32,297 (including 3,142 persons from the PRC). The Skills Stream accounted for 47.0% of the NOM total (or 15,167 persons), while the Family Stream comprised 28.5% (or 9,203 persons). Of the Family Stream arrivals, 11.4% were from the PRC, while such persons comprised 13.2% of the Skills Stream total. In August 2006, persons born overseas made up 26.1% of the Victorian labour force (the Australian average being 25.4%).

- Permanent settler arrivals were 75% of all permanent immigration to Australia in 2005-06. Permanent additions for Australia overall were: Family Stream, 25.9%; Skills Stream, 50.9%; Special Eligibility Stream, 0.2%; Humanitarian Program, 9.4%; and Non-Program Migration (mainly New Zealand citizens), 14.0%. Skill Stream residency grants (on-shore) to students graduating in Australia numbered 17,900 in 2005-06. That policy was approved in 1999, and in 2002-03 there were 8,000 such grants.

- Long-Term Arrivals comprise overseas visitors (including temporary residents and students) who indicate an intention to stay in Australia temporarily for 12 months or more, and Australian residents returning after an absence of 12 months or more overseas. Long-Term Departures comprise Australian residents who intend to stay abroad for 12 months or more, and departing overseas visitors who have stayed 12 months or more in the country.
• Total Net Gain from Permanent and Long-Term Movement data differs from Net Overseas Migration (NOM), as it does not include migration adjustments that provide for changes in travel intention. McDonald, Khoo and Kippen (2003) have challenged the accuracy of NOM estimates made by the Australian Bureau of Statistics, claiming that they constitute a ‘myth’ of rapid increases in numbers. Their detailed analysis cites problems of ‘category jumping’ and confusion about the definition of ‘residency’.

• There were more Australia-Born Skilled emigrants than overseas born emigrants, numbering 17,934 and 14,713 respectively. Of the 1,237 Australia-Born emigrants whose destination was the HKSAR, 84.2% reported themselves to be Skilled.

• A majority of all Overseas-Born emigrant groups returned to their birthplace: the HKSAR = 81.6% and the PRC = 62.6%. The HKSAR was one of the five top destinations for Australian-Born emigrants (5.6%), while the PRC was another highly ranked destination. In some cases, these emigrants may be the Australia-Born children of overseas born parents who return to their parents’ country of birth.

Beyond such ‘statistics’, much more needs to be said about contexts and qualitative features that lie behind them. One must be reminded that there is a notable history of Chinese peoples ‘sojourning’ overseas, including those who ventured to Australia (and elsewhere) during the 19th century gold rush period. Globally, the length of time they ventured from their home places varied greatly. While significant numbers remained overseas permanently, most ventured abroad for considerable periods before returning home. Such sojourners were largely males, and when they did remain overseas frequently they married into the host population, often experiencing an on-going variety of social and cultural difficulties. Kim (1997) has suggested that a longer term consequence of many (especially short-term) sojourners’ contacts with host cultures has been that their experiences continue to be ‘mostly peripheral, and many of their previously held beliefs, taken-for-granted assumptions, and routine behaviours are no longer relevant.’ Initial research here indicates that, generally, such experiences and feelings also must apply to persons of any ethnicity during their initial phase of venturing beyond what they consider their ‘felt home place’.

As the 21st century began, globally there was an estimated population of 57-60 million people of Chinese heritage, called ‘Chinese Overseas’ (huaren) and ‘Overseas Chinese’ (huaqiao). These appellations are used here in reference to the generic and more long-term Chinese diaspora who may still retain some sense of ‘attachment to China’ (or to ‘being Chinese’ in some way), including the specific category of ‘Chinese expats’. They also are considered in light of any inferences to officially established or personally held notions about citizenship. These appellations, however, could possibly (but not necessarily, or adequately) define and/or include people whose heritage might be ‘partially Chinese’—as through intermarriage. Thus, a task set for our research is to better understand such appellations, and their significance.

Of the Chinese residing overseas at the turn of the present century, 90% were located in Southeast Asia (Suryadinata 2004; Wang, et. al. 2002). Until the late 1980s, 85% of those from the PRC came from the southeastern provinces of Guangdong, Fujian, Hainan, Guangxi and, of course, Hong Kong (Naisbitt 1996). In the past two decades, however, increasing numbers have joined the Chinese diaspora from other PRC sites (as well as from Taiwan) as that country has ‘opened-up’ and become more integrated into the global economy. As Naisbitt argued in Megatrends Asia (1996), ‘the Overseas Chinese are not a nation-state, they are a “network of networks”, with some 6,000 clan networks in Southeast Asia alone.’ And, one could add
that these likely extend into Australia. Moreover, Naisbitt suggests that the economy (both legitimate and otherwise) of the borderless Chinese Overseas has become the third largest in the world!

Moreover, despite the fact that they constitute a small, minority population in most Southeast Asian states (as in Australia), their orientation towards family and education—as well as their business acumen—has led the Chinese Overseas (many of whom have long since taken-up local citi-zenships) to achieve a dominant share in host state economies and accrue comparative personal wealth—frequently experiencing the jealously and negative actions of others (‘natives’) because of it. Nonetheless, it is widely accepted that China’s recent dynamic and challenging ‘Rise’ has been accompanied by a number of positive and negative features, both domestically and externally. Beyond an increasing sense of ‘pride’, one of these features is that more Chinese nationals are now venturing beyond their state as global business people, workers, students and travelers. This outward movement of people adds numbers to the huaren that, in turn, provides them with increased ‘connexity’ and affinity with the ‘network of networks’. On the other hand, the increasing inward movement of both ‘returned Chinese’ and of non-Chinese Australian nationals into China, comprising the AEs, has been a feature of ‘China’s Rise’.

Second, in more generic terms, it should be noted that between 1949, when Australian citizenship was initiated in the 1948 Citizenship Act (and, as a significant aside, Indigenous Australians were NOT granted full citizenship rights until a 1967 referendum), and December 2005, some 3 million migrant settlers became Aussie citizens (an average of over 70,000 per year). At the latter date, over 900,000 permanent residents were eligible for Australian citizenship. Currently, about one-quarter of Australia’s population was born overseas (180+ countries of origin), and nearly 5% of the total population was born in ‘Asia’. Recent Australian annual net migrant intakes for all origin countries (declared permanent arrivals, minus declared permanent departures) have averaged between 100,000-112,000, with the Skills Stream now predominating over the Family and Special Eligibility Streams and the Humanitarian Program.

In the 2001 and 2006 Censuses, ‘Chinese Australians’ were found to be the fifth largest ethnic group in the country, numbering 557,021 and 669,890 respectively. They identified the main source countries and regions for overseas-born ethnic Chinese as being the PRC (132,020 and 206,589). In 2001, Hong Kong (59,810), Malaysia (51,910), Vietnam (41,230), Taiwan (21,520), Indonesia (19,620), Singapore (19,120), Cambodia (9,500), East Timor (4,880), Philippines (2,230), and Thailand (2,210) supplied Chinese peoples, along with smaller numbers from Laos, Burma, Mauritius, South Korea and Ghana. Also, in 2001, the second most frequently spoken language in Australian homes was a dialect of Chinese—with 225,300 Cantonese speakers (40.4%) and 135,300 Mandarin (putonghua) speakers (25%). In 2006, over 500,000 people spoke a dialect of Chinese at home.

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1The authors’ earlier research revealed that the total Hong Kong born population in Australia ten years ago was around 83,000, with some 61,000 having arrived in the previous six years alone. This discrepancy with the number cited in the text above is likely explained by the fact that many Hong Kong settlers subsequently returned to the HKSAR after deeming the 1997 transition to PRC rule to be less problematic for them in economic, and even in political, terms. Data from 1991/92 indicated that nearly 60% of Hong Kong born people in Australia had taken up citizenship. It also was significant that the vast majority was highly educated professionals and skilled persons who could be classified as middle-aged. D. McMillen 1996, ‘Contexts for Queensland Business in Hong Kong,’ in Duc-Tho Nguyen, ed., Queensland, Australia and the Asia-Pacific Economy, Economic Society of Australia (Queensland), Brisbane, pp. 20-29.
After the official abandonment of the ‘White Australia Policy’ in 1973, arrivals of the Chinese diaspora in Australia significantly increased in stages. The first wave, in the mid- to late 1970s, was composed largely of ethnic Chinese refugees (‘boat people’) from Vietnam and Cambodia; the second was primarily economic (and ‘political’) migrants from Hong Kong in the 1980s and 1990s; the third was dominated by nearly 30,000 Chinese students and their families from the PRC already in Australia who were allowed by the Hawke Government to settle in Australia after the Tian’anmen Square protests of April-June 1989; and the most recent has been predominantly immigrants (or long-term ‘stayers’) and visitors from the PRC (and Taiwan). At the same time, this latter stage has seen increasing numbers of earlier migrants/residents in Australia from the PRC and the HKSAR return there to reside.

Third, in June 2005 the Australian cities having significant Chinese populations were Sydney (248,579), Melbourne (146,827), Perth (46,559), and Brisbane (40,779). The top five non-English languages currently spoken in Queensland households were Italian, Cantonese, Mandarin (putonghua), German and Vietnamese. In Greater Brisbane, the leading non-English spoken languages in households were Chinese (Cantonese and putonghua), Vietnamese, Italian, Greek, and Spanish. Similar figures for New South Wales (especially Sydney) and Victoria (especially Melbourne) are to be determined in the research.

Fourth, evidence suggests that two points can be made about ‘Aussie repatriation’ (of all ethnicities): the overall return rate for Australian residents who say they are leaving long-term or permanently is about 75%; and about half of AEs stated that they will return to Australia at some stage, with those based in Asia being the most likely to return at 60+% (Senate Report 2005: 6 & 73-75). The Hugo Report (2003) revealed that the two overwhelming reasons given by AEs who stated an intention to repatriate to Australia were lifestyle (82.9%) and family (71.5%) considerations. Table 2.1 (see Hugo Report 2003: 53) shows several reasons why many AEs were either ‘undecided’ or had ‘no intention’ to return to Australia. Some of the reasons given suggest that a number of key issue areas need to be addressed more positively in investigative and policy/operational terms if this percentage of reluctant AEs is to be lowered. Generally, reestablishing a personal place in Australia must come to be seen by more AEs as a more attractive, comfortable and welcoming environment than it is at the moment. Based on initial interviews undertaken by the authors in the PRC and the HKSAR in late 2006, some AEs revealed that they are not convinced that their expatriation experiences are ‘valued, or even recognised, back home’. A few even stated a feeling of being ‘out of sight, out of mind’.

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<tr>
<th>Reasons (No Intention or Undecided)</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tr>
<td>Better employment opportunities overseas</td>
<td>45.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Established in current location</td>
<td>40.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Career, promotional opportunities overseas</td>
<td>40.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Higher income overseas</td>
<td>40.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marriage/partnership issues</td>
<td>38.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lifestyle more attractive overseas</td>
<td>30.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Partner’s employment</td>
<td>26.4</td>
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Given the initial analyses of the above trends, the Australian government appears to have recognised the growing significance of its AEs (and repats) in the context of its now ‘glocalised’, and multicultural, population. This seemingly was demonstrated in the DFAT White Paper (2003), which devoted a specific chapter to ‘Protecting Australians Abroad’, and in March 2005 was further evidenced when the Legal and Constitutional References Committee of the Australian Senate released its afore-mentioned seminal report. Also, several valuable academic studies about AEs appeared in the same period. As cited above, these include the Hugo Report (2003), the Lowy Report (2004), and Duncan, Leigh. Madden & Tynan (2004). In 2008, some two years after the initial writing related to this research was first drafted, Michael Fullilove authored the extremely valuable Lowy Institute Paper, Number 22, ‘World wide webs: Diasporas and the international system’. It appears that the main driver of such studies has been an increasing concern about lower rates of population growth in Australia and concerns about retaining, attracting, or maintaining linkages with Aussies having skills or talents deemed crucial to Australia’s glocal economic future—no matter where they may reside. In any event, these and other issues pertaining to the conditions of ‘people beyond the state’ have undoubtedly emerged as a real concern for Australian researchers, policy makers and publics—but, they beg to be studied in more qualitative depth.

Admittedly, the frequency of this literature is slowly improving, as is the general flow of more personal accounts (‘stories’) of AEs and repatriates (see, e.g., Clegg & Gray 2002; Hutchings 2003; Havenhand & MacGregor 2003). It remains fair to say, though, that until recently few analysts have delved very deeply via more direct investigation amongst AEs themselves into the crucial issue areas proposed here, especially in terms of issues concerning security and states’ jurisdictions. And, even the more recent studies require continual updating by scholars and experts. These notable ‘gaps’ in the relevant literature are addressed in this research through coverage ranging from day-to-day matters of personal security to contingent issues of citizen-cum-human security—and from both official and AE perspectives. The research aims to more systematically identify or generate and evaluate information through both quantitative and qualitative methods in the field. Moreover, a number of Internet databases and web sites pertaining to AEs that have been established in the targeted localities by governments and AE business, social, alumni, and other relevant groupings await detailed study.

**Diaspora and Identity.** We must be reminded that in earlier times the cultural (and frequently racialised) associations of Australian identity primarily were with other distant European places and peoples, and that this resulted in a recurring ‘history-versus-geography tension’ frequently observed in academic and popular commentaries on ‘Australian nationalism’ (Blainey 1966). This reflected a ‘reality’ that Australian citizenship and identity were largely constructed, from the beginning, against ‘Asia’ (and ‘Asians’). Until the early 1970s, this resonated in the ‘White Australia Policy’. In recent years, however, there have been recurring echoes of ‘Asia as a region of otherness, lawlessness and danger’ lying adjacent to an ‘arc of instability’ in the broader Asia-Pacific (Burke 2001). These remnant memories, held by but a minority of Australians, likely were rekindled by the consequences felt about the ‘globalisation’ processes mentioned earlier, as well as such events mentioned above (but, also, the struggles in East Timor, the perception of adjacent ‘failing/troubled’ island-states like Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea, and Fiji, the more distant conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Middle East, and (to name but a few) past legal cases like those of James Peng Jiandong, Schapelle Corby and David Hicks. Moreover, Pauline Hanson and the ‘One Nation’ phenomenon
of the late 1990s in Australia also played on such fears. To an extent, these factors also must have affected persons who were venturing into/out of Australian spaces during times of increased angst about ‘homeland security’. In any event, it is into such culturally different and sometimes volatile Asia-Pacific spaces that many Aussies have continued to venture, and from which many arrivals in Australia now originate.

The fundamental questions being addressed in this study both identify the relevant literature and sources and begins to address the following matters— noting that future research aims to obtain much needed fieldwork evidence for a more detailed analysis: What are the evolving identities of AEs (and other expats), what are their ‘ties’ to home/host states and how are they maintained, and how do these features relate to issues of broadly based security? What roles do the relevant governments, Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs), home/host state societies, and other actors play in these matters?

First, it is recognised that in the present era nation-states have shown no sign of declining to total irrelevance, and the discourse about nationality (and territoriality) in this context has remained prominent in state and global governance. Indeed, closer contacts with ‘the Other’ (Said 1978 and Huntington 1993) through global contacts and networking experiences (including expatriation as venturing)—real or virtual—often have heightened awareness about, and a determination to preserve civilisational-oriented, if not state-connected (and constructed) distinctiveness and attachments. And, Benedict Anderson’s earlier (1983) insightful notion of ‘imagined communities’ in nation-state building processes continues to have some general salience here. However, the growth of trans-world spaces has, in part, significantly blurred extant state boundaries and ‘differences’, creating numerous areas of seamlessness marked by increasing homogeneity—or at least hybridity. Arguably, this trend has contributed to the further emergence of global-local continua based on the notion of ‘glocality’. As Kivisto (2002) has noted:

2 Hereafter referred to as ‘states’ or ‘countries’. Traditionally, in international law the ‘state’ is an entity recognised to exist when a government is in effective control of a community of people sharing common values within a defined territory. It possesses a monopoly over the legitimate use of force and its sovereignty (the entitlement to rule within its own territorial space, or jurisdiction) is recognised by other states in the international system. Its status is comparable to the idea in domestic law of a company being a legal person. Until recently, the state-centric theory of ‘Realism’ has dominated international relations analysis and diplomatic practice. Sovereignty, however, is now increasingly understood to be subject to conditions of accountable, competent and humane governance that could involve the shared exercise of power and authority between national, regional and global agents. The term ‘disaggregated state’ refers to the tendency for states to become increasingly fragmented actors in global politics as most parts of the government establishment at all levels become entangled with foreign counterparts and others in dealing with regional or global issues through proliferating trans-governmental and global policy networks or regimes (McGrew, cited in Baylis & Smith 2005: 25).

3 To add further to the notion of what ‘glocalisation’ means, it refers to processes of increasing ‘interpenetration’ between the global and the local (the idea that the ‘local’ exists within the ‘global’, and vice-versa), such that there are emerging rather ‘seamless continua’ between them and amongst corresponding actors (including states). See, e.g., Robertson (1992); Courchene (1993); and Holton (2005). Murray (2006: 15) suggests that globalisation is a collection of dialectical human agency driven processes which create local-local and person-person networks of inclusion/compression that increasingly transcend territorial borders and stretch to become global in proportion. McGrew (cited in Baylis & Smith 2005: 23) has coined the term ‘intermestic’, meaning that domestic issues are becoming internationalised and world affairs are becoming domesticated, thus creating a new breed of policy problems arising from the globalisation of economic, social and cultural life. As Redwood (1993) suggests, ‘the headlong rush into global capitalism is making people more and more conscious of the local, the particular, and the comprehensible. The “information marketplace” has enabled people to keep in touch with their [national and] ethnic heritage and possibly slowed the integration of immigrants into their [host] culture.’ Weiler (cited in Sweeney 2005: 70) asserts that in the turbulence and uncertainty of market-driven globalisation, citizens will naturally return to their local allegiances in search of some constancy and security. See also McMillen (2009).
We live in a world that is at once local and global—and increasingly the distinction between the two is difficult to make, as the use of the term “glocalization” by sociologists such as Beck (2000) and Bauman (1998) suggests.

Despite official and other efforts to the contrary—including “invented (or reinvented) traditions” (Hobsbawm & Ranger 1983; Isin & Woods 1999; Delanty 2000; Faulks 2000)—the seemingly diminished capacities of states to shape and accommodate a “nation”, and thus an inclusive citizenry congruent with sovereign jurisdictions, is challenged and prompts further investigation. We suggest that the mechanisms, processes and events of CAG have to some degree enhanced a universalised cultural diversity by expanding the spatial (and virtual) dimensions in which many persons now periodically venture and/or reside. This view is similar to that of Kalantzis (2000: 100):

The second [change over the last decade] is rapid globalisation. The local becomes global as immigration transforms once-homogenous local communities into global communities. The universal processes of globalisation perform a function opposite to the one anticipated: instead of imposing homogeneity, they accentuate diversity, deploy diversity as a means of product differentiation, and use local diversity as the basis for making global connections. No country is immune to the effects of internationally global/mobile capital, markets and trade, communication and labour. In this context, nations all over the world are struggling with identity, national constitutions and social rights, sometimes in painfully hideous ways [emphasis added, in italics].

She adds that with ‘life-worlds’ becoming more divergent and their boundaries more blurred, ‘the central fact of community life becomes the multiplicity of meanings and their continual intersection’. This multiplicity is not itself new, but today it is increasing in intensity, importance and political and social significance.

One consequence of heightened human mobility, in whatever form it may take, is that the ‘communitarian baggage’ of national and/or socio-cultural identity is increasingly carried into/out of such ‘cosmopolitan spaces’, where it both contributes to diversity while at the same time some of the more universal forces of homogenisation or hybridisation inevitably kick-in. Therefore, such processes bring spatial and other complexities to avowed ‘fault-lines’ of attachment, identity, state jurisdictions, and culture—contrary to earlier arguments of Waltz (1979) and Morgenthalau (1978). Huntington (1993) has implied that closer and more frequent encounters in global space can often sharpen perceptions of national and/or cultural identity and difference, sometimes arousing broader or more sectoral domestic anxieties and uncertainties about vulnerability and threat. Again, this pattern was exemplified in Australia by the ‘One Nation Party’ phenomenon and by the sensitivities attached to the more recent ‘terrorist (and, generally perceived, Islamic) threat’.

Traditionally, the term ‘diaspora’ has referred to any community (especially those classified as minorities) within a multiethnic/multicultural polity, such as Australia, that takes common ancestry or origins—actual or imaginary—as its basis for membership and promotes a collective local and/or trans-local/trans-state identity. It has been connected primarily to the involuntary, and long-term, scattering of peoples to many locations away from their home place, often by compulsion or need, and frequently accompanied a variety of emotions. The prime example of such diasporic movement is the historic scattering of Jewish peoples, but the transportation to Australia of some 160,000 convicts from the British Isles also can be cited. The loss of ‘homeland’ for such diaspora (except, perhaps, in terms of memory—or what Ma and Cartier [2002] call the
invisible (or inner) homeland’—might have resulted in a condition of permanent exile and in personal emotions such as alienation, disenfranchisement or discrimination—even if, on the other hand, they felt some degree of enthusiasm about being involved in the development of their new host state or society.

Within the broader configuration of diaspora today, however, both a less permanent physical (and/or virtual) absence from homelands and a considerably greater diversity and heterogeneity can be perceived, as the discussion of hybridity below suggests. For instance, today’s diasporic groups are broadly composed of a mixture of short-term, long-term, returned, and even serial venturers. Moreover, there are differences between and amongst, say, the various ‘Chinese’ communities in many countries (see, e.g., Cheng & Katz 1998; Toloyan 1996; Cohen 1996; Wang 1991; Lever-Tracy, et. al. 1996; Skeldon, 1998; McMillen 1998; and Chen 2005), not to mention other features of in-group distinctiveness such as residency experiences, gender, age/generation, marital status, and so on (see Scholte 2005). Appadurai (1990, 1996 and 2006) has coined the useful term ‘ethnoscape’ to describe a ‘shifting world of the diaspora’:

By ethnoscape, I mean the landscape of persons who constitute the shifting world in which we live: tourists, immigrants, refugees, exiles, guest workers, and other groups and individuals constitute an essential feature of the world and appear to affect the politics of (and between) nations to a hereto unprecedented degree (2006: 182).

In the same work, he goes on to state that:

The relationship between states and nations is everywhere an embattled one. It is possible to say that in many societies the nation and the state have become one another’s projects. That is, while nations (or more properly groups with ideas about nationhood) seek to capture or co-opt states and state power, states simultaneously seek to capture and monopolise ideas about nationhood.

One important new feature of global politics, tied to the disjunctive relationships among the various landscapes discussed earlier, is that state and nation are at each other’s throats, and the hyphen that links them is now less an icon of conjuncture than an index of disjuncture (2006: 195).

Significantly, Edmondson and Levy (2008: 68) point out that:

As the international economy broadens and deepens its penetration into states, [bringing] with it trans-national corporations and institutions, the basis of individual identity potentially expands beyond the state of residence to include a range of non-territorial associations. As a result of such developments within states, new forms of non-state political [and socio-cultural] community or identity may emerge to challenge domestic sovereignty.

Drawing on such musing, one might conjure the notion of ‘expatscapes’, whereby increasingly the appearance and role of non-state and other social actors such as expats generically make the sovereign authority of contemporary states ‘conditional’ through their appropriation of popular bipartisan support and communal identity—and, often, through processes of networking. ‘What faces direct challenge,’ Edmondson and Levy (2008: 71) tantalisingly suggest, ‘is the role of the territorial state in [present day] political associations wherein states [in the “institutional” sense] assist in reinventing sovereignty, or risk being marginalised by emerging alternative forms of community, identity and association [in the “social” sense].’ Along similar lines, a generally accepted core notion of any ‘society’ is identity and its maintenance—that is, the self-conception of individuals and collectivities of individuals identifying themselves as members of that collectivity.
Hence, CAG can been seen as a set of processes that increasingly reconstruct the world as a ‘shared social space’, albeit one that is not necessarily uniform due to the unevenness of its processes, the existence of inequalities in power, and the increasing distances between the institutional and the social in the global system. Furthermore, as a core feature of society, ‘culture’ (along with ‘shared values’) gives people a sense of community and belonging—and is therefore one of the other principal means through which identity may be constructed/established and sustained. Until recently, cultures have been thought of as relatively stable and spatially bounded, although historical evidence does not necessarily support this view (Murray 2006: 259). CAG, nonetheless, has resulted in the growing recognition of peoples’ ties with distant and disparate places, symbols, and ideas/imaginings. It thus has tended to expand trans-world relations that, in turn, have attenuated nationality and altered identities, particularly in terms of the sense of ‘self’ and ‘community’ being connected with established states. Moreover, as Holton (2008) has suggested, degrees of ‘glocal networking’ may be established, for a variety of reasons, by diasporic (and expat) individuals, depending on the length of time they reside beyond the ‘homes of their hearts’ and the circumstances they may find in host places. Again, this impacts on their senses of identity.

In fact, as some have argued, ‘state-nations remain important, but they have lost the near-monopoly on constructions of collective identity they held in the early and mid-twentieth century’ (see Scholte 2005 and Edmondson & Levy 2008). The emphases in human and cultural geography have thus shifted from a consideration of bounded spaces to flows of commodities, peoples, ideas, images and beliefs (see the various works of Castells). The result is that societies can be ‘multiple identity units’, partly based on a state and partly based on ethnicity, or on occupation/company-as-employer, or on other ‘solidarities’. Thus, the communities with which one identifies could include those of citizenship of nation-states, localities, or memberships in/attachments to ethnic, religious, or other groupings (see Roe 2007). These have been given labels such as ‘state-nations’, ‘civic nations’, ‘ethnic nations’, and ‘trans-nations’. For instance, in reference to the European Union, Weiler (cited in Sweeney 2005: 70) notes that the appeal of place, land and local community as an ‘antedote to the fragmentation of the post-modern condition’ should be recognised, and that ‘citizenship can imply not nationality—as its usual meaning does—but a shared set of values, common duties and rights within a civic society, a commitment to or membership in a polity which privileges exactly the opposite of nationalism.’ Regardless, the felt need for a personal identity that carries with it senses of belonging—a ‘me-ness’, as well as a ‘we-ness’—remains quite strong.

As McEwan (2001: 17) has argued, diasporic identities are important because they are at once local and global (i.e., ‘glocal’), and are based on trans-national identifications encompassing both imagined and encountered communities (see Holton 2008). For expats generally, a commonality may reside, at least partially, in lingering attachments to a particular place (e.g., a state, or states) rather than, or perhaps in addition to, attachments to an ethnicity, a belief system, a culture, or an overseas locality (see Giese 1997; McMillen 1998 and Su & McMillen 1998; Sheffer 2002; and Goff & Dunn 2004). Frequently, maintenance mechanisms (often referred to as ‘identity therapies’), such as national or ethnic gatherings or celebrations and the Internet, contribute to this phenomenon of connectivity and, hence, a sense of commonality.
Adding to the complexities of all the above is ‘serial’ and/or ‘circular’ migration, whereby individuals voluntarily change host localities over time—having the means and opportunity to do so—sometimes returning from whence they originally came or moving on to places long desired or considered to have perceived advantages. The 1980s and 1990s phenomenon of ‘Hong Kong astronauts’ (Skeldon 1998; McMillen 1998) involving the frequent two-way movement between home and host countries, particularly by members of Chinese families, is an example of such migration. Thus, expats may develop and maintain a significant mix of allegiances and connections to both home and host places, and possibly to dispersed places or communities elsewhere (Gilbert, et. al. 2000; McMillen 1998). In nation-state terms, this especially applies to those who may be granted dual (or even multiple) citizenship status. But, even those with permanent or long-term residency status frequently develop similar plural attachments. Hence, their senses of belonging to and being citizens/residents of any one state may be partial and provisional, moving within and outside ethnic, racial, local, or other ‘borders’. While it can be argued that the vast majority of human beings accept they either may possess, or have ascribed to them, multiple—sometimes referred to as “multidimensional”, or even “split”—identities\(^4\) that shift according to context, preliminary research here has shown that this is likely to be quite pronounced amongst those involved in expatriation-as-long-term-venturing (McMillen 2006b).

In particular, as a type of diaspora, expats may often reproduce senses of identification with a group and in practice or lifestyle find ways of replicating some aspects of common state or ethno-cultural values in a host environment. Examples of this include the establishment of the ‘Australian Association of Hong Kong’ and the ‘Chinese Australian Association of Hong Kong’ (McMillen 2006b). Such efforts may stimulate a ‘diaspora (or long-distance) nationalism’ (Skrbis 1999), or ‘diaspora culturalism’, linking them back to their home places/cultures of heritage. At the same time, whether out of desire or pragmatic need, such persons may develop some identification with (or sensitivities toward) their host state or society. ‘Denizenship’ seems to be an associated condition that identifies long-term resident foreigners who enjoy some rights of host country citizenship. In Australia, “denizens” are those having permanent residence status but who are denied some rights granted to citizens—for example, voting and access to some public service appointments (Hammar 1990; Hudson & Kane 2000; Jayasuriya 2005).

In fact, some have argued that denizens should be given citizen rights no matter where they happen to have been born (Carens, cited in Beiner 1995). As will be further discussed below, human rights advocates make the same argument—that ALL human beings, no matter where they are located and regardless of their citizenship or ethnicity, should be universally and equally granted fundamental rights. In any case, CAG, in its present economic, social, cultural and political manifestations, may be seen to foster a degree of ‘disembeddedness’ and/or ‘distanciation’ insofar as it necessarily means engagement with the world outside

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\(^4\)Some years ago, Weeks (1990) defined identity as being about belonging, about what one has in common with some people and what differentiates one from others. At its most basic identity gives one a sense of personal location, a stable core to one’s individuality—that is, it marks not only what one is, but what one is not. At the centre, however, are the values one shares or wishes to share with others. Identities are largely subjective and ascriptive, that is ‘assigned’ by others and either accepted or not. Moreover, they can be multidimensional (individuals carrying several different identities) and can shift according to different contexts—such as in ‘identity surfing’. Even earlier, Said (1978) claimed that identities, like theories, are always ‘manufactured’ or ‘constructed’ for someone and in someone’s interest. Beyond the personal dimension, identities can be categorised as being communitarian, cosmopolitan, or hybrid.
hitherto self-contained groups (Giddens 1990; Holton 2005 and 2008). In this light, the analyses of Robertson (1992), Portes, et. al. (1999), Pries (2001), and Faist (2000) based on the evolution of ‘transnational social fields’ and ‘global social spaces’ are relevant.

Also of relevance is Hybridity Theory as it has radically reconceived trans- and/or cross-cultural relations, often shifting from models of accommodation to those of domination, mutual contamination, or ambivalence. Within ‘diasporic space’, for instance, processes of hybridisation are paramount as migrants/expats interact with host cultures to create new forms. As Murray (2001) contends, ‘diasporas stretch across traditional boundaries, forging new connections between places and creating cultural forms that challenge accepted hierarchies and structures.’ Furthermore, as Scholte (2005) has argued, generally globalisation is stimulating a ‘pluralisation of identities’, accompanied by a host of different national, cultural and non-territorial frameworks of being and belonging. Often, he suggests, this pluralisation is converging on individual persons who then experience a hybrid sense of ‘self’ that encompasses a melange of several nationalities and non-territorial affiliations. Arguably, the notion of glocality mentioned above is particularly important in this, as the global and the local frequently interact to produce hybridised outcomes, sometimes stimulating what has been called ‘renewed (or revitalised) localisms’ (Levitt 2001). Thus, the recurrence of diasporic movement and the enhancement of supra-territorial or trans-national solidarities through CAG, together with the continuing importance of various forms of nationality, have contributed to a shift in the prevailing structure of identity from nationalism towards greater hybridity and even pluralism. That these factors challenge many long-accepted geographical (and national/social) senses, such as home and belonging, now seems to be a given in most informed analyses involving glocality as a feature of CAG.

As a consequence, therefore, diasporic-like experience profoundly transforms the spatiality of nation-states and cultures. Another effect is that the emerging discourse on hybridity is a response to the exclusionary identity politics that may characterise more hegemonic forms of multiculturalism and ‘new racism’ (see Beckett 1995). Hence, the uncritical celebration of hybridity can run the risk of collapsing the heterogeneous experiences of diaspora into a stereotyped and fetished display of ‘Otherness’ in ways that not only mask but also preserve a status quo. Racial, ethnic, religious and even national categorisation, as so often occurs with diaspora generally, can produce statistics that erase significant differences within such groups and present ascriptive, subjective and usually stereotypical categories that are, in fact, far more diverse. One example is ‘the Chinese’, who may be more accurately identified (or identify themselves) as being ‘Chinese-Australian’, ‘Australian-Chinese’, ‘Mainland Chinese’, ‘Taiwan Chinese’, ‘Hongkongese’, ‘Cantonese’, and so on (McMillen 1998 and 2006). Also, it is likely that, since ‘9/11’, religious identification has become more generally prominent, and that any attachment to a socially-accepted ‘faith-based’ home place/culture has frequently become more difficult—thus making daily life for many more uneasy in their host societies—as in Australia. In fact, the authors were told in interviews in Queensland that this factor also might have had ‘negative side effects on anyone deemed to be “of difference” in Australia, as well as amongst AE communities overseas’ (McMillen 2007).

In our research, the targeted AEs have been identified as being largely professionals, intellectuals, and business people—as are those from the PRC and the HKSAR (although associate-professionals, service workers, tradespersons and labourers likely are more represented in the latter groups). For instance, by
2002/03 the number of overseas visits made by ‘Australian businesspeople’ had almost doubled over the previous decade, reaching more than half a million (DFAT White Paper 2003)—86.8% of whom were Australian citizens and 90.8% were classified as professionals (Hugo 2003a). In 2002, 78.9% of Australian-born respondents surveyed on departure about their overseas destination indicated that they were ‘headed to Asia’. Moreover, as the Lowy Report (2004: 15) stated: ‘in recent years, one of the most significant sub-groups [of AEs] to emerge has been the young/middle-aged, highly skilled, well educated, high earning Australians—who could be described as “Gold Collar Workers”’ (also see Birrell, et. al. 2004).

Putting this very significant trend in a global perspective that many governments should heed, recent research by Fullilove (2008) at the Lowy Institute for Policy Studies in Sydney (also cited in Epoch Times, 20-26 February 2008: 1) has revealed that those classified as ‘Gold Collar Workers’ (people who are not forced to leave their homelands for work but choose to capitalise on the ‘war for talent’ in the global marketplace) in the current population of 200 million migrants globally are sending up to AUD440 billion in remittances and through informal channels to their homelands each year (e.g., some AUD24.5 billion/year into the PRC). This suggests that they are developing as a considerable force of economic and political power, especially as ‘diaspora consciousness’ is on the rise. ‘Combined with increasing disdain for a global monoculture and changes to allow for trans-national features like dual citizenships,’ his research suggests that such diasporas are getting ‘larger, thicker and stronger’. Echoing an argument made in this essay, Fullilove stated that it is inherently difficult for any government to design public policy in relation to such distant populations who are becoming increasingly powerful players in the complex configuration between diasporas, homelands and host countries. Moreover, such diasporas also could pose security issues in terms of raising concerns about the well-being of nationals in foreign countries as well as in terms of concealing criminal/terrorist networks that at base are money/ethnic/religious driven—and could become linked to insurgencies/dissidence.

In any case, their generic identification as being highly educated, skilled or essential workers occupying important roles in a Neo-Liberalist global order might be taken to mean that, to varying degrees (such as being ‘Gold Collar Workers’), expats could acquire some basic universalistic-cosmopolitan features and at some point in time come to hold and share—that is, be affected by—partially hybrid identities and values. As a result, their overall identity could evolve to one partially disconnected from any single sense of place or heritage (or even culture/religion), and it could lead some to think of themselves primarily not as citizens/members of any state/culture but rather as global citizens for whom ‘home is everywhere and everywhere can be home’. Such persons’ identities and ties, as mentioned, also could remain—or become—variously connected to/conditioned by particular social groupings in multiple localities, further contributing to their feelings of being ‘glocal persons’ (Hoffman 2004; Austin 2005).

‘Citizen Security’ and States’ Jurisdictions. With the above considerations as a backdrop, our research qualitatively begins to explore some crucial questions about the security and well being of those Australian citizens and long-term residents who venture as AEs (and the same could be applied to anyone who travels overseas for any length of time) into global social spaces and alternative jurisdictions where Australian state jurisdiction and national attachments are putative. The possible tensions between the more defined ‘citizenship’ of a given nation-state(s) and the less defined notions of ‘global citizenship’ are taken into
account. The questions here thus include: Who are expats and what is their personal, family, ethnic, cultural, economic and other concerns about day-to-day and general security, and how are these perceived and addressed by the AEs themselves and by their home/host states? How might a better definition of citizen security, and states’ policies about them, be devised—that is, when a state’s citizenry resides both within and beyond its borders how might notions of a broadened, inclusive, valued and secure citizenship be incorporated into viable and publicly acceptable policies?

The questions posed about states’ jurisdictions include: What are the meanings, policies and practices regarding states’ jurisdictions in terms of expats/expatriation, and how might these be changing and why? Do expat issues contribute to any sense of urgency in reconsidering the mechanisms and processes of managing and negotiating states’ jurisdictions and the their attendant conditions of citizenship/residency, and a growing import of supra-territorial institutions and/or regimes regarding human beings regardless of their national (or other) affiliations? Are the primarily ‘domestically-bounded’ laws and capacities of states (including Australia) in need of adjustment so as to cope with the less bounded and often complex citizenries of expats? How might AEs themselves be better informed or prepared to function under such evolving conditions of security and jurisdictional complexity? These questions are to be explored in due course through a survey questionnaire and semi-structured interviews.

First, there is a need focus on conceptions of ‘citizenship’, as it is a powerful idea that recognises the dignity of the individual but at the same time reaffirms the social context in which the individual acts. In the more ‘Western’ context, it is deemed to be a membership status (largely statist) which contains a package of rights, duties and obligations, and which implies equality, justice and autonomy. It is, therefore, an excellent example of what Anthony Giddens (1984: 25) has called the ‘duality of structure’ in which the individual and the [state] community cannot accurately be understood as opposed and antagonistic ideas. Instead, individual agency and social practices are mutually dependent. Through exercising rights and obligations, individuals reproduce the necessary conditions for citizenship (see Faulks 2000; Delanty 2000; Isin & Wood 1999). In terms of the extent of citizenship, to ask who is to be included as a citizen is also to ask who are to be excluded from the status. All states, however liberal in their immigration laws, impose controls upon whomever can become a citizen or a resident within their territory, and under what conditions they can remain. Thus, citizenship is closely associated with nationality, and the two terms are often used interchangeably in international law. Moreover, as noted by Hudson and Kane (2000: 1), '[i]n Australia, citizenship has recently become central to debates about how to reinvent Australian national identity.'

However, citizenship in the modern era is ambiguous in light of the interplay between such notions of inclusion and exclusion. On the one hand, Liberalism, as the dominant ideology of citizenship, has stressed the essentially egalitarian and universal nature of the status. On the other hand, from the 18th century onwards, citizenship has been bound closely to the institution of the nation-state and thus in practice has acted as a powerful instrument of social closure. The extent of citizenship, then, has been determined by boundaries between states, which are deemed to be both physical and cultural in form. It can be suggested, however, that the contemporary dilemmas of social membership highlight the contradiction that lies at the heart of questions about citizenship, namely the tension between the state as an exclusionary community and citizenship as a universal status. Moreover, Liberal conceptions of citizenship have come under attack.
As one example, Feminist scholars, influenced by Anglo-Saxon interpretations of Postmodernism and Post-Structuralism, contend that the alleged ‘universality of rights’ has in practice led to the subordination of women and that what is needed is a ‘gendered citizenship’ to do justice to the experiences and life paths of women.

The processes of CAG are transforming the context of citizenship and therefore this requires that we rethink citizenship’s content, extent, and depth. As Hudson and Kane put it:

... the world is changing. Some reconceptualisation of citizenship needs to be evolved to fit the altered circumstances. We are repeatedly assured, at least, that the nation-state, the focal point for citizenship discourse for several centuries, is inexorably mutating as a result of globalisation (2000: 2).

As Faulks (2000: 11 & 132) queries: ‘Could it be that contemporary social change has rendered citizenship to be outmoded? Could it be that the concept of citizenship is becoming redundant, since its close association, historically, with closed political communities is inappropriate to the porous boundaries of a new global age?’ He nonetheless goes on to state that ‘... although globalisation has altered the context in which states govern, it is the state that remains the institution most able to concentrate economic, military and communicative power. The state, therefore, remains the primary context for the individual citizen (145).’ However, he fully agrees with Soysal (1994) about the urgent need to reconceptualise citizenship in way that breaks the absolute linkage with the state. It is only in this way that the rights of citizenship can be extended in a manner consistent with Liberal notions of the equal worth of individuals.

Faulks also notes that in classical international relations theory, the state, which concentrates force in the form of sovereignty, is seen as the only plausible vehicle by which order can be maintained. The primary justification the state has to rule is its promise to provide security to its citizens. Realist theorists have argued that since states are the only viable institution of governance, the claims of individuals outside the jurisdiction of any individual state must be balanced by the state’s primary duty to its own (primarily home) citizens. In effect, Realists postulate an inherent opposition in the international sphere between order and the demands for justice. He notes (138) that this Hobbesian logic is being challenged by contemporary social changes associated with globalisation. His view highlights the fact that contemporary debates have questioned the theoretical terms in which citizenship has been traditionally understood. In these debates the move away from older conceptions of citizenship has not yet led to the acceptance of a single alternative approach. Instead, according to Hudson and Kane (2000: 4-5), a confusing plurality of different perspectives prevails [emphasis added, in italics]:

Controversies have arisen about whether citizenship is a creation of the modern state or derives from civil society, and about whether citizenship can be derived from a theory of human rights or should be understood as specific to particular legal regimes and their technologies. As a result, discussions about citizenship are now often makeshift and transitional to a new synthesis that has not yet appeared.

That there is said to be a tension between notions of universal human rights and sovereignty is a point to be further discussed below. Nevertheless, the premise here is that more traditional (and largely Western)
international relations theory is unable to conceptualise the nature of contemporary social changes that are creating a more interdependent world.

Faulks, amongst others, also rightly contends that 'the pressure to enhance citizenship within states, though itself important, must be accompanied by efforts to build multiple sites of governance that seek to fulfil the egalitarian logic of liberal citizenship in ways which reach beyond the limits of the state' (2000: 133). As Hudson and Kane (2000: 7) suggest, '[p]erhaps we should think of citizenship as multiple, complex and relational.' Moreover, as Stokes (cited in Hudson & Kane 2000: 231) has noted, '[t]he term “global citizen” designates a type of civic identity and practice that transcends the concerns of national citizenship and the boundaries of the nation-state.’ Meehan (1993: 185) has added that there is a ‘growing awareness of common issues arising from the many “social” identities that individuals have and the problems they confront that transcend national borders.’ ‘Such problems,’ she adds, ‘require common institutions for their resolution and these provide the framework for multinational citizenship.’

Briefly, what most Australians understand by citizenship is a mixture of legal and political citizenship. Australian citizenship was conceived largely in statist and passive terms. Until 1948, Australians had the rights of ‘Britons’. Even the Nationality and Citizenship Act of 1948 dealt only with how aliens could become citizens, and the distinction between Australian citizens and non-citizens was not legally enacted until a 1984 amendment to that Act. Hudson and Kane (2000: 2-3) argue that for some time there has been a ‘civics deficit’ in Australia, and that the ‘common bonds’ underpinning Australia citizenship, as enunciated in that Act, have yet to be clearly defined. While this view will be revisited in a later discussion about more recent citizenship legislation, let it be said that arguably the logic of the discussion above is highly relevant to a range of issues concerning the interests and security of AEs.

In the late 1980s, the Australian Labor Government promoted the concept of ‘Good International Citizenship’ (Evans 1989), which may be understood as fulfilling one’s rights and responsibilities as a member of an existing ‘international society’ of nation-states, with such membership creating political obligations amongst states—for example, to carry out the requirements of international law. It was said that a common objective of such international citizenship was to establish a good (that is, safe and secure) international community that would protect the interests of states and their citizens.

In this context, as Jan Lindy Pettman (2005) has observed: “Security, and danger, have as much to do with who we’ are [or who we are seen to be] as where we live, or which state recognises us as a ‘citizen’.” Her words reflect the immense implications of changing notions and practices concerning state sovereignty, jurisdiction, competent and just/humane governance, and citizenship—especially in light of the growing ‘portability’ of citizenship globally. Pressures have since increased to establish relevant bilateral and multinational dialogue and management mechanisms (including ‘supraterritorial regimes’ or ‘spheres of authority’—see Rosenau in Held & McGrew 2002) that can enhance cooperation, compliance, and fairness in the handling of the affairs of peoples within globalised space. Concurrently, there is a concern about how such actors/agents might recognise the evolving nature and newer dimensions and complexities of identity and citizenship—and their associated practices—that may at the same time be national (or cultural), multinational (or multicultural) and trans-national (or trans-cultural).
So far as AEs are concerned, the Australian Citizenship Council (2000: 65) has stated: ‘to hold and enforce the threat of the loss of Australian citizenship over Australians who wish to live and work overseas in countries where the acquisition of another citizenship is important to their situation is to place a completely unnecessary obstacle in the way of expansion of Australian presence in their societies.’ Moreover, it added, this is not in the Australian national interest. Added to this are the age-old questions about what factors contribute to citizens’ (of whatever national affiliation, or ethnic/cultural persuasion) senses and practices of civic duties in both home and host environments, as well as their feelings about being secure or insecure, no matter where they currently live. One indication of what could be called ‘civic limitations’ faced by AEs is that voting in Australian national elections continues to be non-compulsory for them and, perhaps as a result, many have not maintained their electoral registration. The authors were told by informants in the HKSAR in late 2006 that, in the past, those AEs who did wish to vote were ‘at a loss to know how to maintain their electoral registration and cast their ballots’. This, they claimed, had left them with a sense of ‘political disempowerment’. In 2001, some 63,016 Aussies voted at Australian embassies and consulates overseas—an increase over the 46,307 who voted from overseas in 1986, but down from the 65,086 who did so in 1998. But, this represented only Australian citizen-residents who were overseas on a short-term basis (holiday-makers, business people and working holiday people) and were able to retain their right to vote. Voters visiting two countries, namely the United Kingdom and China, stood out.

A 2007 media release on the ‘Southern Cross Group’ (SCG) web site stated that ‘overseas Australians should enrol to vote NOW’ (http://www.southern-cross-group.org/; accessed 28 August). It explained that it

... is not compulsory for Australians outside the country to vote. But failing to maintain one’s federal electoral enrolment and not voting in even one election once abroad can mean that an expat loses the right to vote [emphasis in the original] for the rest of their time overseas.

The law states that if a person is not on the electoral roll, they may only enrol from outside Australia if an application is made within three years of “ceasing to reside in Australia.”

The SCG estimates that there are at least 500,000 Australian citizens of voting age overseas who are not on the electoral roll and who are currently disenfranchised [emphasis in the original] because the law prevents them from enrolling.

It went on to say that in the 2004 election, only 68,544 votes were cast through overseas posts, and only 57,955 votes had been cast from overseas for the referendum on the ‘Republic’ issue. The number of AEs registered with the Australian Electoral Commission as ‘eligible overseas electors’ remains low—with the total on the roll at 31 May 2006 being only 16,047 persons. This prompted the SCG to warn ‘that deletion from the electoral roll spells “civil death” for many overseas Australians.’

For states like Australia, these issues imply a responsibility both to maintain—and enhance—channels that promote citizens’ civic participation in home affairs as well as policies that protect (or to help make them broadly secure) as citizens (including those holding dual citizenship)—no matter where they may reside. In a more limited way, the same state responsibility applies to non-citizen residents having long-standing ties to a host jurisdiction, as well as those who may venture into it on a more temporary basis. Ideally, of course,
when citizens of any state venture into or reside in another legal (sovereign) jurisdiction they themselves should be aware of the laws and the accepted national and socio-cultural customs and practices there—and should participate in the civic culture there according to their status and local legislation. Concurrently, they should appreciate that they are at some distance from (but not totally beyond) the laws of their home country. Beyond cultivating such awareness, the point here is that such responsibility and practice necessarily involves the careful, and sensitive, management of an ‘extended, but cooperative’ sovereign jurisdiction (derived from appropriate domestic authority or practices) by states over a variety of issues affecting their citizens, globally.

Often, such management is undertaken by the authorities of one state through bilateral negotiation with the authorities of another state, or multilaterally with the officials of several states. Bilaterally, examples of efforts by the Australian government aimed at addressing such jurisdictional issues pertaining to ‘extended citizenship’ include treaties and agreements concerning taxation (double tax agreements with over 40 countries as at September 2007), extradition[^5], working holidays (there were such arrangements with 17 countries and negotiations underway with another 11 countries in 2004), and the like. Australia also has prisoner exchange programs with over 50 states, and by mid-2007 it had 23 bilateral social security agreements designed to close gaps in social security coverage [including contributions to and the claiming of age pension benefits] for people who move between countries. It is notable that Australia’s social security agreement with the United Kingdom was terminated on 1 March 2001, although on 21 August 2003 the two governments did sign a new “Double Tax Agreement” that would impact on AEs moving between the two jurisdictions.

Multilaterally, Australia has actively, and rather successfully, initiated some mechanisms (such as the “Bali Process” from 2002) aimed at achieving better regional collective management of a range of pressing transnational issues—such as illegal immigration, money laundering, and counter-terrorism. As Wesley (2008: 190-200) notes, these initiatives are all about process, rather than rules and codified decisions, and are designed to harmonise states’ interests. They frequently involve less formal (that is, ‘second- and third-tier’) meetings or sessions involving dialogue and collaboration that are aimed at depoliticising issues to enhance policy capacity across jurisdictions/sovereignties. While sometimes being highly choreographed and largely state-driven exercises, they have drawn on Asian regional preferences for ‘consensuality’ and have recognised that the atmospherics of such less formal exchanges are better suited to the preferences and styles of neighbouring states and societies. Not only could such processes be highly relevant to the wider management of AE issues, they also have a salience for the issue areas treated at the 1st Dialogue Forum.

As implied above, it remains important that any critique of state-centric security must ask who is included within a state’s community, and who is excluded. Moreover, such a critique must interrogate the ways in

[^5]: According to *Australia-China Connections* (August/September 2006: 5), Australia’s Attorney-General, Philip Ruddock, stated that negotiations had begun between Australia and China regarding an extradition treaty, and that Australia would work with China to repatriate allegedly corrupt Chinese officials. Sources from the Chinese Ministry of State Security had revealed that 800 suspects wanted for alleged economic crimes were at large abroad (and that they were accused of embezzling nearly 70 billion Yuan (USD875 million). The two sides, Ruddock
which a state’s community is imagined and practised in relation to others. Such identity making is boundary making, determining through contests located within specific relations of power, both where the boundary lies and what criteria are used to identify people within and outside that boundary. The problem in this current era is that older notions of citizenry (and likewise a range of other issues) were largely defined according to ‘bounded territories’ that have been altered by the movement of peoples (and issues) beyond their home state(s) and the necessity for states to look after their interests in what amounts to cross-jurisdictional and/or supra-territorial space. Identity in particular, though, can continue to be seen as a strategy that individuals, groups, and state elites deploy to mobilise support, access resources, or enhance their own security. Hence, in terms of current citizenship issues, a number of crucial questions can be raised about identity and inclusion, such as AEs’ feelings of access, participation (verses disenfrancisement), protection, well-being, and so on. And, similar questions along these lines could be raised in the case of residents (or even visitors) in a host environment such as Australia who hail from other jurisdictions.

Thus, it seems to be widely accepted that notions of ‘community’ (however defined) have become less precise due to global processes and events, as well as the effects of the increasingly multicultural make-up of many nation-states. As Edmondson and Levy (2008: 78) suggest, ‘the difference between an international system and the present global international society is that the latter is a political environment in which the juridical equality between sovereign states is recognised.’ However, they go on to suggest ‘that if a sense of social identity no longer conforms to states as conceived in terms of territorial boundaries, then the continued existence of supposed nation-states as viable, unified political associations is clearly challenged.’ In a glocalised environment where states are no longer the sole actors, and where sovereignty has evolved beyond territorial delimitation, inevitably the relationship between internal and external sovereignty is altered (Doty 1996: 122).

Consequently, the wider contemporary political environment can be conceived of as a multidimensional structure of associations and interactions that occur within, between and across states. Territory provides just one possible form of structural association, and as a result states can no longer define identity autonomously. As the density of trans-national linkages has broadened and deepened, the areas of state authority have narrowed and they have begun to partially lose their capacity to manage coherently the multidimensional relationships that coexist within and beyond their territory. Hence, contemporary conceptions of sovereignty presently seem to be in flux as the parameters of state authority simultaneously contract and extend beyond their own borders. Thus, the nature of the state is once again on the verge of evolving into a new and, one would hope, more appropriate form.

added, also had signed agreements on the training of Chinese lawyers and cooperation on dealing with multinational crimes, such as money laundering and human smuggling.

Pettman (2005) has added, ‘who you are [seen to be] can cost you your life. Identities are often imposed from the outside; and those in power can impose their own determinations of who belongs to the political and moral community and who does not. A robust politics of identity can work toward more inclusive and emancipatory accounts of security, asking questions and seeking to learn from ordinary peoples’ experiences of identity and security.’ This, she claims, is a powerful corrective to more visible elite, statist and militarised constructions of the identity-security nexus. And, she cautions that collective political identities are multiple, contingent, contested, and often) racialised or gendered.
In terms of glocality in the present era, questions therefore rightly can be raised about what the current boundaries and conditions of broadly based ‘citizen security’ are, and how they are being (or could they be) managed more effectively. These are important questions since societal (and citizen) security now seems to be based on threats to ‘we-ness’ that range more widely beyond the confines of traditional, territorially-based military security and more deeply from the global level through the state level to the levels of the community and the individual. Thus, this research poses questions about how home/host states address the broad-ranging citizenship and security needs of expat populations residing both outside and within (that is, across) states’ jurisdictions. At a time when the more traditional territorially-based boundaries of citizenry (and the conditions of resident attachments) are becoming more extensive and diffuse but the precision of state borders and jurisdictions largely remain territorial and fixed, how can citizen (or resident) security be best defined and achieved? As the Hugo Report (2003: 20) has argued, ‘given globalisation, it may be appropriate for Australia to seek alternative conceptualisations of what constitutes its national population.’ It is in this nexus between territoriality and supra-territoriality that the broadly defined notion of AE security in the targeted localities is explored.

Moreover, as implied above, beyond the current debates about the nature and conditions of citizenship, it must be emphasised that ‘security’ itself also remains an evolving and contested concept (Baylis & Smith 2005). There is a general consensus that it implies freedom from threats to the core values of individuals/groups as citizens of states and, increasingly, as individuals/groups within the broader collectivity known as humanity. There is, however, a major debate about whether the main focus of enquiry should be on personal/individual, group/community, national, or international/global security. In Australia, as elsewhere, security traditionally has been defined in terms of the state protecting its people (especially its citizens) from the intentional harmful actions of ‘outsiders’. The state thus ensures domestic security by preventing citizens from harming other citizens and seeks to protect itself from attack by other states or actors (Wesley 1999). Gyngell and Wesley (2007: 233 & 238) neatly point out a basic paradox here (emphasis added, in italics):

For any state, then, security against coercion is an existential value; without security it cannot maintain any independence or work with confidence towards the values held to be important by its own society. Unlike prosperity, which is an aspirational value oriented towards the steady improvement of a society’s material wealth, security is a prudential value, conceived as a condition which must be maintained against others’ potential to degrade it.

So, the security concern of most states extends considerably further than their territorial limits, and their security interests dictate that they will have a certain level of investment in a stable international order. The question is, how far should the security concerns of states extend past their borders?

Despite the Australian public’s nervousness about trans-national threats as captured in [a] Lowy Institute poll [in 2006], it appears that that the default setting of security policy making in Australia is dominated by traditional concepts of security.

Thus, such older definitions (and doctrines or policies) seem clearly too narrow and inadequate for current global circumstances and have been challenged on a number of fronts (see Buzan 1991 & Waever 1993). Global terrorism (and non-traditional conflict generally), trans-national crime, global environmental and economic concerns, and the security (and best interests) of states and individuals residing beyond their countries are growing challenges. This was recognised in the 1993-94 United Nations Human Development
Report (Current History 1995) which argued that the concept of security should be expanded to include ‘human security’ (including the security of humanity as a whole)—that is, ‘the legitimate concerns of ordinary people [no matter where they are] who [seek] security in their daily lives. . . [their] protection from the threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression, and environmental hazards’. It went on to stress that ‘the security of states is essential, but not sufficient’, and added that the threats to the well being or dignity of citizens particularly, and residents or visitors generally, can often arise from human security and human rights problems both amongst and within states.

Over time, a number of international agreements, covenants and conventions, as well as several institutions and regimes have emerged within the glocal continua to protect the human rights of both citizens and individuals. Many of these are comprehensively expressed in what has become known as the ‘International Bill of Rights’, and include the ‘Universal Declaration on Human Rights’ (1948) and the ‘International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1966). Relevant institutions that have evolved are the International Criminal Court (2002) and the United Nations Human Rights Council (2006). In addition, many non-governmental organisations (NGOs), such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have come to play important monitoring and advocacy roles concerning human rights. However, it is undeniable that human rights have been variously interpreted in accordance with both universalist and cultural relativist perspectives, and that the rights of persons and the interests of states sometimes collide creating tensions.

Moreover, it has been argued that the dual processes of integration and fragmentation characterising today’s world, labelled ‘fragmegration’ by Rosenau (see McMillen 1997), suggest that much more attention should be given to societal and human security on a glocal scale. As Camilleri and Falk (1992: 254-55) have proposed (emphasis added, in italics):

> If they persist, the twin trends of globalization and its corollary, domestic fragmentation, are likely to weaken the conceptual and practical foundations of sovereignty: firstly, by challenging the notion that state authority is exercised exclusively or even primarily within clearly demarcated boundaries; secondly, by calling into question the claim that within its territory the state’s authority is unlimited and indivisible; and, thirdly, by suggesting a growing disjunction between state and civil society, between political authority and economic organization, and between national identification and social cohesion.

This has led some analysts to contend that ethno-nationalist and other groups (regardless of their citizenship), rather than states, should become the centre of attention for security analysts. The intensification of ‘interconnectedness’, Kaldor (1999) has posed, means that ideological and/or territorial cleavages of earlier eras incrementally have been supplanted by an emerging political cleavage between cosmopolitanism, based on inclusive multicultural values, and the politics of particular communitarian identities, based on much narrower values. And, this has required peace-keeping (either humanitarian or law-and-order) interventions into some otherwise sovereign, but ‘troubled’ or ‘failing’, states. Others go on to argue that the emergence of an embryonic global society demands that more attention be focused on humanity as a whole as well as on the dignity and protection of persons (as individuals), and not just at the nation-state level. According to Gyngell and Wesley (2007: 236):
There is now a large body of opinion arguing that the greatest sources of insecurity are not states, but trans-national threats. Relying on the flows and technologies of globalisation, these new threats come in the form of networks of non-state actors distributed across several societies, interacting amidst the vast quantity of transactions occurring daily in a globalised world [emphasis added, in italics].

And, the broader notion of human security also raises the salience of what have been called ‘grey area phenomena’ that are said to be under-rated, but highly pervasive and borderless, security issues (see Chalk 2001). As suggested above, they include the impacts of environmental degradation/global warming, the spread of disease, the trafficking of narcotics and human beings, burgeoning trans-national criminal syndication, increasing problems of glocal governance and law and order, nuclear proliferation and, of course, terrorism. Alan Dupont (2001: 7) argues that in a world of increasing interdependence where demands for resources are outstripping supply, a concept of ‘extended security’ is required that acknowledges the old drivers of conflict have not been rendered suddenly impotent as they coexist in the same space as the new trans-national forces and may be influenced or intensified by them.

A Lowy Institute Poll (LIP 2007: 2-3 & 18-29) was conducted as an interactive telephone survey in Australia between 21 May-2 June 2007, which included results from a similar poll undertaken in Australia and New Zealand in 12-16 April 2007 on behalf of the Australia New Zealand Leadership Forum. As our study explores relevant foreign policy and security phenomena to ascertain the degree of resonance they have for the AEs, some of the findings of the LIP 2007 provide a useful backdrop for future investigations in the selected sites, and for later comparative purposes. It should be kept in mind that the respondents to the LIP 2007 were in Australia and not overseas, and thus it is highly likely that surveys/interviews amongst AEs could reveal different responses given their differing experiences and perspectives in overseas localities.

Interestingly, in the LIP 2007 it was noted that 74% of the 1,003 respondents in Australia aged 18+ felt that in dealing with international problems, Australia’s democratic or humanitarian values should be considered more important than its economic or political interests (18%). Tackling climate change and protecting the jobs of Australian workers were then deemed to be the two most foreign policy goals. When asked how optimistic respondents were overall about Australia’s economic performance in the world and how optimistic they were about Australia’s international security over the next five years, the results are shown in Table 2.1 (LIP 2007: 18-19). This, of course, pre-dates the 2008-2009 global financial downturn and other events.

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When thinking about world events, most respondents stated they ‘felt safe’, but recognised the existence of external threats—the most worrying of which were global climate change and nuclear weapons proliferation. Respondents’ basic sense of security (LIP 2007: 8) was found to be unchanged since a previous poll in February 2005, being ‘resoundingly positive’ with 90% feeling either ‘very safe’ (40%) or ‘safe’ (50%). When ranking a list of ten threats according to the proportion of respondents who said they were ‘very worried’, the poll found that unequivocally, the most worrying threat from the outside world was global climate change (55%) followed by unfriendly countries developing nuclear weapons (50%). Fewer (but still a significant number) of respondents were ‘very worried’ about Islamic fundamentalism (39%), international terrorism (38%), infectious diseases like bird flu or SARS (34%), illegal immigration (26%), world population growth (22%), and economic competition from low-wage countries (21%). China’s growing power (19%) and failing states in the adjacent region (14%) ranked as the two least worrying potential threats. However, when responses were ranked by aggregating the proportions of respondents who were ‘very worried’ and ‘fairly worried’ about each of the ten threats, climate change topped the rankings at 86%, followed again by unfriendly countries developing nuclear weapons. The only notable change was in reference to China’s growing power (47%), which by this measure was still the least worrying potential threat (although in a LIP Poll 2009 this worry has risen somewhat).

Also, Australia’s free trade agreements (FTAs) with China and Japan, both under negotiation, were thought of positively by a significant proportion of respondents (38%), but not by a majority. The prospect of a China FTA enjoyed less support amongst respondents in 2007 than it did in 2005 (51%), and the prospect of a Japan FTA was substantially more popular than that with China (47% versus 38%). In terms of feelings about other countries on a 100-degree ‘thermometer’, China obtained a lukewarm rating of 56 degrees (5 degrees cooler than in 2006) compared to a warmer rating of 81 and 75 degrees for New Zealand and Great Britain (LIP 2007: 6). On the other hand, respondents felt that the most important economies for Australia were, respectively, China, the United States and Japan, and that 25 years from now China would be far in front of all others. When asked to rate the importance for Australia of five economies on a scale of 1 (least) to 10 (most), China was given a 7.17 ranking and the United States and Japan were given 6.99 and 6.91, respectively. The results for 25 years from now were: China (7.76), Japan 7.01) and the United States (6.72). The result for India, at 6.54, was almost equal to that of the United States.

Finally, and of particular relevance here, “protecting Australian citizens overseas” was also considered important to respondents in the LIP 2007 (19), with 93% saying it was important, 63% “very important”, and 30% “fairly important”. Also, most respondents (83%) said it was the government’s duty to assist Australians caught up in dangerous events in another country, even if they are dual citizens (71%). Again, this highlights the realities of the increasing linkage, if not the growing seamlessness, between what formerly were perceived as the “dichotomous realms” of the domestic and the external—particularly as increasing numbers of Australian citizens venture abroad for any length of time. In turn, this has prompted concerns about how to contrive policies (and address attitudes) that are inclusive of such a ‘more extended citizenry’.
Despite the impacts of CAG, though, Clark (1999) has reminded us that the state nonetheless remains the key referent in debates about security, and contended that the central question about contemporary security is not whether it should be re-conceptualised around individuals, societies, or ‘new solidarities’ as alternatives to the state, but how the practice of states is being reconfigured to take account of such new societal/human groupings and their concerns—particularly given the trans-national movement of people beyond their states of citizenship or long-term attachment. As the Hugo Report 2003 has argued, ‘Australia has a substantial diaspora in comparative global terms and its position in the world economy would suggest that it will grow rapidly.’ And, as the Lowy Report (2004: 47) noted:

Australian leaders . . . have been relatively muted on the subject of the [Australian] diaspora.

Prime Minister John Howard and Foreign Minister Alexander Downer have spoken about the importance of protecting Australians abroad, but there has been no coordinated effort to embrace the diaspora rhetorically (emphasis added, in italics).

On 21 April 2006, in an article entitled ‘Expats are not ingrates but fellow citizens’ distributed on the Advance—Global Australian Professionals web site, John Fillilove quoted a remark made by Prime Minister Howard that received virtually no press coverage:

“I do not share the view sometimes expressed in my country that ‘isn’t that terrible’ [and] ‘why can’t we bring them all [the 1 million Australian diaspora] home’.

For a country such as Australia, a diaspora is both inevitable and desirable. It is a good thing for our people to go abroad to get experience and sometimes to make their fortune . . . we have to teach our young and our talented to be adaptable, not to be parochial, and I think we’ve been very successful at it” (http://www.advance.org/).

On the other hand, one must recognise that recent global/regional events—such as terrorism, various conflicts, trans-national crime, massive trans-national movements of people, the health of the global economy, pandemic threats, and global warming—have contributed to a renewed emphasis by many states (including Australia) on ‘homeland security’. These have stimulated somewhat of a revival of territorially-based notions about security and a partial narrowing of more cosmopolitan outlooks and policies, such as those pertaining to international travel, customs processes, immigration, citizenship, residency, and so on. This has resulted in attempts by the authorities of more multicultural states to more carefully monitor their borders (and persons, goods and finances crossing them—for whatever reasons), and to more closely scrutinise some social groups within their states to assure that domestic order is not upset. Hence, the continued Neo-Liberal economic rhetoric about free trade also is now to some extent ‘conditioned’ by the realities of less free cross-border movements of all types. In recent years, for example, Canberra has taken a tougher stance on human trafficking and refugee management, including on-shore detention policies, the so-called ‘Pacific Solution’ involving offshore refugees, and the ‘forward scrutiny’ of such phenomena in sites of origin.

In a relevant sense, the operative provisions of the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 entered into force on 1 July 2007. According to the SCG, which had lobbied Canberra for several years to enhance certain ‘rights’ of the Australian diaspora, the Act contained a number of important fixes for families in the Australian diaspora (‘Occasional Newsletter,’ No. 1, 2007, http://www.southern-cross-group.org/, accessed 21 September 2007). An estimated 100,000 individuals outside Australia became newly qualified to apply for
Australian citizenship on the basis of descent or resumption. On the other hand, in what could be labelled ‘conditioned citizenship’, in 2006-07 the Howard government introduced legislation for tougher citizenship laws that included tests for those seeking to become Australian citizens (although not for those migrating and settling in Australia on permanent or provisional visas). These new citizenship processes were to publicly emphasise the importance of Australian history and values and a higher level of English language proficiency (hence, the ‘common bonds’ referred to above). A draft Citizenship Test Resource Book was released on 26 August 2007, from which the questions for the citizenship test were to be drawn. It stressed cultural diversity, freedom of religion, a society governed by the rule of law, a nation of proud sports traditions, and ‘mateship’. It also went on to emphasise that Australia has a secular government with no official or state religion, and that religious laws have no legal status in the country. As Immigration and Citizenship Minister, Kevin Andrews, stated [emphasis added, in italics]:

> It is important that people wishing to become Australian citizens demonstrate an understanding and commitment to Australia and our way of life. Before becoming a citizen it is reasonable to expect that a person will understand the core values that have helped to create a society that is stable yet dynamic, cohesive yet diverse. Respect for the free thinking individual and the rule of law are the foundations of the Australian liberal democratic tradition (The Australian, 27 August 2007: 5).

The Australian Citizenship Amendment Bill (Citizenship Testing) 2007 was passed by the Australian Senate on 10 September with some minor Government amendments after the House of Representatives had approved the original Bill on 8 August. The test was to apply from 1 October 2007. Throughout the Parliamentary debates concerning the new bill, the Labor Party supported the Government's legislation, but the Australian Democrats and Greens Party opposed it. Democrats Senator Andrew Bartlett described it as ‘bad policy, and a throwback to the [era of] “cultural cringe”’. He went on to state:

> This citizenship test is not necessary. At best, I think it will just be a large waste of money and a bit of light entertainment every now and then for the media to run some of the test questions . . . against your so-called average Australian in shopping malls. But, more dangerous, is the potential for it to be used consciously, or even subconsciously, as an exclusionary device (Epoch Times 12-18 September 2007: 2).

Thus, the desire for skilled migrants or repatriates aside, a greater ‘top-down’ (that is, ‘statist’) attention in 2007-08 was clearly being given to determining the loyalty and commitment of peoples to Australia so as to enhance civic nationalism and security, as well as to counter (or at least minimise) other negative aspects of globalism. In one sense, however, this seems to have reiterated an earlier conception and configuration (that is ‘construction’) of an ‘Us’/’Them’ identity and citizenship in Australia.

In earlier times, given their differences in culture, politics and history, Australia and its Asian neighbours had relied heavily on the juridical principle of ‘negative comity’—meaning that even though they disagreed, they respected each other’s laws, institutions and juridical decisions (Wesley 2008: 177). As noted in the previous discussion of the ‘Bali Process’, the more positive side of the Howard government’s practice of ‘trans-national diplomacy’—as a component of its broader foreign policy agenda over the past half decade—is highly relevant for Australian citizens residing or venturing beyond their state, both explicitly and implicitly. Rather than simply respecting each other’s laws, institutions and juridical decisions, Australia and its
regional neighbours have begun collaborating to draft relevant legislation on a variety of issues and help each other in its implementation. This has involved an extraordinary movement of Australian officials sent to work with regional counterparts on such shared concerns—creating what Slaughter (2004: 14) has called ‘horizontal governance networks’—that is, ‘patterns of regular and purposive relations among like government units working across the borders that divide states from one another and that demarcate the domestic from the international sphere.’

However, it needs to be noted that in the domestic domain AEs—as a generic grouping of citizens residing beyond their state—continue to have little representation in Australian political institutions or processes. This does not compare favourably with other states that have established processes and mechanisms to give meaningful (participatory, or ‘civic’) voice to their overseas compatriots so far as ‘home affairs’ are concerned. For example, states such as France, Portugal, Croatia, and Italy reserve seats in their legislative organs for their expats (Senate Report 2005: Chapter 8). Australian authorities then stated that such representation for AEs raises ‘constitutional issues’ and that ‘a referendum may be necessary’ to accommodate them. Several countries also have government-sponsored representative bodies or endorse non-governmental bodies representing their expats, although in a largely advisory capacity. To name but a few, they include: France—a ‘Senior Council of the French Abroad’; Greece—a ‘World Council of Hellenes Abroad’, overseen by the ‘General Secretariat for Greeks Abroad’ and answerable to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Switzerland—a ‘Council of the Swiss Abroad’, largely funded by the Swiss government; India—a dedicated research facility called the ‘Centre for the Study of the Indian Diaspora’ at Hyderabad University, and the appointment by the Ministry of External Affairs of a ‘High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora’; and The Irish Republic—a government-funded ‘Task Force on Policy Regarding Emigrants’ and a proposal for the establishment of an ‘Agency for the Irish Abroad’ under the Department of Foreign Affairs.

While the Senate Report 2005 (122) recognised the need for ‘a body dedicated to developing and coordinating policy related to Australian expatriates’, it only went so far as to recommend that the Australian government establish within the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade ‘a small policy coordination unit’ focussed on expatriate affairs, the enhancement of databases by Australian overseas missions concerning local Aussie expats, and the introduction of a web portal devoted to the provision of information and services to them. To late 2007, movement on these recommendations appeared to have been rather slow. It could be said that this was predictable, given that the Senate Report 2005 (123 and 127) stated ‘the Committee does not believe it is necessary or desirable to attempt to include AEs in the Australian Census’ and ‘voting should continue to be non-compulsory for overseas Australians.’ However, the Senate Committee did go so far as to report that it strongly believed Australian citizenship law and policy needed to be reviewed continuously so as to evolve in a manner that would reflect changing global conditions and the country’s increasingly mobile population. It recommended that DIMIA (now DIAc) establish an advisory committee to assist in this process.

**Some Summary Thoughts**

So, where has, or where might, all of this take us (and others) in terms of serious and appropriately framed considerations about the issues treated in the 1st Annual Dialogue Forum? First, the authors here have
discussed the emergence of glocal continua within which there are both synergising and contending forces that are conditioned by alternative identities, loyalties or agendas that relate to contemporary nation-states. The reasoning is that what happens in more locally today may somewhere, some time, or some how have an affect on other glocalities in wider geospatial arenas. Indeed, the early 21st century has become a time in human history when the quest for strategic resources is especially crucial for all actors, including the PRC and Australia, if they are to fuel continued economic development necessary for prosperity, achieve stable and legitimised domestic and global governance, and manage associated environmental, health and law and order issues that are crucial to the sustainable futures of all peoples everywhere. Citing Australia as an example, Glenn Milne aptly suggested that these problems intersect glocally:

Right now, the politics of climate change are being masked by the economics of the global financial meltdown. The truth is that people are now more focused on the brutal beating their superannuation is taking than on climate change. Signs are that vote sentiment about the importance of climate change has already shifted. The Lowy Institute recently reported that voter concerns about global warming have dropped to fifth on worry lists. The economy and jobs is No. 1. These economic wind patterns are likely to push people more towards being climate-change sceptics. They will be looking towards their wallets rather than to the weather (Sunday Mail, 2 November 2008: 72).

And, Michael McConnell, cited as being a director of America’s national intelligence’, has warned that ‘the world faces a growing risk of conflict over the next 20 to 30 years amidst an unprecedented transfer of wealth and power from West to East’ (Sunday Mail, 2 November 2008: 40). He predicted that a rising demand for food and fuel, strategic competition over new technologies, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction would increase the probability for tension and conflict between nations and within nation-state entities. He described the emergence of a ‘new world’ by 2025 that would be shaped by the rise of China, India and Brazil, whose economies will match those of the Western industrial states. China then would likely have the world’s second-largest economy, greater military capability and reach, rank as the largest importer of natural resources, and become the largest contributor to world pollution. It is poised, he said, ‘to have more impact on the world over the next twenty years than any other country.’ Other parts of the world, however, face a vulnerable future as global climate change will exacerbate existing resource scarcities. Some 1.4 billion people in 36 countries will suffer a lack of basic necessities such as potable water and food—and this would contribute to tensions all at levels.

Second, other geopolitical factors conceivably could have a telling influence on local, national, regional and global events or processes. In terms of on-going tension/conflict, there is the case of Iraq where any wind-down of American-led forces in that Muslim state could leave it ‘independent’ but politically and economically fragile. Such an ‘American-led retreat’ might bring some ‘comfort’ to certain actors in terms of any ‘loss of face’ felt by a struggling Superpower whose glocal clout could be seen as waning. On the other hand, the same developments might give succour to ethno-nationalist/religious elements in terms of their abilities to ‘take-on and cast-out’ the forces of any great state actor. In the future, this could mean that a ‘Rising China’, for instance, might face similar costly challenges in consolidating its broader security interests in its own backyard (as in the case of the events in Xinjiang from June-July 2009).

Third, and in perhaps a somewhat idealistic vein, one could hope that the various dimensions of glocality might be objectively considered in future scholarly and official assessments. Moreover, one also would like
to think that our attention to issues of broadly based security would include concerns about the more human conditions of those peoples situated in such glocal realms. Like it or not, issues that ought to be factored into any assessment concerning the future of peoples ‘living glocally’ include accountable governance, human rights and human dignity, environmental sustainability, poverty/inequality, grey area phenomena related to well-being and health (including the scourge of HIV/AIDS and H1N1), and reasonable aspirations that are universal to persons no matter their locality or ethnicity.

Fourth, the discussion related to the case study on AEs in this essay has posed a number of questions about the notions of ‘glocality’, and has considered the challenges faced by expats from Australia in the PRC and the HKSAR and, ultimately, by expats in Australia from those jurisdictions (as well Aussie repatriates who have resided in those places.) Among these very real challenges, now increasingly recognised by their home/host governments and societies, are such expats’ continuing search for identity, appropriate conditions of citizenship, and senses of security (see McMillen 2006b). To a large measure, they relate to an Australia that continues to ‘come to terms’ with itself glocally in terms of its place and interests in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond—a quest that, since late 2007, persists in a post-Howard era under a Labor government led by Prime Minister Kevin Rudd (a Mandarin speaker). But, as a part of any positive policy initiatives, it must be recognised that expatriation, especially involving Aussies, constitutes not simply a movement of peoples, but is a very complicated and demanding negotiation and adjustment about human identities, mutual perceptions, and appropriate skills, with all the social dynamics, emotions and, especially, broadly based concerns about well being and empowerment that accompany them. In support of such views and policies, it is essential that there should be better qualitative evidence, partly based on the role of states and partly on the notion of human agency. This should be obtained on the issues that matter most to AEs—ranging from their notions and practice of citizenship, personal safety, financial and other security, socio-cultural identities, and ‘connexities’ to both host/home places.

Fifth, in terms of identity issues, the authors’ research to date confirms the Senate Report 2005 finding that most AEs ‘still call Australia home’. BUT, especially for many whose heritage is not Australian or for those who have a dual nationality status, many notions about home are not necessarily singular or clear (McMillen 2006b). Their identities and attachments frequently are multiple, often ‘glocal’, and not necessarily fixed. In spatial terms, distance to some degree has been overcome by newer technologies that make the processes of mobility less daunting and attachments and identities easier to maintain or establish—and AEs’ attachments and identities are demonstrated to be an amalgam of views affected by both distance and proximity. On the one hand, ‘home can be where the heart is’. On the other hand, ‘home is what one makes of it, wherever one finds oneself’. And, in temporal terms, AEs’ concerns about the now are frequently conditioned by thoughts about their future, and the length of time they have spent venturing beyond their home state(s). as well as the evolving conditions that have played into these concerns.

Sixth, the policies of home and host authorities, and the social attitudes in such locales, have a significant bearing on expats' senses of worth and safety. Beyond personally negotiating the complexities of their own evolving experiences and identities—which can be essential features in minimizing feelings of insecurity—and taking measures to maintain or enhance their own affinities with both home and host places so as to establish a sense of personal security, to date our research has indicated that AEs have expectations about
what governments can (and should) or cannot (should not) do to promote conditions that enhance the inclusion and protection of citizens/peoples abroad. It only has been over the past decade that various state authorities (such as those in Australia) have begun to seriously take a deeper (and wider) interest in their ‘diaspora’, and to establish some policies and mechanisms that might better serve them. Our research has noted the beginnings of an appreciation that national (hence, citizen) security and human security DO count—that both are in the now broadened national interest. The processes associated with CAG, more recent global and regional events, and changing domestic conditions and needs all have prompted such considerations.

Seventh, as emphasised above, all of this demands that more qualitative efforts be made (and supported) to assess the conditions, needs and expectations of AEs, as citizens or persons with long-standing ties to states like Australia. Our initial findings suggest that many agree that these efforts must be made with a cognisance about a plethora of complex jurisdictional challenges that continue to globally affect both individuals and governments. Also, what is deemed to be ‘politically and socially acceptable’ to home or host populations (including ‘domestic political party contests) need to be taken into consideration. For example, noting the importance of the ‘Australia’s diaspora’ generally, one expatriate’s submission to the Senate Report 2005 (42) stated:

It seems to me that a far more inclusive [Australian] citizenship law and policy . . . is a logical and necessary prerequisite to fully embracing the phenomenon that is the Australian diaspora. In fact, it is crucial if indeed our great country is ever to reach a full understanding, as a nation, that those of us who are physically outside Australia’s territorial boundaries are still an integral part of Australia.

It also has been proposed that the phenomenon of ‘Rising China’—whether ‘benign’ or otherwise in its behaviour, will continue to be of relevance to a number of issues. But, it is undeniable that many AEs of Chinese ancestry in the PRC and the HKSAR who retain ties to Australia as one of their ‘homes’ (and the same could be said for their counterparts in Australia who may retain similar links to a ‘Greater China’) must be somewhat frustrated by being caught between cultures and jurisdictions, let alone by periodic trends like the earlier racially tinged polemics of ‘Hansonism’ or ‘Han chauvanism’ or the more recent phenomena of global terrorism and transnational crime. Of meaning to persons of Chinese heritage who experience expatriation (and venturing in general), are Leo Suryadinata’s (1997: 20) comments about the ethnic Chinese of Southeast Asia:

The issue of Chinese identity will resurface from time to time. In a country where the concept of ‘nation’ is more liberal, it will be easier for the Chinese to adapt; while in a country where the concept of “nation” is rigid, this adaptation will be more difficult.

If his latter scenario were to apply, Australia (for one) either could be viewed as a less attractive migrant destination or, on the other hand, as an ‘ethnic exodus’ destination—which might have enormous implications for states and actors at both ends of such movements. And, arguably, the same logic could basically apply to Australians of non-Chinese heritage who venture overseas to experience periods of expatriation.
Thus, there will be an on-going need for knowledge and understanding, mutual socio-cultural tolerance, and even compassion, by Australians (and others) for such AEs as persons who are experiencing what amounts to a seminal transition involving adjustment processes in their lives. Of necessity, beyond AEs’ obvious value as economic actors and/or ambassadors of their home state(s) and their accrued nous about ‘the world out there’ generally, there exists the continuing challenge to all actors having extended connections, and sometimes presumed divided loyalties, of sorting-out a positive niche in jurisdictions like Australia and the sites of investigation. No matter who they are or where they may reside, such persons neither should be seen as faceless numbers to be ‘bean-counted’, nor ‘auctioned-off’ to past prejudices, nor treated as ‘hostages to pure economic profit or sometimes narrow national interests’. Undeniably, many Australian AEs (and their counterparts in Australia) may be ‘people of a different skin’, but they are fundamentally ‘Australians’ by citizenship or long-term attachment and association—and often by choice, no matter what their motives may have been, however difficult such a decision undoubtedly was for them, and regardless of where they may now reside. Beyond the need for the critical skills they could bring to Australia’s (or other states’) workforce, they are, at base, human beings whose individual value, concerns and well being must be recognised and addressed.

Therefore, in forging a stronger Australia as it moves further into a future fraught with ‘uncertainties’, and as Australia and Australians strive to sensitively manage the political/jurisdictional, socio-cultural, economic, and security dimensions of ‘Us-ness’ glocally, neither Australian authorities, educators, nor the Australian public (or their counterparts) should lose the plot of caring about venturers. It should be recognised that the days are now long gone when anyone, Australian authorities and society included (or their Chinese counterparts), can expect to perform successfully, and safely, at any competitive cutting edge by shadow dancing within ‘borders’ of such concerns. One could be somewhat anxious, however, that those in variously located policy-making circles, both in Australia and in China, might think this is ‘just all too academic, theoretical, or utopian’—that we do not need to be concerned about the largely faceless individuals in our now glocalised political society who live in far-away places and may be deemed to have little impact on the Realpolitik of any ‘New Great Games’ (or lesser ones) that others play on their fields of dreams. Like it or not, such issues as discussed herein require an effort to engage in real and open dialogue (as in the 1st Dialogue Forum of the Sino-Australian Research Program), both in scholarly terms and in more ‘official’ circles—and, perhaps, a combination of both glocally.

To re-emphasise, as the initial research on this ‘case study’ of AEs cited herein has indicated, the dimensions of traditional and non-traditional security and the factors related to uncertainty, security and sustainability and identity do seem to ‘dovetail’ in today’s more glocalised world. It is crucial, however, that both states AND peoples (especially as individual human beings of worth and dignity) must be considered in any investigation—quantitatively and qualitatively. This is an absolute necessity, however difficult any problems may be, IF appropriate and widely acceptable policies are to be developed by ‘those having authority or influence’ in the glocal continua. As Roger Stone’s keynote paper on global climate change has rightly suggested, ‘we must “connect the dots”—that is, climate change information [or that about any other issue] has no value unless it can impact constructively on policy and management positions.’
Sources


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## Appendix 2.1: A Glossary of Terms

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>TERMS IN ENGLISH</th>
<th>TERMS IN CHINESE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Autonomously</td>
<td>自·地</td>
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<tr>
<td>Balkans</td>
<td>巴·干</td>
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<tr>
<td>Borderless</td>
<td>无国界,无界</td>
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<tr>
<td>Citizenship/Citizenship</td>
<td>公民/市民</td>
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<tr>
<td>Continuum/Continua</td>
<td>一体,间</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conditional/Conditioned</td>
<td>有条件的·受条件限制的</td>
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<td>Critique</td>
<td>批··</td>
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<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>差异,不同</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dignity</td>
<td>尊·高·,体面</td>
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<tr>
<td>Everyday People</td>
<td>老百姓</td>
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<tr>
<td>Expatriate</td>
<td>民,移居国外者</td>
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<tr>
<td>Extensity</td>
<td>流·,范·</td>
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<tr>
<td>Flows/Currents</td>
<td>流·、流量·流程·流通·潮流</td>
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<tr>
<td>Flux</td>
<td>流·, 迁</td>
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<tr>
<td>Integrated</td>
<td>完整的,合的</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inter-Connectedness</td>
<td>相互·系,内在系</td>
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<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>公平,正·,司法</td>
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<tr>
<td>Multi-Dimensional</td>
<td>多·体,多重</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nei/Wai Dichotomy</td>
<td>二分法</td>
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<tr>
<td>Networking/Networks</td>
<td>·系,系</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shared Social Space</td>
<td>共有社交圈</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sovereignty</td>
<td>主·,治·,君主</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transcend</td>
<td>超越·,建·,凌·</td>
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