Explaining National Identity: From Group Attachments to Collective Action

Daniel Druckman
Abstract
This paper discusses the motivations, perceptions, and cognitions that are the foundation for group identity and stereotypes. Forming the basis for larger national identities, these attachments and categorizations are shown to be instrumental in mobilizing group members for collective action leading often to war. Drawing on literatures in social psychology, comparative politics, and international relations, an attempt is made to bridge the micro and macro levels of analysis. The research reviewed is organized into a framework that connects social-psychological processes of identity formation to inter-group conflict within and between nations. Group loyalties are connected to collective actions through the influence of public opinion, political representation, policy-making, and norms. This framework is broadened further by considering variability in a society’s political institutions, events that mark transitions in regimes or political cultures, and receptivity to appeals made by policy-making elites. The paper concludes with some implications for the resolution of conflicts between groups and nations and identifies a number of avenues for further research.
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Preamble

The literature on nationalism has exploded since the end of the cold war. Scholars in most of the social science disciplines have turned their attention to this topic. The conflicts that have arisen in the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia concerned matters of identity. These conflicts have brought the issue of nationalism to the fore. For Kedourie, nationalism has become “that other ideological obsession” revived in a “revulsion against socialist tyranny” (1993, p. xvii). For Gellner (1997) and others, it is a strong group identity that can become a source of virulent inter-group conflict.

But, whether nationalism is construed as an ideology or as a sentimental group attachment, there is little doubt that it is an important source of conflict around the world. For this reason, many social scientists are compelled to provide an understanding of the origins and consequences of nationalism.

In this paper I attempt to capture the recent scholarship on national identity. The review extends my earlier work on social-psychological perspectives on group identity in several directions (Druckman 1994, 2001). By so doing, the problem of national identity is cast in a broader framework. The extensions deal with each of three parts of the problem: group attachments, group categorizations, and collective action. They consist of: a) providing an historical context for the issues, b) discussing the variety of explanations for partisan biases and stereotypes contributing to inter-group conflict, c) developing the logic for connecting individual sentiments (at a micro level) to collective action (at a macro level), d) showing how the connections can be made, and e) proposing an agenda for further research on each part. While focusing attention primarily on the most recent research, the discussion takes earlier work into account as well.

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Introduction

Evaluative distinctions are often made between us and them. When Chinese policymakers, commenting on the China-Taiwan conflict, say that “we would rather lose a thousand soldiers than lose an inch of land” (quoted in Newsweek, August 30, 1999), they are assigning extraordinary value to their homeland, indicating the lengths
they would go to protect it against claims made by other groups. We may ask first, just how prevalent are these loyalties? Second, what are the conditions under which they occur, when are they exacerbated, when ameliorated? Third, how can intense loyalties be explained; what kinds of theories are relevant and how can they be evaluated?¹

In this article I discuss the perceptions, motivations, and cognitions that are the bases for group identities and stereotypes. Providing a foundation for larger national identities, these attachments are shown to be instrumental in mobilizing group members for collective action leading to war.² The research reviewed is organized into a framework that connects social-psychological processes of identity formation to inter-group conflict within and between nations. The paper is divided into four parts, group attachments, group categorizations, reducing ethnocentrism, and collective actions. A concluding section is followed by a number of avenues for further research.

**Group Attachments**

Attachments are discussed in this section in relation to ethnocentrism. Beginning with Sumner’s postulation of an ethnocentric syndrome, I discuss some issues raised by the definition and provide illustrative empirical evidence for its manifestation. I then review alternative approaches intended to explain ethnocentrism.

**Categorical Distinctions (“us” and “them”) and Dimensions**

In his 1906 book titled *Folkways*, Sumner claimed that there is a universal syndrome of ethnocentrism. He posited that all groups are ethnocentric, defined as evaluating the ingroup more favorably (at the “center”) than outgroups (further removed from the “center”). It is the concomitance of ingroup amity and outgroup enmity that defines the concept. The universal claim for this concomitance is taken as an hypothesis. It is manifest in the distinctions made by group members in the following table:

¹ Five reasons are suggested for studying this phenomenon: a) it is essential to the understanding of group dynamics and inter-group relations; b) it underlies conformity to group norms; c) it contributes to an understanding of extraordinary actions taken by group members; d) it contributes to difficulties in resolving conflicts between groups, and e) it is a basis for simplified images of other groups, inaccurate attributions, and stereotypes.

² Nationality is defined here in terms of identity rather than in terms of ethnicity or culture. National sentiments and identities are viewed as cutting across ethnic and cultural boundaries. For a similar definition, see Kupchan’s (1995) treatment of the resurgence of European nationalism.
Table 1: Attitudes towards ingroup and outgroup

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Attitudes toward ingroup</strong></th>
<th><strong>Attitudes toward outgroup</strong></th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>See us as virtuous and superior</td>
<td>See them as contemptible, immoral, and inferior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>See our standards of value as universal, intrinsically true. See our customs as original, centrally human</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>See us as strong</td>
<td>See outgroups as weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanctions against ingroup murder and theft</td>
<td>Lack of sanctions for outgroup theft and murder (in warfare)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperative relations with ingroup members</td>
<td>Social distance, dislike, lack of cooperation with outgroup members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obedience to ingroup authorities</td>
<td>Lack of obedience to outgroup authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness/desire to remain an ingroup member</td>
<td>Absence of conversion to outgroup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness to fight and die for the ingroup</td>
<td>No willingness to fight and die for outgroups</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These depictions, made originally by Sumner (1906) and summarized by LeVine and Campbell (1972), are presented as either-or distinctions. They are contrasts of absolutes: the ingroup-outgroup attitudes are polar opposites. Such contrasts are advanced by theorists who take a hard view of inter-group conflict, namely, group members show considerable loyalty to firmly-bounded groups that persist over time (Horowitz, 1999). Does a test of the universal hypothesis depend on confirming the absolute categorizations suggested by Sumner? If so, then it is likely that the hypothesis would be rejected. Should we then consider the differences in attitudes and perceptions along dimensions such as “more or less in favor of the ingroup?” Such dimensions are advanced by theorists who take a soft view of inter-group conflict, namely, group members are motivated by rewards (rather than allegiance based on affection) provided by groups whose boundaries are problematic and malleable (Horowitz, 1999). If so, then the hypothesis is likely to be confirmed. Consider the following evaluations of the ingroup bias hypothesis:

a) In ratings of outgroups and ingroups by many people, all the outgroups receive a net unfavorable index and all the ingroups receive a favorable balance;

b) the average outgroup described by each ingroup receives a net description that is unfavorable while all ingroups receive a favorable balance;

c) all outgroups receive a less favorable description than does the focal ingroup;
d) the average outgroup described by an ingroup receives a less favorable description than does the ingroup for all ingroups studied.

All of these are correlational tests of the hypothesis; each suggests a negative correlation between ingroup and outgroup ratings or judgments. None supports the Sumner conception that ingroups are adulated while outgroups are derogated; all of them posit that outgroups are liked less (or evaluated less positively) than ingroups with some groups receiving more/less favorable ratings than others. But, this too begs the question of how high a correlation is needed for confirmation? Put another way, where should the boundaries be drawn that satisfy the criterion of favorability to ingroups? What does the empirical evidence suggest?

Two types of evidence are laboratory, including simulation, and field evidence in the ethnographic tradition. The former is more suited to hypothesis testing, the latter to descriptions of actual intergroup relations. Laboratory tests have mostly consisted of staging a conflict or contest between groups and assessing self-reported attitudes between members of the groups. An example is provided by a simulation study of ethnocentrism (Druckman, 1968).

Ethnocentrism in the Inter-Nation Simulation

In this simulation, naval recruits were assigned to one of four roles (a central decision maker [CDM], an external decision maker [EDM], a decision maker for force [DMF], and an aspiring CDM in one of five “nations,” two strong nations possessing a nuclear capability (OMNE and UTRO), two weak non-nuclear nations allied to the strong nations (ERGA and ALGO), and a neutral nation (INGO). This structure provided an opportunity to test many hypotheses about ethnocentrism: bias by ally or enemy, by strong or weak nation, by role, and by changes in the alliances. Eleven replications of the simulation made it possible to evaluate the hypotheses statistically. Each role player rated all others on a set of eight “personality traits” (liking traits, respect traits, and potency traits). By having role players rate individuals rather than groups, we reduced the extent to which the purpose of the ratings would be apparent.

The results showed all the behavior predicted by ethnocentrism theory: they rated members of their own and allied nations more favorably on most traits than members of enemy nations; they rated former enemies who had become allies more favorably than long-term allies; they rated former allies who had become enemies (renegades) less favorably than long-term enemies; the bias was particularly strong on the game-relevant liking traits; they respected strong enemies but did not like them whereas they liked weak enemies more than they respected them; the more favorable the ingroup ratings, the less favorable the outgroup ratings (as expected by ethnocentrism theory). And, group members who had more personal contact with members of other groups (“nations”) (the EDMs) displayed less of these ethnocentric behaviors while the aspiring CDMs displayed more of them.

These are impressive results. They are dimensionalized tests of the ethnocentrism hypotheses, in terms of the over or under-evaluation of members of one or another type of nation or role (e.g., the excess evaluation of members of own group in relation to members of other groups). They

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3 The procedure consisted of evaluating “halo errors” in ratings (see Guilford, 1954). These are the systematic tendencies to overvalue or undervalue a particular ratee (member of another nation, ally or
do not provide evidence for the categorical distinctions made by Sumner. Further, they are relevant to a particular setting in which ethnocentrism manifests itself, competitive decision making; and, to a particular kind of evaluation which may be more sensitive to the bias, personality judgments. Although more limited in scope, many other laboratory studies reinforce these findings. The most interesting confirmation comes from studies using the minimal group paradigm.

**Minimal-group paradigm experiments**

Minimal-group experiments consist of assigning subjects randomly to one or another ad hoc group labeled as group X or Y or, in some studies, to the blue-eyed or brown-eyed group. The classical experiment consists of asking all subjects to allocate points to each ad hoc group. Variants on this theme have consisted of having each group perform a non-competitive problem-solving task. Following the task, members are asked to rate the two groups on a number of evaluative adjectives. In many of these experiments, subjects show statistically-significant differences in ratings favoring their own group (see the reviews by Tajfel, 1982, Brewer and Kramer, 1985, and Messick and Mackie, 1989). The results of these experiments suggest that the ingroup-favoring bias does not depend on competition. It seems to occur as a result of merely being a member of a short-lived and arbitrarily-formed group (e.g., Brewer and Silver, 1978). The prevalence of these findings has encouraged some investigators to seek an explanation.

A popular explanation is based on the observation that people want to feel good about themselves relative to others. Identification with groups – even those defined in terms of arbitrary or minimal criteria – enhances a person’s self-esteem. A number of the early minimal-group experiments supported this explanation and showed that one’s own group was imbued with positive valence. More recently, experiments demonstrated that people identify with groups because the identity reduces uncertainty about how to perform a task, about the experimental setting, or about the correct solution. To the extent that identity does reduce the aversive effects of uncertainty, the group is evaluated favorably (ingroup bias). This effect then leads to positive self evaluations (enhanced self esteem) and positive evaluations of other group members (social attraction). Thus, the cognitive effect of uncertainty reduction may precede the motivational result of enhanced self-esteem. These and other explanations for group identification are discussed further below. I will also consider the question of whether the increased group attraction can occur without the corresponding outgroup derogation that defines ethnocentrism.

**Ethnographic evidence**

Further confirmation for ingroup bias comes from ethnographic studies. In their survey of the Human Relations Area Files, Campbell and LeVine (1961) concluded that of the 36 groups on which there was some information available, 35 were judged to be ethnocentric. This means that the content of the stories told by informants had ethnocentric imagery. Although this approach is highly interpretive, the consistency of the reports over so many cases provides another source of support for the universality hypothesis. Even more impressive is Firth’s (1957) report of ingroup-outgroup cleavages that developed on a small homogeneous island where people lived under identical conditions.
Thus, ingroup-favoring bias is a robust phenomenon. The desire to form groups and to differentiate them from others is so strong that it is easily activated under a variety of conditions (Horowitz, 1999). However, its prevalence does not in itself offer an explanation for its occurrence. It may be regarded as a defining feature of groups in the sense that a group’s survival depends on the loyalty of its members. We can say with confidence that a certain degree of ethnocentrism seems to exist in practically all groups. The key here is the phrase “a certain degree.” Its strength is likely to vary with a number of aspects of group structure and culture, the situation, and the group characteristics on which it is assessed. It may also be stronger at certain periods within a group’s history. Further, we know that there are instances of negative ethnocentrism – where members derogate their own group in relation to other groups (Swartz, 1961). And, the phenomenon can be construed differently when considered in the context of multiple groups (Druckman, 1994). Thus, while common-place, the extent and form of its expression varies.

Explaining Ethnocentrism

In this section, I address the question of how the phenomenon of ethnocentrism can be explained. Historically, explanations have come from two sources of theorizing: one, referred to as social cognition, was prevalent in the U.S. during the 1970s and 1980s; the other, referred to as social identity, was prevalent in Europe during this same period. The former emphasizes the way that individuals process information about others (including groups) and focuses on categorization. The latter emphasizes the social context of interaction within groups and focuses on the way that individuals relate to groups. Although this distinction depicts a contrast in the locus for explanations of ethnocentrism, the two approaches actually overlap and, more recently, are combined in providing a more comprehensive explanation. In other words, people are shown to prefer categorizing and distinguishing (in both descriptive and evaluative terms) between their own and other groups – perhaps for reasons related to self esteem – but the implications of this categorizing are understood in relation to such group phenomena as conformity and group influence, the development of group norms, cohesion, and collective action. The categorization research provides a cognitive underpinning for social identity processes (see Abrams and Hogg, 1999).

An attempt was made by Operario and Fiske (1999) to develop a framework that incorporates both the social cognition and social identity perspectives. They do this by drawing on the converging themes of individual-level processes and societal context, showing how researchers in each tradition can learn from each other. Social cognition researchers would expand their perspective by including societal variables such as power and hierarchy into their models. Similarly, social identity researchers would strengthen their theories by including carefully defined aspects of the self, particularly the way that individuals internalize their group’s norms. More generally, this framework addresses the age-old challenge for social psychologists which is to integrate the person with the societal-cultural environment.

Five explanations, deriving from these approaches, have received considerable attention in the literature.

1) Tajfel’s (1981) self-esteem theory posits that by regarding one’s own group as being superior to other groups, the individual experiences an enhancement in his or her self esteem. Experiments have shown that when individuals were allowed to discriminate (invidiously)
their own group from another group, their self esteem increased. It did not increase if the discrimination was not made. However, more recent findings raise questions about the earlier results and their interpretation (see Brewer and Brown, 1998, for a review).

2) Turner’s (1987) self-categorization theory posits that people accentuate differences such that objects in the same category appear more similar and those in different categories appear more different. This accentuation then leads to an evaluative preference for those who are more similar to oneself. The categorizations precede the bias. This is thought to be a direct relationship that does not depend on invoking an intervening process of enhanced self-esteem. However, Brown and Adams (1986) found that even when people are similar in many ways, they find ways to make distinctions. For example, the comparison may be on performance rather than group characteristics in the case of similar groups. Their evidence suggests even stronger biases for similar or neighboring countries. And, they noted that although groups may enjoy friendly and cooperative relations they still often find ways to derogate each other in making ingroup-favoring judgments (especially in competitive situations).

3) Insko and his colleagues’ (1988) consensual strategy theory posits that when groups develop unilateral strategies or plans, they become increasingly competitive and hostile toward other groups. The strategies contribute to cohesion which may intervene between the planning activity and the attitudes or behaviors. Druckman’s (1968a) study of simulated collective bargaining supports this group-process explanation: Teams that prepared strategies prior to bargaining developed more cohesion which led to more impasses than teams that studied the issues. Similarly, Thompson’s (1993) minimal-group experiment showed that when intra-group negotiations were conducted without a corresponding inter-group negotiation, the ingroup-favoring bias was enhanced. The intra-group deliberations may have increased the group’s cohesion. And, Operario and Fiske (1999) offered the hypothesis that ingroup bias is more pronounced among persons who have internalized their group than among those who perceive their group status as being contingent on the situation. Members of cohesive groups are more likely to identify more strongly with their group and internalize its norms.

4) Hogg and Mullin (1999) showed that ingroup bias varied with uncertainty. As I noted above, these investigators proposed that group membership is a way of reducing uncertainty. To the extent that the group is viewed by members as serving this function, it is imbued with positive affect that generalizes to self and fellow members. Enhanced self esteem and categorization are regarded as effects of uncertainty reduction rather than as reasons for favoring ingroups in relation to outgroups or as direct consequences of membership per se.

5) Hornsey and Hogg (2000) suggested that ethnocentric bias is strengthened when one’s own group is threatened. Identity threat is posited as an organizing concept for understanding subgroup relations. Unlike the explanations discussed above, Hornsey and Hogg consider group identity in the context of multiple groups that
characterize societies and organizations. They emphasize the tensions that exist between superordinate (e.g., national) and subordinate (e.g., ethnic) identities. Pressures placed on citizens to assimilate to the superordinate, national identity can threaten distinctive subgroup identities not shared with all members of a nation. A number of ideas are offered for achieving a balance between the more distinctive subgroup identities and the more inclusive superordinate identities. These ideas include perceptions of inclusiveness, structural relations between groups, representation of subgroups in the leadership of an organization or society, and power and status relations among subgroups. The goal is to minimize threats to identity by encouraging a “dual identification (that) reconfigures subgroup relations so that they become relatively cooperative and harmonious; destructive conflict becomes cooperative competition, and discrimination becomes differentiation” (Hornsey and Hogg, 2000: 153).

The various explanations can be considered together. Group membership contributes to self-esteem which, if enhanced, reinforces loyalty. The ingroup bias helps individuals reduce uncertainty by organizing their world and placing themselves in it. Further, the loyalties help them distinguish between those to support and whom to avoid. And, such loyalties can foster a consensus among the members that may become self-fulfilling and difficult to change. The stronger the loyalty, the more likely members will hold similar views and endorse similar strategies which, in turn, strengthen the loyalty. This makes it less likely that discrepant information will filter through or serve to change their views, thereby reducing complexity and uncertainty. Perceived similarity increases the strength of group identification which enhances the discrimination between groups and the accompanying evaluative bias (Brewer and Miller, 1996). It is strengthened further when members perceive their identity to be threatened by other, more powerful groups. Identity threat accentuates group distinctiveness in the context of a larger society or organization.

This cycle may be accentuated in periods of widespread social uncertainty and transformative change. People are often seen to become more committed in their identification with their group’s belief systems and ideologies. They may also be more vulnerable to scapegoating or conspiracy theories that target specific outgroups. At the extreme, identification with “totalist” groups can translate into atrocities as Staub (1989) showed with four cases of twentieth century genocide (Armenia, the holocaust, Cambodia, and Argentina in the 1970s). Using data from the Human Relations Area Files, Ember and Ember (1992) showed that fear about an uncertain future increased the frequency of war, especially for non-State societies. And, Kupchan noted that: “Political and economic transformation may as a matter of course induce the intensification of ethnic sentiment; such sentiment provides psychological bearings in the midst of change” (1995:11). The sentiments, and accompanying ethnocentric biases, are intensified further when the changes threaten the subgroup, ethnic identities as would occur in reaction to discrimination from majorities. A question of interest is what can be done to break into this cycle before it becomes manifest in these forms of collective action?

Overlooked by these psychological approaches, however, is a social system-maintenance function served by an ingroup-favoring bias. Preferential judgments and
associated behaviors support a status quo where some groups are privileged more than others. The social distance that is reinforced by “us-them” distinctions preserves a “top-dog/bottom-dog” social hierarchy. For political elites, preferential judgments, expressed as stereotypes, bolster “the struggle to assert and maintain control in a world of dislocations and ambivalences” (Pickering, 2001:211). But, “us-them” distinctions may also engender pride and provide a sense of community support for members of less privileged social groups.

**Group Categorizations**

Categorizations are discussed in this section in terms of stereotypes. I consider issues of accuracy, shared images, and stereotype change. This discussion is a basis for considering ways of reducing ethnocentrism, including how alternative orientations toward ingroups and outgroups are developed and sustained.

**Images of Groups as Stereotypes**

I have discussed perceptual categorization as an explanation for ethnocentric bias. These are simple, often invidious, distinctions made between groups. I have not, however, discussed the descriptive or evaluative content of these categorizations. Content refers to three aspects of images: a) the group being depicted as “they are (all of them with few exceptions) …”; b) what is said about that group as “they are arrogant…”, and c) how it is said along a positive to negative (valence) dimension as “they are undesirable/their arrogance is inexcusable…” One issue is the extent to which these images are accurate. Another issue is the extent to which the image is shared by members of the same group. A third issue to the extent to which stereotypes change.

Many studies gather data on individuals’ perceptions of groups or nations. The perceptions are regarded as being stereotypes if they are simplified descriptions (adjectives, “traits”) of the target group. To the extent that the other group is viewed as being homogeneous on a particular descriptor, it is regarded as a stereotype. Although there may be only moderate levels of agreement on descriptors across the population, they are stereotypes from the standpoint of the particular individuals sampled. The question then is the extent to which they are accurate.

**The question of accuracy**

Social psychologists approach this question with ambivalence. The long tradition of stereotyping research holds that these are simplified unrealistic images that do more harm than good, even if there is a grain of truth in them. Writing from a different disciplinary perspective, Pickering sums up his treatment as follows: “Stereotypes are also discriminatory because the stunted features or attributes of others which characterize them are considered to form the basis for negative or hostile judgements, the rationale for exploitative, unjust treatment,
or the justification for aggressive behaviour. In a word, stereotypes are bad” (2001: 10). Some recent analyses of categorization are critical of this viewpoint or tradition, claiming that categorization can be functional and may be more accurate than inaccurate. This research has gained prominence with the appearance of the Lee et al. (1995) book on stereotype accuracy.

The central argument of this book is that stereotype researchers have historically regarded stereotypes as unrealistic, inaccurate and pejorative descriptions of groups, and should thus be discouraged. In effect, they have “stereotyped” stereotypes! To balance this state of affairs, the authors suggest that many stereotypes may be reasonably accurate depictions of groups and, if so, we should spend more time evaluating their accuracy. The challenge is to determine how accuracy is to be judged.

On this issue we come across a difference of opinion about making categorical judgments about groups of people. Judgment researchers, in the Baysian tradition, emphasize the importance of categorical information that is probabilistic (Funder, 1995). They show that knowledge of base rates (percentages of rich and poor, engineers and lawyers, coups and non-coups) can improve prediction for groups. Indeed, there are certain categories about which statistical information can be obtained – such as percent of ethnic groups in different occupations, academic achievement, family size. However, even on these sorts of categories, inaccurate stereotypes can occur, first, in absence of the information and, second, by overestimating the size of the group in these categories or the frequency of events that occur in those countries.

It can be argued that the Baysian approach is relevant for available statistical information about groups. It is not relevant for the more subjective or socially constructed categories such as judging personalities of people or characteristics of groups. Viewing a group as being more homogeneous than it is (or can be) is a stereotype that, despite any grain of truth, is likely to be more inaccurate than accurate. At issue in this debate is whether a person should react to other people in terms of their membership in groups or as individuals apart from group membership. Although there are times when it may be useful to use categorical information, it must be recognized that an individual’s or group’s behavior is multiply determined and, thus, cannot be accounted for in large part by any particular group affiliation.

The issue of accuracy turns on whether members of a group behave consistently in certain ways across situations which have both time and place dimensions. It is unlikely that people placed in the same group category display many of the same behaviors across situations. It is more likely that categorizing is an attribution of the observer. The social cognition literature points toward functions of categorical or stereotypical thinking in terms of avoiding having to confront social complexity. This has been referred to by Baron (1995) and others as the “cognitive miser” effect and contrasts with approaches that view self/other categorizations in terms of structures of inequality and power relations. (See Pickering, 2001, chapter 5, for a critique of the “cognitive economy” approach.)

Social categories may, however, serve another function for organizations. By “treating other people as types may facilitate the development of group stratification” (Baron, 1995:137). At the organizational level of analysis, the tendency to fit people into roles contributes to the adaptive functioning of groups. This can become a self-fulfilling prophecy in the sense of individuals adhering to the expectations of
their assigned roles; hence, we observe a high frequency of role-determined behavior as described by role theory. This suggests an interplay between the psychological (attractiveness of categorical thinking) and the social (functions of organizational categories) levels of analysis. Stereotype accuracy may be a result of people within organizations behaving according to role expectations, and this “accuracy” may be pragmatic for group or organizational functioning. Or, in Baron’s words: “cognitive and social complexity … may be seen as having co-evolved in the service of adaptive functioning at the group level (1995:137).” Further, to the extent that role expectations are shared widely within an organization – thus, qualifying as social stereotypes – conformity pressures to behave in certain ways are strong, thereby, creating the impression of accuracy as a circular process. This argument claims that accuracy increases as people enact their stereotyped roles. Much like the idea of a self-fulfilling prophesy, stereotyped groups validate the attributions of them made by others by behaving in a manner that reinforces those very depictions. And, these behaviors are rooted in the social structures – or power relations defined by those structures -- of the societies within which the stereotyped group members live. Note in this regard the conformity to stereotyped images of subordinated groups such as African-Americans prior to the U.S. civil rights movement of the 1960s.

In fact, we can never really pin the accuracy issue down. By definition, stereotypes are imprecise, notwithstanding a “kernel of truth.” But, accuracy may not be the important question asked about stereotypes. What is likely to be more important is how widely they are accepted and their consequences. Following Pickering’s argument: “What counts is how they circulate, and with what consequences, as base coins in the economy of discourse and representation; how they attain their symbolic currency among those involved in their exchange” (2001: 25-26). We turn now to the matter of circulation.

Shared images of groups.

Another issue is the extent to which images or depictions of groups are shared, irrespective of their accuracy. Most of the research deals with the categories used by individuals to describe groups. Fewer studies focus on the issue of shared categorizations or images. The idea of a stereotype implies a widely shared view or image of groups. Implications for collective action would seem to depend more on the extent of sharing than on the views of particular individual: Widespread images are more normative; they may facilitate efforts to mobilize populations for conflict. This is referred to in the literature as uniformity, consensus or stereotypy and various agreement indexes have been constructed to assess agreement. The indices are calculated on the basis of the extent of similarity between raters in the way they distribute their choice of descriptors or adjectives from a list of categories given to them. The index depicts the extent to which a particular image of another (out)group is shared by members of the same (in) group. (See Lambert and Klineberg, 1967, Druckman and Ludwig, 1970, and Druckman et al., 1974, for examples of computations.)

Lambert and Klineberg’s (1967) study found that few descriptive terms but many evaluative terms were used by children to depict unfriendly (and unfamiliar) nations. When little information was available about other groups, descriptions tend to be vague (fewer terms, more of a stereotype) but evaluative terms proliferate (less of a stereotype). Familiar nations were less stereotyped than unfamiliar nations on
descriptive terms. Friendly nations were stereotyped more than unfriendly nations on evaluative terms. The vagueness (proliferation of descriptive terms) with respect to unfriendly nations may reflect a process where there is little desire to seek information. This research addresses both cognitive – the possession of information or knowledge about another group – and motivational – the desire to seek information for a more accurate and detailed description – processes.

In an attempt to bring the research on social cognition into closer contact with the work on motivation, Sherman and his colleagues (1999) point out that the way we perceive ingroups and outgroups is likely to depend on both the extent to which we attribute properties of entitativity to them (see Campbell, 1958) and the extent to which their members value identification with them. They suggest that “ingroups with high social identity value are important to us, and such importance implies that the group is a meaningful, coherent, ongoing entity. Such perceptions of entitativity bestow properties that we want in highly valued groups” (1999:105). The relationship between these concepts is circular: On the one hand, we want our highly valued groups to have entitativity. On the other hand, groups with high perceived entitativity are more likely to be highly valued. Commitment, permanence, and investment enhance both perceived entitativity (a cognitive process) and social identity (a motivational process).

Less is said by Sherman and his colleagues about the causes or effects of perceived entitativity of outgroups. High perceived entitativity is unlikely to lead to high social identity with these groups. In fact, it is likely to lead to the perception of threat with corresponding stereotypes or demonic images. Further, high perceived entitativity of outgroups may lead to more agreement among ingroup members on their characteristics (less diversity in describing them) with implications for collective action. Whether ingroups or outgroups are typically perceived as more or less entity-like is an empirical issue that has received some attention. Early studies by Taft (1959) and Druckman and Ludwig (1970) reported more agreement among group members on adjectives used to describe their ingroup than outgroups, whether allies or enemies. These findings can be interpreted along the lines of Shapiro’s argument that the self (one’s own nation) is viewed as being a coherent and unified body while the other (other nations) is thought of as being disorderly and threatening: “… external disorder, that is, the practices in the world that do not comport with the system of order within which one resides, will be particularly threatening” (1996: 477). This argument is reinforced by Pickering’s depiction of the stereotyping process. For him, stereotypes serve as distancing strategies, “separating what is seen as threatening and disturbing (the other) from that which is regarded as acceptable and legitimate (or the normative self)” (2001: 174). However, other studies showed that perceived entitativity depends on the types of adjectives used to depict the groups. Separating descriptions of groups from evaluations of them, these investigators found more uniformity in describing disliked than liked nations but less uniformity in evaluating them (Lambert and Klineberg, 1967; Druckman et al., 1974).

Stereotype change.

A third issue concerns the way that stereotypes change. Oakes et al. (1999) argue that stereotypes are the product of particular intergroup relationships, not their source or cause. This is a chicken and egg problem: Which should be changed first, the stereotype or the relationship between the groups? Some researchers argue that the
route to improved inter-group relations is through changing images of other groups; the relationship follows the images. Cottam (1987), for example, claimed that images of enemies drive national policies or strategies. Others have argued that the inter-group relationship must change before the images can change; the images reflect the relations (Sherif and Sherif, 1965). Ethnocentric images or values are located in inter-group relations, which include differences between groups in power, rather than in individual attitudes. Ingroup-outgroup distinctions reflect and are preceded by those relations. Thus, stereotypes are understood best, and should (according to this perspective) be analyzed first, from a social rather than individual-cognitive perspective (see also Sherif, 1967).

This debate is similar to the discussions in social psychology about the relationship between attitudes and behavior (e.g., Wicker, 1969). Until some pioneering research, stimulated by the theory of cognitive dissonance, it was widely believed that attitude change preceded behavior change. The research showed the opposite, namely, that behavior change often preceded attitude change. The attitudes served to rationalize and, thus, be consistent with the behavior (e.g., Varela, 1971). The Oakes et al (1999) research indicated that stereotypes reflected the reality of inter-group relations; images changed in the context of changes in inter-group relations. A policy implication of this research is that mandated or legal inducements to change relations between groups will affect the attitudes that reflect those relationships.

Images or stereotypes are not simply influenced in mechanical ways by new information. Information-processing models of categorization are incomplete if they ignore the matrix of social relations in which people are also embedded. Images are influenced by the social context that gives the information meaning. However, the way images and “realities” interact may be more complicated. While stereotypes reflect and support inter-group relationships, they also reinforce these relationships. By reinforcing negative inter-group relationships, the images serve to maintain them, thereby acting as a cause rather than as an effect. This is what is meant by a circular relationship between images or categorizations and behavior or relations between groups. It would seem then that interventions would need to deal with both the images and the relationships. Interventions may be particularly helpful in times of social tensions when stereotypes become more pronounced and hostile and more difficult to change (Tajfel and Fraser, 1978).

**Reducing Ethnocentrism**

Despite the prevalence of ingroup-favoring biases and stereotypes, all groups do not fight or express hostility toward other groups all the time. The variability of the phenomenon may be understood in terms of several observations. One is that emotions may be transitory. Another is that intergroup contact may lead to improved relations. A third concerns the effects of poor performance in competitions. A fourth is that large groups may have difficulty coordinating for collective action. And a fifth is that members may spread their loyalties across many groups. Each of these observations is discussed in turn followed by a longer discussion of patriotism and nationalism.

**On emotions**

It was noted earlier that group loyalties are easy to establish. The issue is that, once established, how resistant are they to change? On the one hand, we observe that
people often make considerable sacrifices on behalf of their groups (Campbell, 1972). Partisan or ethnocentric biases are strong. On the other hand, we observe that emotions can be fleeting. Rapid swings in feelings can occur as events or leadership changes: Observe how rapidly the Chinese became “good guys” after Richard Nixon went to China, how fast Saddam Hussein became “a devil” after his invasion of Kuwait, and how feelings expressed by Americans toward the US military changed dramatically following the war in the Persian Gulf. Could it be that the loyalty we observe is situational, even if it is strong? The ease with which identities are established suggests that they can also be re-established with relative ease. Note in this regard how quickly we change our views of former allies (enemies) from positive (negative) to negative (positive), as shown by the findings reported by Druckman (1968). More recent findings reported by Haslam and Turner (1992) also highlight the way the stereotypes vary with changes in context.

**On intergroup contact**

The research literature on intergroup contacts or exchange programs suggests that the conditions of contact influence the impact of the experience on attitudes and perceptions. Contact per se with members of another group does not produce predictable effects on attitudes. The interactions can provoke areas of sensitivity or offer the promise of rewarding relationships. Such factors as the relative status of the groups, the goals of the exchange, perceived cultural differences, and variables that affect one’s adjustment to the new environment have been found to make a difference. (See Pettigrew, 1998 and Druckman, 1980, for reviews of the studies.) While getting to know outgroup members may improve relations with their group, it may also call into question one’s own identity. This may create anxiety and uncertainty which are reduced by a strengthened group identity and derogation of the outgroup, leading to deteriorated relations. In their simulated negotiation experiments, Druckman and Broome (1991) found that contact led to more positive perceptions of the other group and more agreements with them when both familiarity and liking were high. In her minimal-group paradigm experiments, Thompson (1993) found that when a mutually-beneficial or integrative outcome was available in inter-group negotiations, the extent of the ingroup-favoring bias was reduced.

**On group performance**

Research has shown that there is a circular relationship between performance and cohesion (Landers et al., 1982). Good performing teams are cohesive teams although the direction of the relationship is difficult to disentangle. Performance has rarely been studied in the social identity literature. Groups are more likely to attract members when they serve members’ needs. Especially for task-oriented groups, members strive for good performance. One consequence of poor-performing groups is reduced loyalty or identification and the concomitant loss in cohesion. The socio-emotional functions served by groups cannot readily be separated from their task functions. Performance is both influenced by and influences the socio-emotional functions served by groups. Hypotheses about the relationship between identification and performance are a basis for new research on identity.

**On mobilization**

Issues concerning readiness to take action have also not been addressed in this literature. Although loyalty contributes to motivation to act, it may also play a role in matters of coordination and related logistics
-- referred to also as readiness --- concerning the action itself. Among the group characteristics that have been shown to influence mobilization are concentration, autonomy, homogeneity, leadership centralization, communication effectiveness, and provision in the sense of members receiving rewards from the group (Druckman and Green, 1986). Again, to the extent that these characteristics facilitate performance, they are likely to enhance loyalty as noted above in the cohesion-performance relationship. To the extent that they impede group performance, they are likely to reduce loyalty. However, this supposition remains to be evaluated. Although group performance and mobilization issues are central in the study of groups they have been treated largely apart from identity issues.

**On multiple groups**

Groups are best understood in relation to other groups about which members are aware. Much of the laboratory literature consists of experiments with a small number of interacting groups. People have multiple group identifications: How then do they decide to relate to each of these groups? How do these various groups contribute to an individual’s identity? Loyalty to one group does not preclude having attachments to other groups. Some of these attachments may be to non-membership groups, referred to as reference groups (Merton, 1957). Studies done in Latin America have shown that people may actually derogate their own group in relation to other, sometimes more powerful, groups or nations (Montero, 1986). This is referred to as negative ethnocentrism or as xenocentrism (in contrast to xenophobia). This phenomenon would seem to have implications for group performance and mobilization, but these relationships have not been explored. It also has implications for reducing group loyalties: If loyalties are spread across several groups, each group is more likely to receive less loyalty than it would if it were the only group. Findings obtained by Crisp et al. (2001) show that cross-category identifications reduce intergroup bias.

Another interesting implication is the case where different ingroups have different outgroups. Then, which are chosen for derogation? How are they scaled in relation to the various ingroups? It would seem that sentiments expressed toward groups should be understood in the context of multiple, sometimes contradictory, group identities. This is a more complex problem than has been addressed in the social identity-social cognition literature to date.

**Patriotism and Nationalism**

Implications for reducing ethnocentrism come also from another direction. Research by Feshbach and his colleagues (Feshbach, 1987, 1990, Kosterman and Feshbach, 1989) suggest that it may be possible to distinguish between kinds of ingroup orientations. Their factor-analytic studies of expressed attitudes revealed two factors. One emphasizes an emotional attachment to ingroups without feelings of superiority or denigration of other groups or countries. They called this orientation “patriotism.” The “patriot” can indeed feel proud of being an American (or any other nationality) without feeling either superior or hostile toward others who are not Americans – the ingroup is liked even when outgroups can also be liked. The other factor emphasizes a kind of moral and material superiority for one’s own group or country (in contrast to liking or attachment per se). They called this orientation “nationalism.” For the “nationalist,” pride is a result of an invidious comparison between one’s own and other groups. The ingroup is liked because it is compared favorably to various
What then accounts for these different orientations? There have been several approaches to this question.

Feshbach’s correlational results showed that nationalists were more willing to support war but less willing to risk their own lives than were patriots. They were not more aggressive in their personal behavior than were patriots. In effect, nationalism was associated more with a competitive and militaristic view of the world – with hawkish attitudes – while patriotism was associated with a more cooperative or peaceful approach, as dovish attitudes. Interestingly, those with patriotic attitudes indicated a stronger attachment to their fathers, a finding that may seem counter-intuitive since mothers are typically regarded as the more nurturing parent.

Sears’ (1969) review of studies of child development shows that feelings are developed before cognitions. Early sentiments felt or expressed toward groups precede content or labeling. The content tends to rationalize the feelings and

distinguishes between nationalism and patriotism: Are the feelings justified in terms of being superior to others (nationalism) or because one’s nation is simply good (patriotism)? Less clear are the influences that move a child to rationalize his or her feelings in one way or the other. We do know, however, that the feelings are stronger than the cognitions and early attachments – whether of the nationalist or patriotic type – are more difficult to change than later ones. Further, cognitive change may depend on prior emotional change (Greenberg et al., 1993).

A study by Duckitt (1989) found that nationalism (or, in his terms, ethnocentric patriotism) was associated with insecure group identifications while patriotism was associated with secure identifications: The more secure individuals felt as members of the groups to which they belonged, the more healthy their relationship to the group and the lower their need for distancing their group from others.

Strong national identities may be associated either with increased or decreased trust in others. Brehm et al. (2000) showed that for many (but not all) of the respondents in their cross-cultural survey of national identities, stronger identities accompanied greater trust in others. A high or low level of trust in others is a variable that distinguishes between nationalism and patriotism: Nationalists have strong identities accompanied by low trust; patriots have strong identities and high trust. For some demographic and geographic categories, high levels of trust accompany weak national identities. Respondents in the Brehm et al. study with higher levels of education and those who lived closest to national borders had weak identities but high trust. Those with post-materialist values, in particular, had high levels of trust but weaker senses of national identification.

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5 The literatures on stereotyping and ethnocentrism are replete with examples of nationalism, not patriotism, as these terms are used in this section. Most of the theorists on this subject seem to accept the acknowledged wisdom that positive ingroup descriptions are coincident with negative portrayals of other groups. (For a broad survey of writings on this topic, enter the google search category, “ethnocentrism in inter-group relations. This category contains about 500 entries.) This “wisdom” suggests that identities are developed by invidious contrast. An example comes from Emerson’s depiction of mid-19th century England. He notes that the English defined who they were by negative symbolic reference to who they were not, making France “a kind of blackboard on which English character draws its traits in chalk” (1966: 94). And, Pickering chimes in with: “Anti-Frenchness, and anti-Irishness, served to bolster the sense of a superior ‘national character’ (2001: 93). Nationalist discourse turns on a conception of difference with a positive-negative spin. The idea of patriotism also recognizes differences but without the evaluative trappings.
Another interpretation of the distinction is that nationalism is merely a more complex form of patriotism. If patriotism is commitment – a readiness to sacrifice for the group – then nationalism is commitment plus exclusion of others, a readiness to sacrifice (although Feshbach’s data question this readiness) bolstered by hostility toward others. Patriotism is a simpler relationship between the individual and the group. Nationalism requires a more elaborate matrix embedding one’s own group into a set of groups and differentiating among them. In this interpretation, patriotism is acquired earlier in the socialization process and, as a consequence, may be the stronger feeling.

The research reviewed above suggests that these may be relatively stable orientations. However, the evidence from the simulation and laboratory studies of ingroup bias reviewed earlier suggests that they are more likely to be aroused by the situation. For example, patriotic orientations may be manifest in non-competitive situations where there is less need to derogate other groups. The question of interest is whether it is possible to arouse nationalist feelings in non-competitive situations: Must a situation be competitive to arouse nationalistic feelings? Or, do people bring these feelings to situations and, by doing so, create competition? A challenge for the practitioner is to de-couple ingroup amity from outgroup enmity, to build patriotism instead of nationalism. At issue is whether the best route is through the socialization process or by designing situations that encourage such feelings.

The distinction between nationalism and patriotism is contested when it takes the form of ideologies. These orientations capture certain aspects of progressive and conservative political ideologies. The construal of patriotism used in this section corresponds closely to a defining feature of progressive patriotism as stated by Coy et al: “…the love of one’s nation is not inherently incompatible with respect for and even identification with others beyond the nation” (2003: 469). In their expression of patriotism, American progressives emphasize the core values of fairness, equality. Freedom, justice, and the right of dissent (Dreier and Flacks, 2003). Although these values have a long historical legacy in the U.S., they have only recently been publicly defended from attacks made by Americans who promote a nationalistic brand of loyalty. Current-day American progressives rail against the sort of “blind nationalism, militaristic drum beating, and sheep-like conformism” evident in the aftermath of 9/11 (Dreier and Flacks, 2003: 403). This clash of perspectives on national identity served to mobilize a divided population, resulting in the largest voter turnout in American history. The closely-contested election was won by the “nationalist” candidate. Whether dissent turns to revolution during Mr. Bush’s second term depends on the kinds of policies enacted by his administration. To the extent that “patriotic” dissent slows the momentum toward further military escalation, revolution is less likely to occur.

**Collective Actions**

Actions are discussed in this section in terms of the connection between attachments and categorizations on the one hand and actions taken by groups including mobilizing for conflict or war on the other. Following a brief discussion of the issue of aggregating sentiments expressed by individuals, I develop a framework for conceptualizing the way that group loyalties lead to collective behavior. Focusing primarily on national loyalties and actions, the framework connects micro-level identity processes with macro-level policies and actions.
From Individuals’ Sentiments to Collective Behavior

Research on individuals in groups has implications for collective action. It is this connection that links sentiments expressed by individuals to policies and actions taken by groups and nations, and is a basis for a social psychology of international relations (see Druckman, 1990). The laboratory research deals largely with attitudes expressed and behavior displayed by individuals who are placed in contrived intergroup situations. Of interest is the relevance of this research for actions taken by nations, ethnic groups, and other collectivities. It is useful to consider the problem of relevance before moving to a discussion of collective action. Following are alternative ways in which the connections between levels of analysis can be made.

1) The sentiments expressed by individuals aggregate in the form of a collective expression similar to the way that votes aggregate to determine the outcome of elections. This approach assumes that the whole is a sum of its parts.

2) Analogies can be made between individual or small group behavior and the behavior of leaders, social movements, and whole national populations. The insights provided from the former translate directly to an understanding of the latter. This approach assumes that national behavior is an outward projection of small group behavior.

3) By studying individuals in roles of group representatives, as in many of the laboratory simulations, we gain an understanding of how comparable individuals in leadership positions are likely to act. It is assumed here that roles (and role behaviors) are similar in different settings.

4) The sentiments expressed by laboratory subjects are similar to the sentiments expressed in public opinion polls about particular national policies. These opinions influence the direction taken by leaders, toward or away from taking militant postures. In other words, individuals’ sentiments or attitudes influence collective behavior through public opinion.

5) Loyalty as positive sentiments expressed toward a group is a defining element of cohesion which also consists of a sharing of attitudes and beliefs. This sort of bonding facilitates collective aggressive action toward other groups. It is assumed that the same or similar group processes occur in different kinds of groups and group settings.

6) Since the policy-making process usually involves a few individuals, an understanding of this process can be gained through laboratory policy-making simulations; the ease with which loyalties can be established in laboratory groups and the consequences of such loyalties should be similar to the way this occurs in small groups of leaders and advisors.

At issue is whether collective behavior can be understood from the results of research on individual or small-group behavior. By linking large-scale social phenomena to the way individuals or small groups behave, the distinction between levels of analysis is preserved without reducing social behavior to individual behavior. Others argue that group behavior is fundamentally different than individual behavior. This argument was made long ago by Durkheim (1895) who attempted to justify sociology as the study of groups rather than the study of individuals in
groups. In this regard, Campbell’s (1958) observation that groups have more entitativity than personalities is relevant: When considered in terms of the criteria of similarity, pregnancy (form), and common fate (moving in the same direction), groups may be perceived as being more entity-like than individuals. However, it has been difficult historically to study groups as the unit of analysis. (Davis and Singer, 1991, discuss the logistical problems.) This line of argument favors emergent group properties that are not simply an aggregation of members’ behavior (see Druckman, 1994b). This is consistent with the linking perspective summarized in points 3-6 above, and seeks explanations for the way individuals relate to groups. This perspective is reflected in the framework developed in the sections to follow.

The perspective advanced here is similar to that espoused by Simon (1991) with regard to reducing psychological to neural processes. He and his colleagues “believed that complex behavior can be reduced to neural processes only in successive steps (layers of theory), not in a single leap … for psychology, a theory at the level of symbols located midway between complex thought processes and neurons, is essential” (1991: 191-192). Similarly, a theory of group identity may be thought of as being located midway between complex collective behavior on behalf of a nation and sentiments expressed by individuals. The steps, or layers of theory, are the linkages from collective to group (communal, organizational), to individual emotions, cognitions, and behaviors.

A matter frequently addressed in discussions of levels of analysis is whether nationalism is another form of group identity or a distinct kind of identification. The former emphasizes similarities, the latter differences. Moving away from depicting this as an either-or issue, I would like to suggest that nationalism both shares features with other forms of identity while also differing from them. A key shared feature is the binary juxtaposition of positive sentiments expressed toward one’s own group coupled with negative sentiments expressed toward others. Related issues of acquisition and maintenance of these sentiments, discussed in earlier sections, may also be shared. However, it may seem that these similarities are over-shadowed by a number of differences.

Unlike face-to-face groups studied in the psychological laboratory, nations are abstractions and the attachments of citizens to them are largely imagined. (See Anderson’s, 1986, treatment of imagined communities.) These abstractions gather meaning in shared land, language, and

6 This juxtaposition is also a central tenet of ethnocentrism theory, which claims to be a universal feature of groups and nations. My evaluation of this proposition in a study of simulated nations showed support for it: Strong negative correlations were obtained for ratings of own and other “nations.” Positive correlations would have supported the alternative “patriotism theory.” At issue, however, is whether these results are essentially limited to small interacting groups (see Druckman, 1968).

7 The importance of land or territory to identity was recognized long ago by Rousseau who linked territory to the constitution and protection of a people: “By thus holding the land, they are quite sure to hold its inhabitants” (1978: 130). Connolly (1996) mentions the dual contrasting meanings of territory, as a place for receiving sustenance and as a place to exercise violence. The latter reflects the boundary-maintaining feature of territory that functions to keep other people out. Failure to do so often fosters reactive movements of nationalism that can lead to violence. More broadly, Tocqueville (1969) connected territory to civilization. Referred to as a “civi-territorial complex,” he observed that territory and civilization reinforced each other in the construction of America. All of this is to say that land plays a central role in the development and maintenance of identities. Informal conversations that I have had with a number of Australians revealed that after spending time abroad
As mutually reinforcing bases for identities, these three elements strengthen the affective attachments to the concept of the nation. They provide an emotional foundation for the extraordinary acts and sacrifices performed by some citizens as well as for the imperial adventures proudly undertaken by nations defining themselves as—or aspiring to become—empires. They also lend support to policy doctrines and more general ideological world-views that justify calls for action on behalf of the nation. (Note in this regard the popular support for American mobilization for the war in Iraq.) This support connects the emotional to the cognitive aspects of nationalism.

For a number of scholars, nationalism is described as an ideology which purports to provide a remedy for human alienation (Kedourie, 1993). The fall of Soviet-style socialism did not usher in an age without ideological direction—or an “end to history.” Rather, it produced a revival of nationalism, referred to by Kedourie as “that other ideological obsession” (1993: xvii). Like socialism, nationalist regimes have been anything but guarantors of prosperity or honest government. This may be due in large part to the exclusionist ideologies and coercive manipulation of populations practiced by the leaders of these regimes. Over time, however, the coerced identities will whither as opportunities for re-settlement become available. Ideologies alone cannot assure loyalty. Strong psychological affiliations—in the form of patriotism or nationalism—are needed. These affiliations are at the heart of nationalism just as they are the essence of attachments to other types of groups. In the sections to follow, I discuss the role of group attachments in efforts to mobilize citizens for action.

Group Loyalty and Collective Action

The research reviewed earlier on ingroup bias and stereotyping contributes to our understanding of identity and attachments to groups. Functions served by identity include enhanced self-esteem, reduced uncertainty, and perceptual discrimination that reduces cognitive or social complexity. Such functions, in turn, reinforce the group attachment. With regard to nations, the attachment is referred to as patriotism. However, when combined with the derogation of outgroups, the attachment (identity, bias) can contribute to inter-group conflict, referred to earlier as nationalism.
The conflict may take the form of competition which is regulated by institutionally-defined rules. Or it may take the form of violent conflict between groups that are not bound by the same normative institutional framework. Focussing attention primarily on the latter, I discuss in this section the way that positive sentiments toward -- or attachments to -- ingroups can be mobilized for collective action against other groups.

One issue is the extent to which people are willing to suspend judgment in acting on behalf of the group: When do emotions or emotional appeals trump rational appraisals? Sumner’s (1906) ethnocentrism syndrome emphasized extreme behavior on behalf of a group, a willingness to fight and die for the group. Campbell (1972) re-interpreted this aspect of the syndrome in terms of altruism, emphasizing the element of ultimate personal sacrifice. Stern (1995) made the case that emotional attachments to groups override calculations of self interest, especially when the group is threatened (see also Sturmer et al., 1998). Blake and Mouton (1962) argued that group representation is the primary determinant of competitive behavior and inflexibility in negotiation. Representatives may go to great lengths in defending their constituents’ interests and positions, although the extent of their commitment or inflexibility has been shown to depend on aspects of the negotiating situation other than their role definition (Druckman, 1994a). These observations suggest that group members would be receptive to appeals made by their leaders to mobilize for actions directed against other groups. But, does action follow directly from receptivity? Or, are there factors that intervene between readiness and collective action? What does the evidence suggest?

The stronger the identification with the group, the more members are receptive to a variety of appeals to mobilize for action: The laboratory evidence reviewed above shows how easily loyalties can be established but also how easily they can be re-directed. But cognitive factors are also likely to influence receptiveness. Eidelson (2000) argues that a group’s worldview can trigger or constrain mobilization resulting in intergroup conflict. Five of six of his worldviews can act as triggers: viewing the group to be superior, treated unjustly, vulnerable, distrusted, or perceiving the conflict in zero-sum terms. The sixth, referred to as a “helplessness worldview,” may act to constrain mobilization. Whether these worldviews actually trigger or constrain action depends on such factors as centrality, salience, functionality, the confidence with which it is held, ease of establishment, and resistance to change (Bar-Tal, 1990). It also depends on the extent to which group members share the view. Even prevailing worldviews may be ineffective triggers if sub-groups demur from them and, thus, reject calls for mobilization. Sub-groups can be moderating influences on appeals to take collective action; they can also be polarizing influences when they hold even more extreme views. Less clear is the direction of causality between the worldviews and conflict: While the worldviews may be precipitants of conflict, the conflict may also serve to further reinforce and simplify the worldviews. An issue, however, is whether and how perceptions of group members aggregate for a group worldview. How are we to judge whether all or most members of the mobilized group share the same worldview?, How stable are these group perceptions? (See the discussion on levels of analysis in the previous section.)

Groups vary in the extent to which their members share a common worldview. Some groups may be characterized as having a more coherent worldview than others, and this has implications for mobilization. With
regard to societies, strong ethnic or subgroup identifications are barriers to assimilation, which can be seen as hindering societal or national collective action. The barriers are increased to the extent that members identify more strongly with the ethnic category than with the super-ordinate (national) category. Smith (2000) showed that strong identification with a group perceived to be disadvantaged (such as ethnic minorities) propels group members toward collective action directed against another group viewed as being responsible for the deprivations (such as majorities). Intra-societal divisions militate against social harmony. From an assimilationist perspective, subgroups are encouraged to define their allegiances entirely at a superordinate, societal level. A competing multicultural perspective “assumes that ethnic (subgroup) identities are inescapable and fundamental to the self-concept; as a result, individuals are motivated to retain their cultural heritages” (Hornsey and Hogg, 2000: 145). This perspective addresses the dual identity needs of many individuals. They are recognized also by Hornsey and Hogg’s (2000) concept of identity threat discussed earlier. These authors show how subgroup identities can be encouraged in the context of a larger, superordinate identification. The objective is to increase social harmony between subgroups while, at the same time, providing a basis for mobilizing diverse constituencies for collective action.

Of interest are the strategies or appeals that influence the relative intensity of the competing identities with an ethnic minority or with a majority. In his review of the literature on the psychological aspects of ethnic nationalism, Azzi (1997) discusses three types of strategies: persuasive appeals to self interests, cognitive over-simplification of group categories and fomenting violent action toward outgroups. One type of appeal is to group members’ self interests. To the extent that members are persuaded that achieving their self interests is contingent on achieving the group’s (ethnic or national) goals, they are more likely to act on behalf of the group. This appeal is likely to be effective when members view the group as being instrumental in reducing a perceived deprivation or in providing opportunities for social mobility. However, people may place less emphasis on their own interests when group loyalties are strong: They may be motivated to act on behalf of the group even when such actions have limited benefits or are costly to themselves (Sturmer et al., 1998).

Another strategy consists of simplifying the ideology that casts problems in terms of ingroup-outgroup categorical dichotomies. By exaggerating the divergence between ingroup (ethnic minority or nation) and outgroup (the larger nation in which the ethnic group resides or another nation), political elites encourage members to attribute frustrations or disadvantages to the outgroup rather than to the ingroup (Taylor and McKirnan, 1984). Kramer and Brewer (1984) showed that the exaggerated divergence also leads members to have greater confidence that other ingroup members will “rally around the flag.” These strategies may have the effect of increasing the inter-dependence between self interest and group interest. However, it is also important to increase members’ subjective probabilities of success for the collective action (Hechter et al., 1982).

A third strategy consists of instigating violence toward the targeted group. For ethnic minorities, violent actions may serve to encourage retaliation that galvanizes or strengthens members’ support for their (weaker) group. For nations, citizens can take pride in military success as illustrated
by the U.S. role in the Persian Gulf war or, more recently, in Afghanistan. In addition, violence may play a role in the creation and crystallization of political or community boundaries (Dandeker, 1997). Each of these strategies can be used effectively by leaders of ethnic minorities seeking separation from nation-states as well as by the political elites of nations seeking to submerge sub-group identifications in order to create a larger national identification. The identifications -- with the smaller or larger entity -- are further reinforced by effective mobilizations for collective action.

**A Path from Loyalties to Collective Action**

The issue of mobilizing sentiments for collective action requires a more sophisticated analysis that includes both individual and group psychology as well as societal conditions. The challenge is to situate the loyalties in a larger framework. One approach consists of connecting individuals’ loyalties or attachments to actions taken by collective actors through a path of social processes. The first connection is from loyalties to public opinion, also referred to as the spread of opinion through a population. Widely held or shared sentiments are often expressed in opinion polls which get the attention of politicians and other elites (Mueller, 1973). Although citizens only interact with others who are in close proximity, the shared sentiments are magnified through media representations. The influence process has been shown to be bi-directional, from citizens, referred to also as “partisans,” to elites, referred to also as “authorities,” and vice versa (Gamson, 1967; Druckman, 1980). The effect of interest is the way shared sentiments impact on political representatives. A large literature exists on the concept of representation, which I will not review here. (From a political science perspective, see Pitkin, 1967). Suffice it to say that representatives are constrained (in democracies) by constituencies to whom they are accountable. And, while they surely can influence those constituencies, they cannot afford to deviate much from their expressed preferences.

Constraints on negotiating representatives can be thought about in terms of negotiating flexibility. The latitude that representatives have for making a deal may be influenced by various aspects of group identity. In particular, three aspects have been put forward in recent work: the process of negotiating identities, durability of identities, and spread of identities (Druckman, 2001a). Identities are “negotiated” regularly in most democratic societies. They are largely coerced – in the sense of sanctions for deviation -- in more authoritarian regimes (“we have no choice but to be Serbs”). Coerced identities reduce the flexibility of negotiating representatives. Durable or sustained identities (“we are unshakable in our loyalty to Serbia”) are more likely to lead to firmer commitments to negotiating positions than more fluid or changing identities. Widely spread (vs. limited spread) identities through a population (“we are all Serbs”) may be a source of constituent pressure on representatives to adhere to preferred positions or strategies. These three aspects can be construed as dimensions within which different kinds of countries, regimes, or historical periods can be compared. Placing this three-factor model in the context of collective action, it would be interesting to ascertain how they moderate the relationship between mobilization for action in conflict and negotiating flexibility.

A start in this direction has been taken in a recent project. For each of three types of collective actions – violent, non-violent, and humanitarian missions – we ask about the relative influence on decisions of identity and contextual variables. Role players are
presented with scenarios that contain these variables. A pair-comparison task is used to structure their judgments about the relative importance of five variables: motivation to act, efficacy of the acting unit, type of political system, durability of citizen identity, and spread of citizen support for the action. Of interest is the question whether the context variables (motivation and efficacy) are more or less important elements in their decision than the identity variables (system, durability, and spread). Early results indicate that, for both violent and humanitarian actions, motivation and spread are judged to be the most important considerations in the decision to act or not to act. An implication is that collective action decisions (war, disaster relief) made by national representatives are driven primarily by a sense of shared urgency in the form of widespread population support for a particular type of action.

These national representatives typically function in small policy-making groups. Strong evidence for group-think or conformity phenomena in these groups makes deviation from a kind of party line anathema (Janis, 1989, t’Hart, 1990). They will reflect, and exaggerate, nationalist sentiments, propelling them to take the lead in advancing aggressive policies; note in this regard the political unpopularity of dovish policies in all societies, by the left and the right (Mueller, 1973). The result is a set of policies that are developed through the lens of national self, and self-serving, images. Often these policies lead to judgments of superior strength or moral conviction for the nation, a (mis)perception that can have disastrous consequences. Two examples are U.S. policies toward China and the authoritarian manipulation of Serbian sentiments by Milosevic (see Druckman, 1994, for other examples).

The intertwining of loyalty and cohesion produces a set of norms that encourage aggressive actions and that become shared by substantial numbers of publics within the polity who show little tolerance for deviation. Widely-shared norms may harden into ideologies that rationalize and reinforce pernicious stereotypes as Fyfe (1992) observes with the example of racial distinctions. The resulting collective action taken by the State in the name of the nation reinforces the loyalties that we began with, especially if successful as in the example of the U.S. role in the Persian Gulf war. The collective action feeds-back to individuals’ loyalties in a loop. The linear but recursive route taken is depicted as follows:

→ Loyalties ----→ public opinion ----→ political representatives ----→ policy-making groups ----→ policies ----→ norms ----→ collective actions

This path focuses attention on influence and decision-making processes within societies. It can be broadened further by considering variability in a society’s political institutions, internal or external events that mark transitions in regimes or in a society’s political culture, and differences in receptivity from diverse citizens or constituencies to appeals made by policy-making elites. I turn now to a discussion of this broadened framework.

Nationalism and Mobilizing for War

Probing further into the link between collective action and loyalties, we can better understand the role of nationalism in warfare. In this discussion we are moving from relatively mild forms of group identity, as studied by social psychologists, to the more destructive forms of national action.
studied by some analysts of international relations (e.g., Gellner, 1997; Comaroff and Stern, 1995). An important aspect of the latter is the recruitment of citizens to fight the wars. Mobilization depends both on the interests of political decision makers and the receptiveness of the citizenry to their appeals. With regard to interests, a regime’s legitimacy is likely to be important. The less legitimate a government (defined in terms of performance or political structure as authoritarian or democratic), the greater the incentive to provoke nationalistic sentiments that support conflict. Presumably, conflict is thought to divert attention away from the issue of legitimacy, unite the population, and consolidate the regime’s power. One way to provoke nationalist sentiments (or “flag waving”) is to construct myths about the state in relation to foreigners: For example, Stern (1995) regards myths as analogies such as the nation as family to whom certain obligations are owed. Myths are reinforced within policy-making groups by the group-think phenomena referred to above and spread more widely through the media. Citizens are most receptive to them under such conditions as: a) when the society has weak evaluative institutions such as the media or universities, b) during economic crises, and c) during periods of transition (see Van Evera, 1995). Fluid national identities (by which is meant momentary) also make citizens more receptive to myths and, thus, they are easier to mobilize. However, just as fluid identities make citizens more malleable or manipulable, they also make them more subject to change with the experience of combat as Bienen (1995) notes and Lynn (1984) demonstrates. For this reason, a more durable nationalism (by which is meant relatively unchanging) may sustain combat even if it is more difficult to manipulate by policy elites. It provides a source of stable support for military mobilization.

Several variables are identified in this discussion: a regime’s legitimacy, a society’s evaluative institutions, economic crises, leadership transitions, and fluidity of identity with the group or nation. These variables define the opportunities available to decision-making elites to influence citizens. They also serve as indicators of societal stability or closeness to societal collapse. Each variable can be hypothesized to be related to ease of mobilization and evaluated empirically.

A type of myth promulgated by leaders is the illusion of homogeneity. Connor (1994) discusses the myths of hemispheric, continental, regional, and state unity. While he devotes his discussion to exploding these myths with historical evidence, he also notes that they can have powerful influences on perceptions. The challenge for leaders intent on consolidating their power is to perpetuate the image of a common historical culture, such as “Europeanness” or “we are all Americans,” among different language communities: For example, as Connor notes, “prior to the demise of the Soviet Union, numerous authorities on South Central Asia maintained that Kazakhs, Turkman, Usbeks, and others viewed themselves first and foremost as a single Muslim people” (1994:118). For leaders intent on exploiting divisions between communities within a region or state, the tactical challenge is to engender and sustain the image of distinctive ancestral roots and cultures among the different language communities. Milosevic’s attempts to arouse Serbian nationalism illustrates a divide and conquer strategy that culminated in ethnic cleansing campaigns against non-Serbians in former Yugoslavia.

The variable identified here is the extent to which the state or nation is described as being homogeneous. (Note in this regard the research reviewed above on perceived entitativity.) Related to this is the extent to
which citizens are receptive to the image or myth. Citizens may be more prone to nationalist myths in non-democratic regimes that lack academic freedoms – or strong academic institutions – and a free press. However, it is also be the case that freedom per se does not assure that myths will be scrutinized. Van Evera (1995) points out that scrutiny is less likely by faculties -- including those in strong institutions -- that pursue research agendas with little connection to the actual world of domestic and international politics. These are additional variables hypothesized to influence a leader’s (or policy-making group’s) attempts to mobilize citizens for action.

These processes can be organized into a framework designed for understanding the connection between nationalism and war: I prefer to consider nationalistic sentiments as one among several factors leading to conflict. As shown in my earlier chapter (Druckman, 2001b, Figure 4.1), mythmaking and mobilization are understood against the background of goals, structures, relations with minorities, and legitimacy, as well as a variety of internal and external conditions. Looking at that figure, nationalism refers to fluid or durable identities (a background factor) and responsiveness to myths created usually by decision making elites (a process): New myths are easier to create among citizens with fluid identities; older myths are more likely to be sustained when citizens have durable identities that coincide with the images. These are some of the factors that converge on an outcome – which could be a decision to fight or to sustain combat – with implications for legitimacy, power, and relations, referred to in the framework as “the aftermath.” The feedback loop from consequents (aftermath) to antecedents indicate that the adjusted evaluations following the conflict lead to another cycle of decisions about continuing the conflict. For example, victories may increase citizens’ nationalism and reinforce leaders’ hegemonic goals, both of which may fuel further violent conflict.

Mobilization is easier to accomplish in non-democratic societies with a small middle class (Van Evera, 1995). It is also more likely when there is an imagined or real external threat and when minorities are subject to discrimination or used as scapegoats (Smith, 2000). Another way of construing relations among these variables is in terms of a rough time ordering as follows:

Political structure → size of middle class → extent of economic and political transitions → extent of social disintegration → extent of perceived external threat → manipulation of nationalist sentiments → fluidity of national identification → mobilization of citizens → intra or inter-state conflict → outcomes of conflict → post-conflict changes → nation rebuilding.

The picture painted here is that of a controlling leadership that can manipulate the national sentiments of a malleable population. Mobilization is further facilitated in periods of transition, economic crises, or social disintegration. Posen’s (1995) treatment of military mobilization reinforces this picture and adds other considerations. In addition to external threats, he claims that national insecurity about defending the nation encourages leaders to stimulate aggressive nationalism, especially when they are also insecure about their own legitimacy. Although this is not a new insight, he develops his argument further in less intuitive directions. One proposition put forth is that mass literacy facilitates military mobilization in two ways: Literate people are more susceptible to propaganda and they can learn to operate the complex technologies of modern warfare. Another proposition is that nationalism is weakened by nuclear forces for two reasons: Nuclear
nations demand less of their citizens and the nation feels more secure or less threatened. Conventional (non-nuclear) competitions and land armies “depend on the greatest reserves of human courage and commitment” (Posen, 1995:171). This can be interpreted as an argument for nuclear forces, and even nuclear proliferation, in the sense that they serve to reduce the kind of aggressive nationalism that leads to warfare. However, while widespread nationalist sentiments in non-nuclear countries may facilitate mobilization for combat, these sentiments may also dissipate during the course of the combat experience as Lynn’s (1984) study of armies of the earlier French republics makes evident.

Posen identifies the variables of international competition, mass army mobilization, technology, mass literacy, and nationalist ideology and highlights the way that they are inter-connected. Emphasized here, as in the framework above, is the influence of an interplay of domestic or internal (technology, literacy) and international or external (international competition/threat) factors on a citizenry’s receptivity to nationalist ideologies and calls for mobilization. It also connects context (international competition) with the psychological processes of receptivity (indicated by mass literacy), commitment (discouraged by advanced technologies), and sentiments (manipulated attachments that lead to a willingness to fight and die for the nation). These connections further illuminate the kind of micro-macro level framework put forth in this paper. They are the basis for hypotheses that can be evaluated with multi-method research designs including surveys for assessing attitudes and sentiments, archival and events data sources for measuring literacy and international cooperation, and simulations for demonstrating causation. This is a next step in the development of a theory that relates individuals’ sentiments to collective action.

Of course positive sentiments toward the nation can also be mobilized for peaceful activities, including humanitarian missions. Citizens in societies that have cultivated a civic form of nationalism (or patriotism) are less prone to mobilize at the whim of nationalist leaders concerned more with enhancing their own power than with the welfare of their country’s citizens. Writing about Western Europe, Schopfloen observes that “the strength of civic elements of nationhood, as expressed in the multiple and cross-cutting identities and interests of individuals and groups, loyalty to the state, coupled with the attractiveness of the integration process, are likely to be substantial enough to offset occasional upsurges of ethnic or even ethno-national mobilization” (1995:57). A widely shared commitment to democratic institutions coupled with a tradition of bargaining and compromise provide strong countervailing forces to engaging in nationalist conflicts abroad and ethnic conflicts at home. They also support peace-building efforts designed to foster cross-cutting loyalties that militate against destabilizing conflict spirals. This pattern of loyalties is the basis for developing civic institutions – or a civic nationhood – that function in turn to reinforce and sustain it. They de-emphasize the ethnic elements of nationhood which are characterized by overlapping loyalties that lead to instability and reduced prospects for building democracies.

Conclusions
The research on group identity has focused on a) the functions served by identity such as increasing self-esteem or reducing uncertainty, b) categorizations of ingroups and outgroups regarded as stereotypes, and c) group influence, conformity and deviance.
This focus is primarily on the individual in the group, examining perceptions, judgments, and attitudes. In this paper I have discussed the etiologies, manifestations, and consequences of group identities as well as their fluidity and durability. However, the implications of identities for actions are limited by what the research does not consider, namely, inter-group relations. Focusing attention on small and large groups or collectivities, studies of inter-group and international relations deal with issues of political power, ideologies and interests, mobilizing members for action, and conflict including the motivation to compete (or fight) and defend a group. An attempt was made in this paper to connect identity-formation and sustenance with collective behavior and, by so doing, link the individual and social levels of analysis.

We have learned that group attachments have certain functions for individuals and that these functions are both motivational (as in self-esteem enhancement) and cognitive (as in uncertainty reduction). To the extent that these functions are served, the individual is likely to act on behalf of the group, to contribute to and be influenced by the group’s norms and culture, and to use it as an opportunity to transcend the self or to view the self as being integral to the collective (Kelman, 1988). These group identities can, however, be a problem for inter-group relations. Rarely is the group considered as being synonymous with all of humanity. Typically, individuals identify with particular kinds of groups that can be distinguished from other groups in terms of language, customs, ideology, economics, or even ascriptive characteristics such as gender and age. Hence, dividing lines occur: Ingroups are distinguished in preferential ways from outgroups, and the groups compete with each other for scarce political (power and influence) and economic (material) resources. The competition is restrained in some social systems and in some situations; it is aggressive or virulent in other contexts. Attempts made to understand this difference turn on the way identities manifest themselves in collective action, including the relationship between nationalistic sentiments and mobilization discussed in this paper.

With regard to the resolution of conflicts between groups, it is useful to distinguish between the ideational and the material aspects of identification. Cycles of polarized and de-polarized conflict occur between groups through time as they or their representatives interact to settle their differences. Unresolved differences in interests further polarize the groups ideologically; the polarized ideologies in turn intensify the conflicting interests. Without mediating mechanisms, the conflict cycle would perpetuate in a trajectory toward possible annihilation. Third-party intervention, in various forms, can serve important functions. So too can attempts to design social systems in ways that emphasize cross-cutting rather than overlapping identities (for more on this perspective see Druckman and Zechmeister, 1973; for a case application, see Druckman and Green, 1995). We need to learn more about these processes and mechanisms. They are at the juncture where the theory and research discussed in this paper meet the practices of negotiation and third-party intervention.

Avenues for Further Research

The discussion in this paper suggests a number of ideas for additional research summarized in this final session. Several key ideas are presented for each major part of the essay.
**Group Attachments**

(1) It would be interesting to learn whether uncertainty reduction (or other positive effects of group membership) can lead to increased ingroup attraction without the corresponding outgroup derogation that defines ethnocentrism. What are the conditions that increase patriotic rather than nationalistic identifications?

(2) Another interesting question concerns the relationship between group loyalty and group process. Do strengthened loyalties increase the pressure on group members to endorse similar views and strategies in the manner of a “groupthink?”

(3) It would be important to learn more about the conditions that intensify (or lessen) the coupling of group identification and discrimination. When are these cycles accentuated? When do they become manifest in collective action leading to war? Is there a threshold of intensity which, when passed, becomes a point of no return?

**Group Categorization**

(1) The cognitive economy functions served by stereotypes, including arguments about accuracy, can be pit against the social dysfunctions of discrimination fostered by them. A practical research question is how these cognitive functions can be satisfied without the negative social consequences that eventuate.

(2) The relationship between the cognitive processes of categorization and the motivational processes of group identification needs to be further clarified. Do stronger identifications co-vary with more rigid categorizations or stronger perceived entitativity? Are these mutually-reinforcing processes? Or, are they time-lagged with categorizations (cognitions) following identities and commitments (emotions)?

(3) A research challenge is to untangle the complex web of affiliations in societies where citizens have multiple, conflicting identities. Which group memberships evince stronger (or weaker) loyalties? How are the various non-membership groups scaled in terms of social distance from the ingroups?

**Collective Action**

(1) Group or national world-views remain elusive. Survey research can contribute to the documentation of sharing among a population of views that encourage mobilization and invasion of foreign countries. Longitudinal panel surveys would help to gauge the stability of these views.

(2) Only modest empirical work has been done on the conditions that lead up to decisions made by collectivities to act. In particular, the way in which national loyalties – as compared to other factors such as motivation and readiness to act -- influence policies and contribute to norms that encourage collective action is a question that can be addressed with methodologies of process tracing, path analysis, and scenario-based approaches.

(3) Little is known about the conditions that foster civic or ethnic-based nationalism. A research strategy would consist of performing focused case comparisons of countries (and historical time periods) that differ on the prevailing pattern of loyalties or
group identifications, as cross-cutting or overlapping.

The more ambitious research challenge is to forge a connection among the three parts of this essay, attachments, categorization, and action. This would entail examining the mutually reinforcing processes of identity, stereotyping, and readiness for mobilization to act on behalf of the nation. A circular pattern of relationships is perhaps a better way of capturing the interplay than positing any particular causal direction. Advances in such research methodologies as path modeling holds promise for analyses of data collected on each of the parts of the framework developed in this paper (e.g., Maruyama, 1998).

Finally, a few broad topics relevant to identity have received only limited attention in this essay. One is the role of group identity in nation-building. The tension that exists in many countries of the world between local, provincial identities and national, cosmopolitan loyalties would seem to have important implications for governance and participation in world organizations. Another topic concerns the role of national identities in regional and multilateral politics. A question of interest is the influence of the more insulated national loyalties on willingness to cooperate with other nations in security and trade alliances or on other joint endeavors. A third topic would focus on the various sources for national identity - land, language, and culture. Mentioned in notes 7, 8, and 9, these sources may vary in strength and either conflict or complement one another. And, a fourth area of interest is the connection between nationalism or patriotism and various sub or extra-national identifications, including religion, profession, social class, gender, and age. Probes into the similarities and differences among these identities would shed light on the prospects for a more general theory of group identity.10

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10 Another topic that has received scant attention in the national identity literature is the influence of identity on immigration and immigration policies. Questions asked about Australian immigration policy at the Museum of Immigration in Melbourne capture the heart of the problem:

What kind of society do we want?

Is Australia a southern outpost of British culture? Or is its identity bound to Asia and the Pacific?

• Is there a “typical” Australian? Or does the very idea of ‘typical’ deny the diversity of our society?

• How does the Aboriginal identity fit into the idea of Australia as an immigrant nation?

• Can different cultures maintain their identities while participating in a ‘national’ identity?

The last question also addresses the tensions between sub-national and national identities raised above as a topic for further investigation.


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