

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN QUEENSLAND

**SOUTHEAST ASIA: MOVING BEYOND
THE CONSTRUCTION OF A NASCENT
SECURITY COMMUNITY?**

A dissertation submitted by

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CERTIFICATION OF DISSERTATION

I certify that the ideas, experimental work, results, analysis, and conclusions reported in this dissertation are my own effort, except where otherwise acknowledged. I also certify that the work is original and has not been previously submitted for any other award, except where otherwise acknowledged.

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ENDORSEMENT

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ABSTRACT

This study applies Deutsch's security community framework to the states of Southeast Asia in order to assess whether or not, as at September 2002, there exist dependable expectations of peaceful change. The study has three primary goals. The first is to develop the framework so it may better reflect the realities of interstate and communal relations in Southeast Asia. The second is to assess whether or not Southeast Asia has in fact moved beyond the construction of a nascent security community where there exists adequate empirical evidence to suggest a future *sustainable* course towards 'dependable expectations of peaceful change'. The third seeks to analyse the potential for Southeast Asia, as a community of states, to evolve to the higher tiers of integration and be characterised as a mature security community, where disputes between states and state-elites will be resolved without recourse to violence. In investigating these tasks, the dissertation considers a broad range of issues, including (but not limited to): the multilateral security frameworks embracing the region; the impact of ethnic and religious tensions as well as non-traditional security issues (with a focus here on narcotics and piracy); and the impact of terrorism and the recent economic crisis on the normative behaviours and ideologies of state elites throughout the region. It is found that while a substantial degree of interaction, integration and cooperation has developed in Southeast Asia, these developments have been insufficient to alleviate a number of traditional security issues and tensions (such as border and territorial conflicts). Consequently, there exists only a transient sense of expectations of peaceful change throughout Southeast Asia and this level of integration is characterised by the dissertation to represent nothing more than the embryonic phase of a security community's evolution.

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GLOSSARY

- ACOT.** ASEAN Centre on Transnational Crime
- AFTA.** ASEAN Free Trade Area (1993)
- APEC.** Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (1989)
- APT.** ASEAN Plus Three (1993)
- ASEAN.** Association of Southeast Asian Nations (1967)
- ASEM.** Asia Europe Meeting (1996)
- ARF.** ASEAN Regional Forum (1994)
- CSBM.** Confidence and Security Building Measure
- CBM.** Confidence Building Measure
- FDI.** Foreign Direct Investment
- FPDA.** Five Power Defence Arrangement (1971)
- FTA.** Free Trade Arrangement
- FY.** Financial Year
- NGO.** Non-governmental Organisation
- Konfrontasi.*** Confrontation (Bahasa Indonesia)
- Reformasi.*** The Reform Process (Bahasa Indonesia)
- ROI.** Republic of Indonesia
- SCF.** Security Community Framework(s)
- SEA.** Southeast Asia
- SPDC.** State Peace and Development Council

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: RESEARCH TOPIC AND KEY QUESTIONS

Over the past thirty years, Southeast Asia has distinguished itself as a region of diversity with vast potential based on an abundance of resources. Until the ‘Asian economic crisis of 1997-1998’, it was also considered to be a region of dynamic economic growth and rapid development. While some states in Southeast Asia now may be regaining their reputation as ‘economic tigers’ since 1998,¹ future economic progress is unlikely to be uniform. The *original* ASEAN member-states may have avoided large-scale military confrontation, but there are now newer ASEAN member-states that had previously been in armed conflict with each other. The claim has been made that these new member states have been ‘successfully engaged’ and now embrace the ASEAN norm of peaceful change. Notwithstanding the adverse affects of the economic crisis, as well as the internal turmoil that Indonesia has experienced over the past few years, many assessments of the region have found the likelihood of interstate armed conflict to be highly improbable. However, given the flourishing narcotics industry in the Golden Triangle; the cold to bitter relations that exist between Singapore and Malaysia; and the conflicting claims in the South China Sea is such a contention defensible? Within the discipline of international relations, this is one of the core issues that security

¹ Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore. Singapore was only minimally affected by the economic crisis.

community frameworks (SCFs) seek to address. Yet, to date, most security community frameworks applied to Southeast Asia have primarily aimed at illustrating the success with which the region has integrated over the past few decades. While this dissertation does not refute these studies or their claims, it does contend that the framework may equally be applied to a region for the purpose of critically understanding the current limitations to dependable expectations of peaceful change in Southeast Asia.

In this context, the present study has three primary investigative tasks. The first explores how security community frameworks can be improved in the sense of better reflecting the realities of interstate and communal relations with a view to evaluating the dependability of peaceful relations between the states of Southeast Asia. Based on the insights obtained in the first investigative task, the second critically evaluates whether or not Southeast Asia can, as some analysts claim, be properly characterised as a 'nascent security community'.² The third task assesses the potential for the communities and states within Southeast Asia to integrate to a level that might be properly defined as a 'mature security community'.³ When a region satisfies

² Some examples include the comments of: Amitav Acharya, "Collective Identity and Conflict Management in Southeast Asia," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), Yuen Foong Khong, "ASEAN and the Southeast Asian Security Complex," in *Regional Orders: Building Security in the New World*, ed. David A. and Morgan Lake, Patrick M. (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), p.339, Raimo Vayrynen, *Stable Peace through Security Communities? Steps Towards Theory-Building* [Occasional Paper] (The Joan B. Krock Institute for International Peace Studies, June 11, 2001 2000 [cited September 10 2001]).

³ Where there is virtually no possibility of military conflict. See the definitional framework in Chapter II.

the requirements of a mature security community, it is contended that the theory merges with the practice to the extent that there exist long-term expectations of peaceful change throughout the region. At this point in a region's evolution, the primary focus of the leadership of the regional states shifts towards the consideration of both personal security (e.g., freedom from oppression and exploitation) and social security (e.g., law and order and the absence of transnational crime).⁴

In exploring these issues as important aspects of the investigative tasks above, the following central questions frame the analysis undertaken with regard to the Southeast Asian region:

1. What are the key concepts and terms that need to be defined and applied in this study; and what is the relevant literature and other sources of information concerning them? (Chapter I)
2. What appropriate theoretical framework of analysis can be devised to address the key dimensions of the study? (Chapter II)
3. How has the historical strategic security architecture served to facilitate or restrain the creation of dependable expectations of peaceful change within the region? (Chapter III)
4. How have the events of the Asian economic crisis, and the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 impacted on elite level normative behaviour and, more broadly, on the contemporary strategic security architecture? (Chapter IV)
5. How do the concepts of collective identity formation and domestic security relate to, and develop, dependable expectations of peaceful change? (Chapter V)
6. How do non-traditional security issues interlink with the notions of traditional and comprehensive security, as well as the formation of dependable expectations of peaceful change within Southeast Asia? (Chapter VI)

⁴ These concepts and terms are further defined and contextualized within Chapter II.

7. How have the bilateral and multilateral responses pertaining to issues of conflict within Southeast Asia, and beyond, impacted on an assessment of collective identity formation and dependable expectations of peaceful change within the region? (Chapter VII).
8. How do the various components of a security community (such as traditional security, non-traditional security and communal relations) interrelate with one another in substantiating or detracting from dependable expectations of peaceful change? (cumulative analysis throughout the chapters and concluding in Chapter VII)
9. In terms of a security community framework, how can the region be categorised today? (cumulative analysis throughout chapters and concluding in Chapter VII)
10. What are the primary challenges faced by Southeast Asia in becoming a security community within the foreseeable future? (cumulative analysis throughout chapters and concluding in Chapter VII)

Generally, these central questions provide a chapter structure for the study. While for each chapter there is a central question setting the primary focus of analysis, questions 8, 9 and 10 run through the whole study as threads to the analysis. The first question is considered in this introductory chapter, while question 2 is considered in Chapter II. Further, while the investigative tasks and central questions are representative of the general thrust of the enquiry, there exist a number of sub-questions, or issues, that are too many in number to be summarised here and will be raised, where feasible, at the appropriate locations throughout the dissertation. Below, a section entitled *Research Approach* provides a brief description of the individual chapters and how the various components of each chapter address, comprehend, examine, and answer each of the central questions.

It is necessary to make one explanatory qualification before moving into a review of the literature. The accuracy of any analysis in the realm of security

studies, let alone a *security community framework*, decreases proportionately to the number of actors extant within the analytical model. That is, the attempt by the political scientist to understand '*the political*' follows a kind of 'reverse probability' whereby analytical accuracy decreases proportionately as the sample number (of actors) increases. Therefore, as the security community framework discussed here deals with a large number of actors (states, transnational communities, NGOs, and so on), the level of analysis required has proportionately increased in complexity and is mirrored by the ensuing discussions within the dissertation.

Literature Review: The Emergence of the Concepts and their Definitions

The emergence of a 'security community' as a conceptual framework is largely accredited to the research of Karl Deutsch and associates in 1957. While Deutsch developed the initial framework and its composite notions, the actual founder of the term was Richard van Wagnen in the early 1950s.⁵ This work was the first substantive challenge to the realist paradigm.⁶ A neglected connection to the framework is its relationship to the concept of an 'international society',⁷ a concept proposed by the English school of thought and one which has its roots in the work of Grotius and his famous

⁵ Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, "Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p.3.

⁶ Acharya, "Collective Identity and Conflict Management in Southeast Asia," p.201.

⁷ Barry Buzan, "Book Review: Adler and Barnett, 'Security Communities'," *International Affairs* 76, no. 1 (2000), p.154.

book, *De Jure Belli et Pacis* (The Law of War and Peace) in 1625.⁸ In terms of international theory, an international society sits on the constructivist end of the spectrum, that is, unlike Neo-Realism which places emphasis only on material structures (such as national interests, maximum gains and so on), ‘international society’ emphasises the value of a normative structure (for example, socially constructed norms of peaceful interaction) in *addition* to the material.⁹ Central to the idea of an international society is the belief that states can form a society where there is emphasis on common norms for the conduct of their relations and recognition of their common interest in maintaining these arrangements.¹⁰ The connection of this so-called ‘English School of Thought’¹¹ with a ‘security community framework’ is found in Deutsch’s assertion that a security community will exist where there are ‘dependable expectations of peaceful change’.¹² According to Deutsch, the existence of such ‘expectations’ will most likely exist whenever two or more states become integrated to an extent that there is an overall sense of community, ‘which in turn, creates the assurance that they will settle their

⁸ *The Random House Encyclopaedia*, ed. James Mitchell, 3rd ed. (New York: Random House, 1990) p.2,247.

⁹ Adler and Barnett, "Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective," p.10.

¹⁰ In other words, they move beyond self-gain and self-interest – from relative gain towards more absolute gain. Ian McLean, *Concise Dictionary of Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) p.248.

¹¹ Mohammed Ayoob, "From Regional System to Regional Order," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 53, no. 3 (1999) p.247.

¹² Karl W. Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organisation in the Light of Historical Experience* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1957) p.5.

differences short of war'.¹³ Therefore, the 'community of states' that form the security community abides by norms of peaceful conduct and in fact anticipates a stable peace. Deutsch articulated his framework in the following manner:

A security-community is a group of people which become "integrated"... By integration we mean the attainment, within a territory, of a "sense of community" and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a "long" time, dependable expectations of "peaceful change" among its population. ...By sense of community we mean a belief on the part of the individuals in a group that they have come to agreement on at least this one point: that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of "peaceful change."...By peaceful change we mean the resolution of social problems, normally by institutionalised procedures, without resort to large-scale physical force.¹⁴

Adler and Barnett claim that the study of a security community framework has been often cited but rarely emulated.¹⁵ Figure 1.1 on p.10 is indicative of a changing process in international relations theory where the imaginary Idealist/Realist divide has started to dissipate. As it demonstrates, a security community framework – and its constructivist approach – has been increasingly applied since the end of the Cold War. Where once such concepts were simply stereotyped as a minority school of thought by

¹³ Adler and Barnett, "Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective," p.3.

¹⁴ Under the definition provided by Deutsch, a security community may exist between communities within states or across states – a security community is in fact non-territorial. However, for the purpose of this study and in light of its modern application, the study will limit the focus and application of security community frameworks to inter-state relations. Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organisation in the Light of Historical Experience* p.5.


¹⁵ Adler and Barnett, "Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective," p.9.

‘utopianist idealists’, the notion of a security community framework has now entered mainstream thought, and debate – both in academia and in various governments across the globe. Because Adler and Barnett argue for the superiority of security community frameworks and the constructivist paradigm, they therefore make the contention that the realist-idealist divide is nothing more than artificial. Adler and Barnett summarise their contention in the following manner:

Theories of international politics, therefore, can and should occupy a pragmatic middle ground between the view that identities and international practices cannot change, and the view that everything is possible. They should be able to blend power, interests, and pessimism with norms, a dynamic view of international politics, and moderate optimism about the possibility of structural change that enhances human interests across borders.¹⁶

¹⁶ This is because the study of security community framework incorporates elements of both the realist and idealist paradigms. Idealism has been vicariously labelled utopianism, rationalism and/or liberalism. It emphasises the importance ‘moral values, legal norms, internationalism and harmony of interests...’, Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, eds., *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations* (London: Penguin Books, 1998) p.235. Idealism holds that universal and long term peace is both a possible and obtainable goal. In contrast to this, realism contends that the international system is characterised by a system of anarchy; that states are generally rational actors but such rationalism is confined to the achievement of national interests and selfish desires of maximising political gain. The way the security community concept examines the dynamic relationship between the power of the state, international organisations and institutions (including non-governmental organisations) and the various changes in security practices has resulted in the incorporation of aspects of both the realist and idealist paradigms. Adler and Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities," pp.14-15.

Figure 1.1: The Re-emergence of Security Community Framework Discourse



Compiled by Author from the Ebscohost Database, October 2001.

Advocates of the security community concept have ranged from the Office of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade in Australia to the Commander in Chief, US Pacific Command, Admiral Dennis C. Blair.¹⁷ The re-emergence of the concept has been the result of a number of factors. One of these is that the collapse of the Soviet Union *did* create a new world order that ended bi-polarity in the global system of states. The world did not, however, revert back to the old Westphalian system of a *multipolar balance of power* but, rather, to a system generally seeking collective governance. That is, there exists a preference for a system of governance

¹⁷ Interview by Author with Amanda Hawkins and Bradley Haynes, *Office of the Minister for Foreign Affairs* (Canberra), 11 July 2001. Dennis C. Admiral Blair, "United States Pacific Command" (University of California, San Diego, 13 April 2000), Dennis C. Admiral Blair and John T. Hanley Jr., "From Wheels to Webs: Reconstructing Asia-Pacific Security Arrangements," *The Washington Quarterly* 24, no. 1 (2001).

that looks more to an ideal of institutionalism and integration between states – an example of this would be the European Union. Indeed, war and uncertainty continue to persist, but rather than existing primarily between states, conflict and uncertainty has developed *within* and across states – such as with terrorism and transnational crime. While a great deal of scholarly literature has been produced on the topic of why this is so,¹⁸ it is sufficient to state that for the purpose of this dissertation, a new *world system of integration*¹⁹ has created the prospect, and the belief, that ‘dependable expectations of change can exist between states’ and that Deutsch’s ‘security community framework’ *should* be accepted as a part of the mainstream of international relations theory.

According to the scholarly literature, there are two types of security community, an ‘amalgamated security community’ and a ‘pluralistic security community’.²⁰ Both categories maintain the notion of dependable expectations of peaceful change, but an amalgamated security community is said to exist where states formally unify, such as in the case of the United States of America (USA). By contrast, a pluralistic security community exists

¹⁸ For a general discussion of this topic see: David Lake and Patrick Morgan, ed., *Regional Orders: Building Security in the New World* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997).

¹⁹ This is taken to mean integration as between states, as opposed to any notion of fragmentation within states.

²⁰ Adler and Barnett, "Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective.", Arie Kacowicz, *Regionalization, Globalization, and Nationalism: Convergent, Divergent or Overlapping?* [Journal Article] (Alternatives: Social Transformation and Humane Governance, Oct-Dec 1999 [cited 15 May 2001]); available from <<http://globalvgw11.global.epnet.com>>.

where states preserve their sovereignty. This dissertation will only examine the application of a 'pluralistic security community' framework, as it represents the developments taking place at the international and regional levels, including the Southeast Asian region. In its contemporary form, Adler and Barnett define a pluralistic security community (henceforth referred to as a *security community*) '... as a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change'.²¹

This simplified definition, while aptly stating the essence of a (pluralistic) security community, does require one clarification. Adler's use of the word 'region' can invoke the possibility of several theories such as Buzan's 'regional security complex' framework²² or Thompson's 'regional subsystem's theory'.²³ An in-depth discussion as to the characteristics or requirements of a region would, however, be superfluous as a security community does not require a geographical region to exist. Rather, it can exist between just two or more states, such as the security community of Australia and New Zealand;²⁴ Australia, New Zealand and Singapore;²⁵ or

²¹ Adler and Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities," p.30.

²² Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, 2nd edition ed. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991) p.190, Barry Buzan, "The Southeast Asian Security Complex," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 10, no. 1 (1988).

²³ William Thompson, "The Regional Subsystem: A Conceptual Explication and a Propositional Inventory," *International Studies Quarterly* 17, no.1 p.101, cited in Ayoob, "From Regional System to Regional Order," p.249.

²⁴ Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order* (London: Routledge, 2001) p.20.

the United States and Canada.²⁶ The relationship between the concepts of ‘security community’ and ‘region’ will be discussed in greater depth in Chapter II.

The Neo-Kantians and the Democratic Security Community

Linked to the constructivist school of thought on a security community is the Kantian notion of ‘Democratic Peace’.²⁷ The Kantians do not discount security community frameworks, but rather, advocate democracy as a necessary precondition to their existence. Therefore, in applying security community frameworks, the Kantians usually refer to it as a ‘democratic security community’. The Kantian school of thought stems from Immanuel Kant and his classic 1795 work *Perpetual Peace*. Kant’s philosophy solidly supported the Universalist camp and the primacy of the rule of law. That is to say, that there exist certain grand norms that are universally applicable to all peoples on earth. Examples of this would include the right to eat and the right to be left alone and unharmed. The latter is aptly surmised by Justice Louis D. Brandeis: ‘[t]he right to be left alone is the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued in civilised man’. For example, the Universalist approach and the rule of law as a philosophy would conflict with any

²⁵ Interview by Author with Kwa Chong Guan, *IDSS* (Singapore), 5 December 2001.

²⁶ Buzan, *People, States and Fear* pp.114-5.

²⁷ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) p.299.

justification of an 'ASEAN way',²⁸ particularly if the norms that stem from its existence acted to negate the rights of the individual and society.

One of the most fundamental contentions behind the notion of a democratic peace is that democracies 'are significantly less likely to fight wars with each other'.²⁹ There are three primary reasons behind this contention. The first is that the *flow and type* of information in democratic (pluralistic) institutions (as opposed to dictatorships or oligarchies) leads to a better, more rational, decision making process that increases the likelihood of a 'no-war' result.³⁰ The second factor, one that is partly related to the first, is that democratic institutions emphasise parliamentary responsibility and place conditions on when, how and to what degree a political leader can act. The leader of a democratic government can rarely exercise the right to wage war without the support of at least the executive, the legislature and eventually, the people (at least by way of election). Thirdly, there has been a recent expansion of the 'democratic peace theory' to include considerations of economic interdependence. This is because democratic states now tend to be more economically open, giving increased latitude to the theory of economic interdependence.³¹ While this argument has been raised in an abundance of

²⁸ Such as the principles of non-intervention, consensus, regional and national resilience. Defined in detail within Chapter III.

²⁹ John Wiggs Patty and Roberto A. Weber, "Agreeing to Fight: An Explanation of the Democratic Peace," (Carnegie Mellon University, 2001), p.2.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p.1.

³¹ John R. Oneal and Bruce M. Russett, "The Classic Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985," *International Studies Quarterly* 41 (1997): p.267-8.

Kantian literature, there has been little by way of empirical evidence that has been utilised to justify this contention.³²

Even in stepping away from the Kantian view of a security community, it has been claimed that the major problem in applying security community frameworks (herein labelled SCF) to the developing world is an implicit assumption that 'such communities require a quintessential liberal-democratic milieu featuring significant economic interdependence and political pluralism'.³³ Amitav Acharya, in his application of SCFs to Southeast Asia, ranges between dismissing democracy as a necessary prerequisite to the formation of a security community to only briefly outlining what he sees as an implicit assumption by European academics that democracy *is* a necessary prerequisite.³⁴ However, his works have yet to provide an in-depth critique of this 'European' assumption.³⁵ A major reason for this may be because of a perception, by a significant percentage of colleagues within the region, that Acharya himself is overly Eurocentric.³⁶ By contrast, Zhiquan Zhu does

³² It has been further argued by Alexander Wendt that the 'democratic peace' notion has never attempted to 'tap into' the causes as to why such a pattern exists: see, Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* p.68.

³³ Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order* p.31.

³⁴ Acharya, "Collective Identity and Conflict Management in Southeast Asia," p.199.

³⁵ Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order* p.31.

³⁶ Interview by Author with Joseph Liow, *IDSS* (Singapore), 7 December 2002; Interview by Author with Andrew Tan, *IDSS* (Singapore), 5 December 2002. Interview by Author with Kanala Khantaprab, *Government of Thailand* (Bangkok), 26 December 2002.

expand on Acharya's arguments and acknowledges the difficulty for countries to share similar values and expectations when they have different political and economic systems.³⁷ It is not the aim of this dissertation to provide a substantive analysis of the relationship between democratic systems of governance and the facilitation of both dependable expectations of peaceful change and collective identity formation. However, the dissertation does refer to the contrasts that exist in comparing the ability of democratic governments with authoritarian regimes and their reciprocal ability to adapt to political and economic crises. It is hoped that these comparisons may provide some valuable background to future research and analysis on the topic.

The Research Approach

This dissertation applies the disciplines of political science and international relations theory throughout its analysis. This by no means narrows the scope or depth of the dissertation's analysis, because the political scientist's field of study is not constrained by a 'self-denying ordinance against the use of materials and techniques of other social scientists'.³⁸ However, keeping the framework and analysis within the discipline of political science does provide a logical coherence and requires justified derivations. The discipline of political science also places a premium on the historical factors behind why an

³⁷ Zhiqun Zhu, "Prospect for Integration in Pacific-Asia," *Asian Profile* 28, no. 6 (2000): p.517.

³⁸ Kenneth Waltz, "Man, the State, and War," in *War*, ed. Lawrence Freedman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p.74.

event is so.³⁹ This requires, above all else, an adequate degree of evidence and the absence of 'emotional attachments, personal hunches and [merely] intuitive understanding'.⁴⁰ One criticism that can be directed at the discipline is its emphasis on quantitative research (so as to maintain objectivity and a 'logical coherence') at the expense, or neglect, of qualitative research such as in-depth interviews. However, Fiona Devine contends that the use of qualitative in combination with quantitative methods should, and *does*, play an important role in political science.⁴¹ Therefore, in agreement with Devine, the dissertation has utilised both qualitative and quantitative methods of research whilst seeking to maintain the requisite degree of objectivity as demanded by the discipline of political science. The statistical information utilised in the dissertation comes from a broad range of primary and secondary sources, from information on drug production (United Nations Drug Control Program) to military expenditure (the United States Central Intelligence Agency). In terms of qualitative research, forty-one in-depth interviews were

³⁹ Gerry Stoker, "Introduction," in *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, ed. David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (Houndmills: MacMillan Press Ltd and St. Martins Press, 1995), p.3.

⁴⁰ A Zuckerman, *Doing Political Science* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1991) p.3. cited in, Stoker, "Introduction," p.3.

⁴¹ For further discussion of this issue see, Fiona Devine, "Methodological Questions - Qualitative Analysis," in *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, ed. David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (Houndmills: MacMillan Press Ltd and St. Martins Press, 1995), pp.138-9. To illustrate the importance of qualitative research Anthony Seldon provides some examples of in-depth interviews that have provided vital facts unavailable by any other means. Two of these examples are found in the collection of information that is not yet available on public record, such as Paul Johnson's *The Suez War* (1957) and Lawrence Freedman's *Britain and the Falklands War* (1988). As Seldon states, these authors left little to the imagination and without which readers would have had to have waited until 1987 and 2013, respectively, for the official release of classified information pertaining to the topics, Anthony Seldon, *Contemporary History* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988) p.4.

conducted and over one-hundred academics, strategists and government representatives were contacted for the purpose of finding answers to the questions raised by the dissertation's research. The two sub-sections below provide some further insights as to the limitations, structure and the various methods employed in the completion of the dissertation.

Limitations of the Research and Further Considerations

While this dissertation addresses a wide variety of issues relevant to the establishment of a security community in Southeast Asia, the work done to date is suggestive of a need to undertake further empirical study and apply various research techniques in the future. One example is the use of surveys to ascertain community and regional perceptions by people at the communal level of analysis. Initial studies might focus on the more developed regional countries such as Singapore, Malaysia and Brunei. Such research might also utilise mathematical plotting similar to game system theories. This might entail the establishment of a rating system to provide a 'score' for each of the micro-components to a security community (i.e., language compatibility, intra-regional trade, and so on) and then compare this, via an historical time line, with the establishment of, say, the European security community. The resulting graph plotted as a consequence of aggregating such data could permit the political scientist to ascertain a theoretical rate of integration over a set period (i.e., twenty years) and thereby predict an estimate of time that might be needed for this region to develop into a more mature security community.

While the chapter titles serve as a broad guide to the issues analysed therein, they cannot completely delineate the central questions and investigative tasks of the study. This is because, to one degree or another, the range of issues considered is completely interrelated. Therefore, while the South China Sea disputes are considered as a ‘traditional security’ issue in Chapter VII, the basis of some of these tensions are also to be found in economic and human security considerations. As Chapter VII *also* considers bilateral state relations and exogenous influences, word restraints have inhibited any further consideration of these dynamics other than what is alluded to within Chapters IV, V and VI (such as economic security, domestic security and non-traditional security issues). Furthermore, in order to understand the broad spectrum of issues pertinent to security community formation, analysis must be limited only to those factors related to (positively or negatively) two key components, namely, ‘dependable expectations of peaceful change’ and ‘collective identity formation’. For example, in the consideration of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), analysis is limited to the impact of the two organisations (as they pertain to confidence and security building measures and act as *facilitators* of dialogue) to state relations and peace within the region.

Recent events, such as the Asian economic crisis of 1997-98 and the terrorist events of 11 September 2001, have propelled some of the developments and qualifications to the framework made in this study. Therefore, the development of SCFs is anything but a stagnant process. As regional and

global environments change, it is likely that future scholars will be able to develop further insights on the application of the framework. The only components likely to be left unchanged are the broad requirements of the framework, such as the necessity of good inter-state relations and the presence of an interstate communal and elite level identity. This is because the absence of military tensions and/or conflict, as well as the absence of ethnic and religious tensions and/or violence (with the potential to develop into inter-state armed struggles), is fundamental to the Deutschian thesis and dependable expectations of peaceful change.

This study covers the events up to and including the opening ceremony of the 23rd General Assembly of the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Organisation (AIPO) in Hanoi on 10 September 2002. The necessity to place a time limit on the study is dictated by both word constraints and the complexity of the issues covered. Further, because of the constraints placed on a Masters level dissertation (both in time and words) this dissertation, regrettably, has had to remove several components from its consideration. Some of these included case studies on Indonesia/East Timor relations; Myanmar/Thailand relations; the environment and the impact of the haze; as well as a much larger assessment of the strategic goals and military capacity of China, and an in-depth of analysis of the obstacles to security sector reform in Indonesia. It is hoped that future studies could look into, and develop, these areas as well as the multitude of additional issues and considerations that stem from the investigative tasks, central questions, and analysis of the study.

The Chapters: Structure, Argumentation and Further Limitations

To achieve the stated aims of the dissertation, Chapter II deals almost exclusively with the first investigative task and the second central question. It further refines the boundaries of analysis by elaborating and developing the aforementioned theories on SCFs. For reasons mentioned previously, SCFs are only just starting to come to the fore and it is important to distinctly label and define both the correlation between theory and empirical evidence that is necessary to the existence of a security community in Southeast Asia. In light of this goal, Chapter III considers the security architecture of Southeast Asia, and in so doing addresses the third central question to the study. It commences with a brief historical analysis of the development of a security framework for Southeast Asia after World War II. In relation to this, the chapter contextualises APEC and the ARF as multilateral organisations, with a traditional normative preference by the states of the region for bilateral dialogue in the resolution of security issues. Following this, there is a consideration of the relationship of both the ARF and APEC (as confidence and security building measures) to the establishment of dependable expectations of peaceful change in Southeast Asia.

Chapter IV, in addressing the fourth central question, shifts the focus of examination to some of the contemporary security issues that have affected elite level normative behaviour within Southeast Asia. The first section considers the impact of the Southeast Asian economic crisis on the strategic security environment, and there is an examination of how the crisis may have

created an opportunity for (or, perhaps, compelled a move towards) a paradigm shift in the normative values, behaviour and relations within the region. The second section gives some preliminary consideration to the impact of terrorism on the region and how the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 may have further compelled this shift in elite level normative values and perceptions.

In addressing the fifth central question, Chapter V assesses the relationship of collective identity formation and domestic security with regard to dependable expectations of peaceful change in Southeast Asia. The first section considers communal level collective identity formation, the second component of Deutsch's theory. The emphasis of the section is on the obstacles to communal level collective identity formation within Southeast Asia and how communal relations are interdependent with elite level relations. In order to substantiate the propositions of the chapter, the section builds the SCF by incorporating the nation-building process as a sub-framework to the study. In light of this analysis, and the events considered within Chapter IV, section two provides a case study that considers how the negative and discriminatory nation-building process of Indonesia (i.e. elite level policy regarding the ethnic Chinese) has contributed to the current domestic insecurity faced by Indonesia. The case study then shifts its focus to security sector reform (a further development to the framework) and how, as an analytical tool, it assists in an evaluation of the breadth and scope of reform needed to overcome domestic insecurity. Additionally, the case study provides a brief

synopsis on how a failure in Indonesia's security sector reform process could impact on transnational relations and the comprehensive security of Southeast Asia.

Chapter VI analyses how non-traditional security issues (as defined in Chapter II) are interrelated with SCF notions of traditional security. The chapter provides some insights on the level of cooperation and cooperative security extant within the region. The degree to which non-traditional security issues result in the formation of common goals and the implementation of cooperative efforts between states provides a valuable tool in assessing the level of integration and therefore, the application of SCFs.⁴²

Chapter VII addresses the sixth central question. The chapter is divided into two sections. The first considers two case studies on potential issues of conflict within Southeast Asia. The first case study covers the bilateral relations between Singapore and Malaysia. The second moves into a consideration of the multilateral tensions in the South China Sea. The section concludes with a discussion on how these two issues have served to enhance, or detract from, any finding of dependable expectations of peaceful change. The chapter then considers the potential impact, both direct and indirect, of exogenous factors on the formation of dependable expectations of peaceful change. In order to accomplish this task, and for the sake of brevity, the section incorporates China as a brief case study and links the analysis to

⁴² An analysis of the total spectrum of security concerns is beyond the scope of the dissertation but may be a possible area of future study within a PhD level dissertation.

China's impact on dependable expectations of peaceful change in the region. While direct threats, such as actual military confrontation, are more obvious in how they impact on Southeast Asia's strategic security environment, the study also recognises how less direct threats (such as the economic ascendancy of China), can detract from consensus and elite level collective identity formation in the region.

Chapter VIII, the final and concluding chapter, entitled 'Retrospect and Prospects', provides a summation of all three investigative tasks and in turn, further addresses central questions 8 through to 10. The chapter commences with an analysis of how empirical observations from the study can be utilised to further strengthen and develop an analytical understanding of SCFs and their application to real life communal and elite level political relations (the first investigative task). On the basis of these insights, the chapter moves towards a consideration of the second investigative task and seeks to examine whether or not Southeast Asia has moved beyond the construction of a nascent security community.

By taking into account the events and circumstances discussed within Chapters III through to VII, Chapter VIII also addresses the third investigative task and contends that the contemporary security architecture of Southeast Asia has provided state-elites with a remarkable opportunity to undertake a paradigm shift in inter-state normative relations leading to enhanced integration and interaction. If the political elites of the region follow this path, then both domestic and interstate security could develop to a point

where the region could be characterised as a nascent or even ascendant security community, within the next ten to twenty years. In these circumstances, dependable expectations of peaceful change would be relatively assured and this would lead to a combination of strong investor confidence, rapid economic development and strong domestic security. Under these conditions, the peoples of Southeast Asia will be able to obtain both 'personal' and 'social' security including such basic things as freedom from oppression, exploitation; crime and poverty. The terms and concepts mentioned above are further explained in the next chapter.

CHAPTER II

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF A SECURITY COMMUNITY


This chapter addresses the second central question by examining both the theoretical foundations of a ‘security community’ (in terms of known paradigms) and the definition of its respective components. In line with the first investigative task, and where appropriate, the chapter seeks to develop and strengthen the key concepts and definitions of a security community. However, the evolution of the framework does not end here. Further developments to the framework are made as a consequence of the empirical insights in later chapters. Consequently, Chapter V contains an expanded conclusion that further develops the components of the framework relating to communal considerations and introduces ‘nation-building processes’ as a valuable addition to understanding collective identity formation within the region. Chapter VIII, the final and concluding chapter, also assesses some of the developments to the framework that are a consequence of this study. In the meantime, and in addition to above, this chapter aims to provide a conceptual map to which the experience of Southeast Asia can be set.

Conceptual Foundations of Security Communities

Figure 2.1 illustrates how the various concepts that define a security community relate and intermix. There are several primary branches of conceptual framework that stem from the words ‘security community’. These are security, integration, ‘dependable expectations of peaceful change’,

community and society. The notion of *security* provides the foundation to which the remaining four conceptual frameworks can build upon. *Integration*, in its traditional sense, is the key component to the formation of *dependable expectations of peaceful change*. *Community* should be viewed as a continuation of the process of integration but moves beyond integration's traditional boundaries through the consideration of the relationship between nation and state. It also recognises the existence of transnational communities and how they might impact on the emergence of a collective identity between the states that are thought to be composite members of a security community. Each of these inter-linked conceptual frameworks requires intricate explanations, which will continue to be reinforced in the remaining chapters of the dissertation. By comparison, the notion of *society* is relatively simple and is therefore included with the conceptual framework behind a *community* rather than as an independent category. The qualification of the meaning behind the notion of *society* is necessary in order to layer, or tier, the dissertation's reference to groupings and people – for example, is the dissertation referring to all the people that reside within the defined territory of a state, or is it referring to a community that may be transnational in nature?

Figure 2.1: Definitional and Conceptual Framework



Source: Compiled by author

(a) Security

In the traditional sense, the concept of security applied exclusively to the absence of a military threat to a sovereign state. Adler and Barnett apply the contemporary trend of broadening security to include ‘economic, environmental, and social welfare concerns’ (examples of these concerns are illustrated by the category of ‘non-traditional security’ in Figure 2.1).⁴³ In contrast, Ramo Vayrynen⁴⁴ criticises this approach and applies a narrow,

⁴³ Adler and Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities," p.4.

⁴⁴ Vayrynen, *Stable Peace through Security Communities? Steps Towards Theory-Building* (cited).

realist definition. Vayrynen has a point in arguing that a broad definition of security encompassing non-traditional security matters could destabilise the Deutschian framework and its application. That is, should a broad definition of security apply, there would be difficulty in the classification of a community of states in the event of a *vis major* (i.e. a plague or economic crisis). This neo-liberalist approach would result in a security community that is existent one week, nonexistent the next, and back again the week after. In light of this problem, Vayrynen defines security in the following terms:

[As a] 'low past, present and future probability of using serious coercive force between or within nations'. Coercion can be both military and economic in nature as both of them can inflict major damage and pain on the targeted people. Peace is broken, and the security community unrealised in the region, if people are subjected to physical destruction and suffering. In other words, peace and security mean, ultimately, freedom from coercion and its threats'.⁴⁵

As the events that took place on 11 September have illustrated, terrorism now has an elevated capacity to impact on 'peace and security'. Its existence as a 'serious coercive force between or within nations' can exist at a level that is both military and economic in nature. Thus, not only did the terrorist destruction of the Twin Towers in New York critically impact upon the economy of the US (and shortly thereafter the economies of the globe) but it also resulted in a direct military response that was eventually targeted against the political elite of the state that was accused of harbouring the alleged terrorists responsible for the attacks. Therefore, in this dissertation, terrorism

⁴⁵ Ibid.(cited).

will be characterised as falling within the category and definition of ‘traditional/hard-security’.⁴⁶

This dissertation does not intend to simply dismiss broader non-traditional security approaches. On the contrary, it will utilise the aforementioned definition of security as a threshold test for the existence of a security community and will be referred to as *traditional security*. However, once the application of this threshold test is satisfied, it will then be necessary to apply a broader definition of security that encompasses certain non-traditional concerns such as transnational crime (see Figure 2.1). To this end, the type of security framework that this dissertation has adopted as its overall umbrella is that labelled *comprehensive security*. The choice of this organising concept has been made partly because of its analytical integrity, its adaptability (particularly for the purpose of SCF) and its application to the states of Southeast Asia.⁴⁷ At the second meeting of the ARF on the 1st of August 1995, the ARF specifically referred to, and adopted, the notion of ‘comprehensive security’ and the Chair’s statement recognised that it included ‘not only military aspects but also political, economic, social and other issues’.⁴⁸ In view of these

⁴⁶ In an interview with Dr. K. S. Nathan, he states ‘I think this is very good, your discussion of hard security and soft security, and also the issue of terrorism, you have to now include the 11 September issue ... for the simple reason that it is real, that we cannot ignore it, it is real because the United States is a trend setter, it sets major trends in global politics like it did during the cold war’. Interview by Author with Dr. K.S. Nathan, *ISEAS* (Singapore), 6 December 2001.

⁴⁷ Interview by Author with Bantarto Bandoro, *CSIS* (Jakarta), 26 November 2001.

⁴⁸ “Concepts of Comprehensive and Cooperative Security,” *CSCAP Newsletter*, no.6 (1997): p.1, see also: Peter King, "Australia and Southeast Asia: 'Comprehensive Engagement' or

comments as well as other considerations – such as the impact upon security by forces such as globalisation – the Council on Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) formulated the following as an indigenous definition of comprehensive security in the Asia Pacific;⁴⁹ ‘Comprehensive security is the pursuit of sustainable security in all fields (personal, political, economic, social, cultural, military, environmental) in both the domestic and external spheres, essentially through cooperative means’.⁵⁰ Personal security is taken to mean freedom from oppression, exploitation, poverty and adequate medical attention; social security exists with the absence of drug trading, people smuggling, and general transnational crime; and cultural security is the community’s ability to refract external dilution of customs and practices. Reference to domestic security in this study is taken to mean the sum of all the factors that stem from the categories of both ‘personal’ and ‘social’ security. In this study, domestic security deliberately excludes cultural security as it is contended that, aside from raising an entirely separate debate (beyond the scope of this investigation), globalist forces are making it an increasingly difficult, if not impossible, ‘ideal’ to sustain.

Marriage of Convenience?," in *Peace Building in the Asia Pacific Region: Perspectives from Japan and Australia*, ed. Peter and Kibata King, Yoichi (St Leonards: Allen and Unwin, 1996), p.29.

⁴⁹ “Concepts of Comprehensive and Cooperative Security,” CSCAP Newsletter, no.6 (1997): p.1.

⁵⁰ Ibid, p.2.

(b) Power

Related to, or perhaps a subcategory of, the concept of security is that of *power*. It is argued that this is an example of an area where the realist paradigm continues to maintain its primacy. Some theoretical comment is necessary in this area as it has been generally accepted by political scientists that any theory or prediction as to the cause of conflict or peace, must pay due consideration to three levels of explanation: the individual, the state and the international system.⁵¹ As the aim of this dissertation does not require a detailed investigation of the theories in this realm, it is sufficient to say that the quest for power (or the fear of it) is not only central to the three levels but is also a key element in the cause of war and conflict. The power of a system of states, a state, a regime or a transnational community (such as a terrorist organisation) is defined by the total combination of military and economic capacity, as each of these can be equally destructive when used for personal gain.⁵² Background knowledge of the role of 'power' in international affairs is also necessary because of a fundamental assumption within the realist paradigm that states are rational actors (further qualified below). History provides ample support to this contention.⁵³ It is also important to note that

⁵¹ Nazli Choucri and Robert C. North, "Roots of War: The Master Variables," in *The Quest for Peace*, ed. Raimo Vayrynen (London: Sage Publications, 1987), p.204.

⁵² P.A. Reynolds, *An Introduction to International Relations* (London: 1980) p.117.

⁵³ Hans Morgenthau, *War* (Oxford: 1994) p.160. Some historical examples that have supported this contention have been provided by Michael Howard. He refers to the circumstances of the war between and Sparta and Athens as well as the Second World War. In 431 BC Sparta attacked Athens. The Athenians had spent many years continuously building their empire and had started to encroach upon Sparta's allies. Thucydides wrote that 'what made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian Power and the fear this caused

the actions of state-elites are constrained by the political processes of the state or organisation to which they are subject. At this level, any decision that could lead to conflict or war is made by a careful analysis of costs and benefits – that is, war will occur when it is believed to serve a state’s material interest, or alternatively, ‘national interest’.⁵⁴ This argument therefore mirrors the realist contention of if not rational, then at least predictable, decisions at the leadership level. Two exceptions to this maxim are, firstly, when decisions are made under severe stress or duress; and secondly, when the decision making process is influenced by extremist ideology such as in the case of transnational terrorist communities.⁵⁵ The inclusion of this framework is a further attempt to bridge the realist/constructivist divide.

(c) Dependable Expectations of Peaceful Change

Adler and Barnett break down this key concept to its two companion elements, that is, ‘dependable expectations’ and ‘peaceful change’.⁵⁶ The authors contend that ‘dependable expectations’ is best considered by reference to the various theories of social interaction. Dependable

in Sparta’. Likewise, in 1914 many of the German people, and in 1939 nearly all of the British, felt justified in going to war not over any specific issue of conflict, but simply to maintain the balance of power and the status quo, Michael Howard, *The Causes of War and Other Essays* (Sussex: Temple Smith, 1983) p.16.

⁵⁴ Brian R. Ferguson, "Anthropology of War: Theory, Politics and Ethics," (Sussex: 1987), p.151-2.

⁵⁵ However, the realist school of thought might argue that even in the case of extremist terrorist organisation’s there remains a degree of rationality so long as the analysis considers the concept of power and there idea of gain, that is, gain at any cost including the lives of its own members of the decision maker him or herself.

⁵⁶ Adler and Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities," p.34.

expectations can exist where the actors have *shared identities* (discussed below) where identities are shaped by their environment. This belief, as opposed to the realist explanation for the absence of war, is very much a part of the constructivist paradigm and the contentions of Deutsch. While accepting the contentions of Adler and Barnett on this point, this dissertation further advocates the continued inclusion of the realist formulation and the aforementioned comments on the 'role' of power in contemporary *international* and *regional* politics. The reasons for this are that if a political scientist commences an analysis of a community of states under the realist paradigm, an objective overview and general prognosis of the subject may be obtained. The analysis can then move into a deeper examination of the degree of collective identity that exists within the community of states and the various socially constructed norms that act to inhibit conflictual relations. In fact, both the realist and constructivist models have a degree of overlap and it is contended that they can fit and work together to assist in the understanding of state and community actions. The realist paradigm is the stepping stone and the constructivist paradigm is the polishing cloth, to the theorist's analysis.

The second of the companion elements to the concept is 'peaceful change'. Adler and Barnett argue that peaceful change can be best defined as 'neither the expectation of nor the preparation for organized violence as a means to settle interstate disputes'.⁵⁷ In order to satisfy this criterion, it is assumed that

⁵⁷ Ibid.

states do not prepare for or even *consider* security actions that would or could be interpreted by others as representing a threat to another state or community's hard-security. Thus, if a security community was to exist in the absence of 'well-developed strategic ties or formal alliance' then there would at least be 'tacit and/or formal normative prohibitions against states settling their disputes through military means'.⁵⁸ The degree to which either strategic ties and formal alliances, or normative prohibitions against conflict exist, is directly proportional to the degree of integration that subsists between and throughout the states of a community.

The existence of confidence and security building measures (CSBMs), preventative diplomacy and dispute resolution procedures, assist in a finding of peaceful change. CSBMs are defined as actions which fall into one of four categories: the exchange of information and/or increasing communication between the parties; the exchange of observers and/or the implementation of inspections; an established set of rules for specific types of military operations; and the application of restraints on the operation and readiness of military forces.⁵⁹ Preventative diplomacy is defined as 'action taken in vulnerable places and time to avoid the threat or use of armed force and related forms of coercion by states or groups to settle the political disputes that can arise from the destabilizing effects of economic, social, political and

⁵⁸ Ibid., p.35.

⁵⁹ Marie-Francis Desjardins, "Rethinking Confidence-Building Measures," *ADELPHI*, no. 307 (1996): p.5.

international change'.⁶⁰ In the context of this dissertation, prevention requires that the deepest roots of a conflict be addressed by the countries within Southeast Asia.⁶¹ Preventative diplomacy focuses predominately on the period 'in which violence is imminent or early but still short of mass deadly conflict'.⁶² Conflict management or conflict resolution is concerned with limiting the spread of disputes in the event that they have escalated and preventative diplomacy has failed.⁶³

It has been argued that CSBMs result in an increased transparency to government actions which facilitates greater trust, we-ness and a reduction in the likelihood of armed conflict.⁶⁴ CSBMs reduce the likelihood of tensions emerging in the first place. However, it is contended that preventative diplomacy and dispute resolution procedures will only come into play once a sufficient level of trust between a given set of states has been established. They are a consequence of a degree of 'we-ness', empathy and collective identity formation. Thus, when there exists sufficient institutionalisation and adequate levels of CSBMs, preventative diplomacy and disputes resolution procedures there will then exist, *ipso facto*, reasonably dependable expectations

⁶⁰ Jentleson, 'Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized', p.10

⁶¹ However, this does not require that all the countries must actively seek to engage in preventative diplomacy, but rather, that an appropriate body of states or organisation (such as ASEAN) has a legitimate means of exercising some type of action that would constitute a practice of preventative diplomacy.

⁶² Jentleson, 'Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized', p.10

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Desjardins, "Rethinking Confidence-Building Measures," p.18.

of peaceful change and the requisite level of collective identity formation to constitute at the very least, a nascent security community. This link between collective identity formation and dependable expectations of peaceful change is further evidence of how it is impossible to completely dissect the two issues in any security community study. The only distinction that can be made is the degree of emphasis placed on the two concepts in each chapter. On this basis, CSBMs, preventative diplomacy and conflict resolution procedures will be considered throughout the body of the dissertation and will be evaluated in their entirety within Chapter VIII.

(d) Integration

In the current context, the study of integration is concerned with 'how and why states voluntarily mingle, merge, and mix with their neighbours so as to lose several factual attributes of sovereignty'.⁶⁵ In its classical form, integration is one of the key factors in providing a security community's 'dependable expectations of peaceful change'. Deutsch states that integration begins at virtually any moment that both sides cease to fear or prepare for war.⁶⁶ Barnett and Adler would add to this the requirement that these habits of peaceful exchange be entrenched to an extent that would exclude the declaration of a security community between states that form an overnight

⁶⁵ Kacowicz, *Regionalization, Globalization, and Nationalism: Convergent, Divergent or Overlapping?* (cited).

⁶⁶ Adler and Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities," p.35.

alliance, only to renege the next day.⁶⁷ While integration is a question of fact, rather than time, it is contended that by necessity, there should be a degree of consistency and evolution towards a situation of anticipated and actual peace between nations. What has just been described is a 'process' but integration also represents an 'end state' or the end of a means. That is, it is on the integration of states and communities that a community of states will be formed.⁶⁸ Following this, the degree of integration that exists determines whether a community should be classified as anywhere between an embryonic security community and a tightly coupled security community (the meaning of these terms are discussed below).

(e) 'Community' and (f) 'Society'

To date, the concept of *community* within SCFs has not been considered in relationship to the concepts within other related frameworks and has been lacking in structural hierarchy.⁶⁹ In part, this has been because many scholars, particularly from the realist school of thought, have criticised the term *community* as lacking any practical resemblance to the international system of states. However, from the onset of his work, Deutsch envisioned that the development of a *stable peace* was inseparable from the existence of a

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Evans and Newnham, eds., *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations* p.253.

⁶⁹ For example, cooperative security, the relevance of nation-building to collective identity formation and security sector reform theory.

transnational community.⁷⁰ Time has given weight to Deutsch's vision and in this new *transnationalist relations* phase of global politics, theorists have been presented with a unique opportunity to reconsider past beliefs and theories. Consequently, sociologists have returned to the concept in recent years and attempted to examine the conditions under which groups of 'actors form relations that can be theoretically and empirically catalogued as communities'.⁷¹ In this realm, the dissertation will attempt to overcome some of the analytical problems of the term *community* while highlighting in practical terms, the increasing relevance and significance of its study in the development of a security community.

A review of the scholarly literature reveals three key components to the existence of a community.⁷² According to Karklins, the first and perhaps most important component is the existence of a *collective identity* (see Figure 2.1). Consistent with the aforementioned philosophy behind constructivism, a central element of a *collective identity* is the belief that an *identity* can be socially constructed. Identity is defined as a sense of belonging to some type of citizenship or population and this sense of 'belonging' may exist at any level

⁷⁰ Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organisation in the Light of Historical Experience* p.5.

⁷¹ Acharya, "Collective Identity and Conflict Management in Southeast Asia," p.31, Adler and Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities.", Vello Pettai, "Competing Conceptions of Multiethnic Democracy: Debating Minority Integration in Estonia" (paper presented at the European Consortium for Political Research, Joint Sessions workshop on "Competing Conceptions of Democracy in the Practice of Politics", Copenhagen, Denmark, 19 April 2000), Vayrynen, *Stable Peace through Security Communities? Steps Towards Theory-Building* (cited).

⁷² Adler and Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities," p.31.

including the local, domestic, state, regional and global.⁷³ Additionally, the emergence of a 'collective identity' is assisted by a pluralist formation of shared values and meanings. These common identities, meanings and values are the key to both a transnational and intersubjective understanding. A transnational understanding provides a common language to communicate a social reality and a 'common understanding of certain norms' where as common meanings create a 'common reference world' where there exist common actions, celebrations, and feelings.⁷⁴ This sense of 'belonging' is analogous to what Adler and Barnett refer to as a 'shared identity'.⁷⁵ However, in order to avoid confusion, the remainder of the dissertation will utilise and refer only to Karklins' concept of a 'collective identity'.

As per Figure 2.1, the second factor in the construction of a community is the requirement that the *interaction* occurring within a community is direct and numerous in its types of setting. Labelling it the *transactionalist approach*, Deutsch utilised a wide range of indicators in the measurement of integration. These include 'international trade, mail flows, student exchanges and travel'.⁷⁶ In contrast to the definition provided by Adler, it is argued that such contact and transactions between communities need not be proximate. This is

⁷³ Prof. Dr. Rasma Karklins, "The Concept of Collective Identity" (paper presented at the Directorate of Communication and Research, Strasbourg, 17-18 April 2001), p.1.

⁷⁴ Adler and Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities," p.31.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order* p.32.

because of a continuing increase in the processes of globalisation and the partial elimination of time and space. As a result, there has been a growing recognition of the fact that a community can exist over increasing distances to the extent where there might eventually exist one *single* global community.⁷⁷ For the time being, however, it is possible to imagine a kind of Wallerstein-type core and periphery in the existence of community at the global and regional levels.⁷⁸ This would occur where the core, represented by the industrialised world, has access to the type of community building technologies such as internet and email that would enable it to form a common identity leading to the creation of a community. By contrast, the periphery, represented by the still underdeveloped world, embodies a fragmented community where globalisation has merely increased the divide between societies. Finally, as in Figure 2.1, the third requirement to the existence of a community is that there exists a practice of *reciprocity*, which indicates a 'sense of long-term interest' – that is, knowledge of, and between, the groups within the community. Additionally, there would potentially exist a sense of obligation towards, and a responsibility for, the members of the community.⁷⁹

⁷⁷ Ira J. Cohen, "Structuralisation Theory and Social Praxis," in *Social Theory Today*, ed. Anthony Giddens and Jonathan H. Turner (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987), p.298.

⁷⁸ For a concise summary in relation to his work, see: Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century* (New York: Academic Press, 1974).

⁷⁹ Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order* p.32.

By comparison, it is important to note that the existence of a community in general does not of necessity dictate dependable expectations of peaceful change. That is, while there might be norms to regulate a community's security and to foster order, there is no guarantee of a mechanism for non-violent dispute resolution. Adler and Barnett in fact recognised that some communities could be categorised as 'war communities'.⁸⁰ It is dependable expectations of peaceful change that distinguish security communities from other communities.⁸¹ Additionally, in partial answer to the critique at the beginning of this section, an exclusive use of the term 'community' will be incorporated into the dissertation. The reference to community will continue to apply in the Deutschian sense but may only apply to particular segments of the society within the states referred to. Therefore, as argued by Amitav Acharya, the existence of a community may exist only at the state elite level while failing to embrace the rest of society.⁸² *Society* itself is defined as the entire portion of a populace that exists within the territorial boundaries of a state.⁸³ By contrast to community, in this dissertation the term 'society' possesses an inclusive rather than exclusive connotation.

⁸⁰ Adler and Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities," p.34.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Acharya, "Collective Identity and Conflict Management in Southeast Asia," pp.207-14.

⁸³ McLean, *Concise Dictionary of Politics* p.461.

Security Community Structure

Figure 2.2 attempts to depict the constituent elements of a security community, drawing in part on the insights of Adler and Barnett. However, Adler and Barnett's description of the terms in Figure 2.2 is more likely to misguide rather than enlighten the reader on the structure behind a security community. For example, the authors' discuss two ideal types of security community, loosely and tightly coupled.⁸⁴ They then move on to what could appear to be three further levels of integration within a security community, being nascent, ascendant and mature. The authors again discuss the various factors that establish either a loosely coupled or tightly coupled security community.⁸⁵ However, this two-fold discussion leaves the reader wondering whether a tightly coupled security community is necessary to the emergence of a mature security community or whether a mature security community is necessary before a loosely coupled⁸⁶ security community can arise? Additionally, what can only be described as a subjective framework of analysis is defined by at least five subcategories. The need to simplify this criterion, as has been a stated goal of this dissertation, has been admirably attempted by Amitav Acharya in the recent publication, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*. Acharya condenses


⁸⁴ Adler and Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities," p.30.

⁸⁵ Ibid., pp.56-57.

⁸⁶ Let alone tightly coupled.

Adler's twenty-eight pages into less than one.⁸⁷ While Acharya's summation may have swung the pendulum to the opposite extreme by oversimplifying the framework, Acharya does succeed in addressing some of the ambiguity left over from Adler and Barnett's work.

Figure 2.2: Security Community Structuralisation



Source: Compiled by author

Following Acharya, and (in part), to alleviate the ambiguities in the work of Adler and Barnett, it can be contended that Figure 2.2 illustrates the integrational hierarchy that exists within a SCF, starting with a 'nascent security community' and concluding with a 'tightly coupled mature security

⁸⁷ Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order* pp.34-35.

community'. A nascent security community emerges with the existence of triggering mechanisms such as mutual threat perceptions, joint trade benefits, collective identities and the duplication of other organizational structures such as the European Union.⁸⁸ As reflected by the title of this dissertation, there is some academic consensus that Southeast Asia *now* constitutes a nascent security community.⁸⁹ Within the ascendant phase, one can begin to witness greater levels of interstate integration with the military (such as joint exercises, training and cooperation), a heightened sense of security between states, and the beginnings of cognitive transition towards inter-subjective processes and collective identities encouraging 'dependable expectations of peaceful change'. In the mature phase, there is a greater degree of institutionalism, supranationalism and multilateralism with a substantive degree of trust (such as unfortified borders) and virtually no possibility of a military conflict.⁹⁰

To continue up the hierarchy, a mature security community may be either loosely or tightly coupled. A tightly coupled security community includes all the factors that constitute a loosely coupled, that is, a mature security community. Additionally, it requires the existence of substantial cooperative and collective security, a high level of integration between the military, joint

⁸⁸ Ibid, Adler and Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities," pp.52-53.

⁸⁹ Some examples include the comments of: Acharya, "Collective Identity and Conflict Management in Southeast Asia.", Adler and Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities.", Khong, "ASEAN and the Southeast Asian Security Complex," p.339, Vayrynen, *Stable Peace through Security Communities? Steps Towards Theory-Building* (cited).

⁹⁰ Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order* p.35.

policy coordination against internal threats, unrestricted movement of societies between states, the internalisation of authority and a multiperspectival policy where rule is shared at the national, transnational and supranational levels. In the event that a security community disintegrates then the community may either form what is defined as a regional security complex (or some other regional framework) or be absorbed into a larger regional security complex (discussed below).

Towards a Defensible Concept

As illustrated by Figure 2.3, this dissertation develops the framework by introducing the notion of an *embryonic security community* (as alluded to by Jones and Smith).⁹¹ During the embryonic phase of a security community's evolution, there is little certainty as to whether the relations between states will undertake a future and sustainable course towards 'dependable expectations of peaceful change'. Many of the factors pertaining to the existence of a nascent security community are also existent at the embryonic phase but are either insufficiently bedded, or insufficient in number, to evidence that a community of states has irreversibly accepted a continual process of integration and interaction. In other words, expectations of peaceful change are nothing more than transient in nature. By contrast, a *nascent security community* evolves where there exists adequate empirical evidence to illustrate a future *and sustainable* course towards 'dependable expectations of

⁹¹ David M. Jones and Michael Smith, "The Changing Security Agenda in Southeast Asia: Globalization, New Terror, and the Delusions of Regionalism," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 24 (2001): p.273.


peaceful change'. An ascendant security community will advance where there are *reasonably* dependable expectations of peaceful change and such a condition may be indicated by the existence of a long-term peace – in addition to the factors discussed in the section, 'Security Community Structure' above.

A mature security community only exists where there are *absolutely* no foreseeable prospects of conflict as well as *absolute* expectations of peaceful change. A higher level of integration would further distinguish between a mature security community and a tightly coupled security community. An example of the type of infrastructure required to satisfy this test would be the European Union. The use of the term 'loosely coupled security community' is irrelevant as it merely reflects the criteria of a mature security community within the framework of this dissertation. The elimination of this term further simplifies and clarifies the framework. The definition of a tightly coupled security community is applied in the same manner as by Adler and Barnett, where 'there is a 'mutual aid society' providing for collective and cooperative efforts to help each other and offer joint solutions to common problems'.⁹² This addition to the previous framework provides a clear demarcation of relevant empirical factors that satisfy the criteria for each level of a SCF. The requirement of 'absolutism' in the definitional analysis reduces the ambiguity

⁹² Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order* p.35.

of the framework – a framework that could otherwise be extremely subjective in nature.

Figure 2.3: Amended Security Community Structuralisation



Source: Compiled by author

To date, some academics have contended that a ‘Security Community Framework’ is interested in the prevention of war rather than the development of security cooperation between states.⁹³ Against this contention, the criteria provided by Deutsch as well as Adler and Barnett, dictate the need for security cooperation as one of the requirements of the ‘community building’ process. An example of a community evolving to such a

⁹³ Amitav Acharya, *Re: Research Trip to Singapore - an Investigation of Security Community Framework in Southeast Asia* [E-mail] (2001 [cited 21 September 2001]). In this correspondence Amitav Acharya states that he is not sure whether the ‘...security approach will hold for piracy. Its more about avoiding war than developing specific forms of security cooperation...’

super-integrational level would be the existence of a joint state naval operation to remove piracy from the Malacca Straits. Other examples would include regional cooperation to inhibit the production and movement of illicit drugs, both in the intraregional and interregional sense. These concepts will be further developed and applied in Chapter VI.

Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective

The concept of a security community has become fashionable not just because of the end of the Cold War but also because of developments in political science, which are now exploring the role of 'identities, norms and the social basis of global politics'.⁹⁴ Additionally, new theoretical developments have enabled scholars to overcome what Adler and Barnett considered to be 'methodological difficulties' in Deutsch's framework.⁹⁵ The political science and international relations theories that explain the absence of war can be conceptualised along a spectrum of whether or not they see 'structure' as comprised of *material forces* or *material* and *social normative* forces. At one extreme sits the theory of realism, which is completely material in its analysis as well as asocial. At the opposite end of the spectrum sits constructivism, which views the international environment as a social construction that comprises 'collective understandings' including norms that emerge from social interaction. Norms are defined as the 'standard of

⁹⁴ Adler and Barnett, "Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective," 4-5.

⁹⁵ Ibid., p.10.

appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity'.⁹⁶ Within this paradigm, society is both normative and material (contains both rules and resources) and where there is the possibility for the evolution of both shared identities and norms that can create a stable peace. The various theories of neo-liberal institutionalism, society of states and the Kantian perspective, sit amidst these two ends of the spectrum.⁹⁷

According to the scholarly literature, a SCF exists as one of at least five separate *multilateral security frameworks* alternatively known as *community based cooperative orders*.⁹⁸ Figure 2.4 illustrates the spectrum of orders that exist within this multilateralist framework. An international system/society was referred to in Chapter I and while it mirrors the 'community' component of the SCF, it attempts to apply the theory at a global level and in the absence of any in-depth consideration of the conceptual components to 'security' (defined in Chapter II). By contrast, the most basic of these orders is the *concert system*. This is created where there is a consensus amongst the greater powers of the globe that they will collectively manage regional security relations. The scope of this notion is limited and certainly of little help when examining individual

⁹⁶ Markus Hund, *The Development of ASEAN Norms between 1997 and 2000: A Paradigm Shift?* [Internet - Occasional Paper] (Center for East Asian and Strategic Studies, 2001 [cited 20 July 2002]); available from www.zops.uni-trier.de/op/OccasionalPapersNr15.pdf.

⁹⁷ Adler and Barnett, "Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective," pp.9-13.

⁹⁸ Buzan, "Book Review: Adler and Barnett, 'Security Communities'," John G. Ikenberry and Jitsuo Tsyuchiyama, *Between Balance of Power and Community: The Future of Multilateral Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific* [Conference] (The Center for International Political Economy and The James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, 2000 [cited September 10 2001]); available from <<http://www.rice.edu/projects/baker/Pubs/studies/jescgem/fmscap4/fmscap.html>>.

states or regions. Secondly, there is the notion of a *common security association*, which is an aligned grouping of states that are associated with a particular ideology such as communism – an example of this was the former Soviet Union. A third alternative is the classic *collective security system*, which stems from the ideology of Woodrow Wilson and the League of Nations.⁹⁹ It would seem that like the *SCF* and *international system* framework, the concept of collective security is strongly related to the formation of a collective identity. However, unlike a *collective security system*, the criteria utilised for the establishment of a security community go far beyond a mere reliance on collective identity at the elite level to include earlier factors such as community, pluralism and integration. Adler and Barnett aptly state the conceptual superiority of a SCF in the following terms, '[t]he concept of a security community posits the possible relationship between the growth of a community and pacific relations, and offers a more exacting and demanding explanation of a stable peace, but also more fully opens up the sociological bottle'.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁹ Ikenberry and Tsuychiyama, *Between Balance of Power and Community: The Future of Multilateral Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific* (cited).

¹⁰⁰ Adler and Barnett, "Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective," p.13.

Figure 2.4: Competing Multilateral Security Frameworks

