Deegan, Craig (1997) Efficient management remuneration plan design: a consideration of specific human capital investments. Accounting and Finance, 37 (1). pp. 1-40. ISSN 0810-5391
Abstract
This paper investigates the contractual relationship between the manager and the firm. The results indicate that cross-sectional variation in the components of management remuneration plans can be explained by variations in the specificity of both the manager's human capital investments and the firm's resources. Where the returns on the firm's resources are relatively more dependent upon (specific to) a particular manager, that manager is more likely to be able to negotiate his/her remuneration. The manager is also more likely to be paid on a long run contingent basis and to be offered deferred forfeitable remuneration. The results also indicate that the greater the firm-specificity of a manager's human capital investments the greater the likelihood that the manager is offered termination compensation as part of the remuneration package.
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