Rashid, Afzalur (2012) CEO duality and agency cost: evidence from Bangladesh. Journal of Management and Governance . pp. 1-20. ISSN 1385-3457 (In Press)
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Official URL: http://www.springerlink.com/content/68824103v1017130/
Identification Number or DOI: doi: 10.1007/s10997-012-9213-x
This study examines if Chief Executive Officer (CEO) duality reduces the firms' agency cost in Bangladesh. The agency costs are measured as two efficiency ratios: expense ratio and asset utilization ratio. The finding is that, there is no significant relationship between CEO duality and agency costs. These findings imply that, duality may have given the CEOs enormous powers; it may have reduced the check and balance or board's ability to exercise the governance (monitoring) function, which is not helpful to enhance firm efficiency. This study contributes to the global debate on CEO duality and provides a new avenue of knowledge on CEO duality and firm efficiency in the context of an emerging economy.
|Item Type:||Article (Commonwealth Reporting Category C)|
|Additional Information:||Published online 29 Feb 2012. Permanent restricted access to ArticleFirst version.|
|Uncontrolled Keywords:||agency theory; Bangladesh; board; CEO; power; stewardship theory|
|Fields of Research (FOR2008):||22 Philosophy and Religious Studies > 2201 Applied Ethics > 220102 Business Ethics|
15 Commerce, Management, Tourism and Services > 1503 Business and Management > 150303 Corporate Governance and Stakeholder Engagement
15 Commerce, Management, Tourism and Services > 1501 Accounting, Auditing and Accountability > 150102 Auditing and Accountability
|Socio-Economic Objective (SEO2008):||E Expanding Knowledge > 97 Expanding Knowledge > 970115 Expanding Knowledge in Commerce, Management, Tourism and Services|
|Deposited On:||14 Sep 2012 18:07|
|Last Modified:||13 Mar 2013 16:28|
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